Medrano v. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. of Cal.

• Decision Date: 19 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. C-00-20826 JF.,C-00-20826 JF.
• Parties: Paul MEDRANO, Teresa J. Lara, Faustino Garcia and Alejandro Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. D'ARRIGO BROTHERS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

125 F.Supp.2d 1163

Paul MEDRANO, Teresa J. Lara, Faustino Garcia and Alejandro Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. D'ARRIGO BROTHERS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.

No. C-00-20826 JF.

United States District Court, N.D. California. San Jose Division.

December 19, 2000.

Annabelle Cortez-Gonzalves, Marcos Camacho, A Law Group, Salinas, Paul Strauss, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Geoffrey F. Gega, Kevin M. Erwin, Cook, Brown & Prager, LLP, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

[Docket No. 12]

FOGEL, District Judge.

Defendant D'Arrigo Brothers Company of California ("D'Arrigo") moves for dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Alternatively, D'Arrigo asks the Court to apply a two year limitations period to Plaintiffs' first four causes of action. The Court has read the moving and responding papers and has considered the oral arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This case was filed as a class action by current and former employees of D'Arrigo. Plaintiffs are agricultural workers, and D'Arrigo is an agricultural employer engaged in the business of planting, harvesting, grading, packaging, packing, and processing vegetables. Plaintiffs allege that from 1996 to the present, D'Arrigo has not accurately recorded or compensated them for all hours worked. These allegations stem from D'Arrigo's policy and practice of mandating that its employees perform certain "work activities" without compensation. In particular, Plaintiffs are required to report to a designated departure point ("Spreckles Parking Lot") where they must board buses operated and owned by D'Arrigo. The buses then transport the workers to work sites located in various parts of Monterey County. Plaintiffs are not allowed to drive directly to a work site even if it is closer to their home than the Spreckles Parking Lot. At the end of the workday, Plaintiffs are not permitted to leave the work site immediately, but instead must wait for the foreman (who often doubles as the bus driver) to finish his or her administrative tasks before the bus can transport them back to the Spreckles Parking Lot.

Plaintiffs claim that D'Arrigo should have compensated them for this "compulsory travel time," including the time spent riding the bus to the fields, waiting for the bus at the end of the day, and riding the bus back to the departure point. Plaintiffs also claim that D'Arrigo required them to perform "warm-up" exercises and did not record or pay them for this "compulsory exercise time." Plaintiffs contend that the legal effect of D'Arrigos' failure to compensate them for these activities is that they have not been paid wages due to them by law. Plaintiffs now assert a federal claim for violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA" or the "Act") (first cause of action);¹ as well as supplemental state law claims for violation of California Labor Code §§ 218, 201, 202, 203, 205.5 (second² and third causes of action), breach of contract (fourth cause of action); and violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (fifth cause of action).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, the issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss is not whether a plaintiff's claims have merit but whether the moving defendant has shown beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Court's review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents referenced by the complaint and matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir.1991); In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation, 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986). Ordinarily, a complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for only two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Moore's Fed. Practice ¶ 12.08 at 2271 (2d ed.1982)). When a court considers a motion to dismiss, all allegations of the complaint are construed in the plaintiff's favor. Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir.1987). For a motion to dismiss to be granted, it must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proved. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir.1987).

III. DISCUSSION

D'Arrigo contends that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because Plaintiffs fail to assert a cognizable AWPA claim and thus have not raised a federal question. D'Arrigo also argues that even if the Court does not dismiss the AWPA claim it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims. Finally, D'Arrigo asserts that the applicable limitations period for the first four claims is two years and that Plaintiffs therefore are precluded from obtaining relief based upon violations which occurred before August 4, 1998. The Court considers each of these issues in turn.

A. AWPA CLAIM

The AWPA is the successor statute to the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2053("FLCRA"), which was "the first major federal effort to improve the lot of agricultural laborers who have long been among the most exploited groups in the American labor force." Barajas v. Bermudez, 43 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (enacted in 1983). Congress replaced the FLCRA with the AWPA in order to redress perceived shortcomings in the FLCRA. The Act provides a variety of protections for seasonal agricultural workers, including, inter alia, disclosure of employment terms when workers are recruited, payment of wages to workers when due, required compliance with the parties' work agreements, and guarantees of adequate housing and safe transportation. 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. It creates a private right of action, 29 U.S.C. § 1854, and authorizes awards of statutory damages of up to $500 per plaintiff per violation, or where the complaint is certified as a class action, the lesser of $500 per plaintiff per violation or $500,000. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c).³

The statutory provision at issue here 29 U.S.C. § 1832(a) provides that:

Each farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, and agricultural association which employs any seasonal agricultural worker shall pay the wages owed to such worker when due.⁴

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend that D'Arrigo violated Section 1832(a) by failing to pay them for compulsory travel time, which is compensable pursuant to state law.⁵ See, Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 588-592, 22 Cal.4th 1152B, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Cal. IWC Order No. 14-80 (hereinafter "Wage Order No. 14-80"); California Labor Code §§ 218, 201, 202, 205.5. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that Section 1832(a) only applies to violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act ("FLSA") and other federal wage and hour laws and not to violations of state law.⁶ Accordingly, the threshold issue is whether Section 1832(a) incorporates state law, including substantive provisions of state wage and hour laws.

The AWPA does not define or otherwise explain which substantive rights define the "wages owed" under Section 1832(a). That is, the Act does not address whether an employer's violation of provisions of state law or the parties' agreement is equivalent to a failure to pay wages. There are no reported cases which have addressed this precise issue. This Court thus must decide as a matter of first impression whether D'Arrigo may be held liable under AWPA for violations of state wage and hour laws. "In construing a statute as a matter of first impression, we first must look to the statutory language: [t]he starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) (internal citation and quotation omitted). "It [also] is necessary to look to the purpose and intent of a statute when deciding what its terms mean." Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.1987). If the statutory language is unclear, then the Court must "attempt to determine Congressional intent from the legislative history." Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105.

The Court concludes that the intent of Congress is apparent from the language of the statute. The Act provides that an agricultural employer shall pay its employees "wages owed when due." An employer's obligation to pay wages may arise from various substantive sources of law. See, Donaldson v. United States Department of Labor, 930 F.2d 339, 350 n. 13 (4th Cir.1991) ("No principle of statutory construction prevents a private right of action conferred by one statutory regime from drawing substance from provisions of another regime which does not provide such a right of action.").

Defendant asks the Court to add limiting words to Section 1832(a), reading it to say that payment of wages is required only when wages are due according to federal wage and hour laws.⁷ However, the Act simply provides that wages must be paid when due, without limiting the source of the obligation. Section 1832(a) does not make specific reference to federal or state law, and the Act certainly does not indicate that an employer's obligation to pay may arise only from the AWPA itself. See, e.g., Donaldson, 930 F.2d at 349-350, n. 13 (AWPA violation properly alleged based on failure to pay wages due under Wagner-Peyser Act); Elizondo v. Podgorniak, 70 F.Supp.2d 758, 777 (E.D.Mich.1999) (...