Medrano v. State, 95-31
| Citation | 914 P.2d 804 |
| Decision Date | 26 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-31,95-31 |
| Parties | Darreal J. MEDRANO, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program; John McClanahan, Student Intern; Stephanie Sprecher, Student Intern; and Jay Bachlet, Student Intern (argued), for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; Larry M. Donovan, Senior Assistant Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi T. Sansonetti, Special Assistant Attorney General, Pro Hac Vice (argued), for Appellee.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.
Defendant Darreal Medrano appeals his conviction for possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1977) and W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xxi) (1977).
We affirm.
Defendant, though failing to include a separate statement of the issues in his appellate brief as required by W.R.A.P. 7.01(d), presents the following for our consideration:
Argument I
The court below erred in admitting into evidence items seized during Mr. Medrano's arrest because (1) the arrest was unlawful as the arresting officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion required to stop Mr. Medrano (2) officer McDonald's subsequent actions were not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place and (3) Mr. Medrano did not give voluntary consent to search his vehicle.
The trial court violated Mr. Medrano's right to legal counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when it admitted at trial incriminating statements deliberately elicited from Mr. Medrano by an undisclosed agent of the State of Wyoming and where such statements were the only direct evidence indicating Mr. Medrano's knowing possession of a controlled substance.
The trial court erred by allowing as substantive evidence against Mr. Medrano the unconstitutionally obtained hearsay statement of Ms. Clara Calderon, by failing to sua sponte give a limiting instruction, and by allowing the prosecutor to use substantively, inadmissible evidence under the guise of impeaching its own witness.
The trial court erred by allowing Officer Bruce Dexter to testify substantively regarding Ms. Calderon's hearsay statement and committed plain error by failing to sua sponte give a limiting instruction.
The State gives a more concise statement of the issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the contraband to be admitted into evidence.
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Clara Calderon to be admitted into evidence.
III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Officer Bruce Dexter to be admitted into evidence.
On May 19, 1994, Officer Carl McDonald of the Wyoming Highway Patrol heard a broadcast over his radio that a robbery had occurred in Fort Collins, Colorado at about 12:35 p.m. The robber was described as a white male in his thirties with brown hair, a partial beard, and wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt. The getaway vehicle was described as a white Mercury Topaz bearing license plates with a white background and dark blue or black lettering, possibly a Wyoming plate. A later broadcast stated that the car may have been a Honda Prelude.
Officer McDonald headed south on interstate highway I-25 towards the Colorado border in an effort to assist other officers who were keeping vigil in the event the suspect entered Wyoming. At about 2:00 p.m., Officer McDonald observed defendant's white two-door Chevrolet coupe with two occupants traveling north on I-25. The car had license plates with a white background and dark blue lettering from Nebraska. Following the vehicle, Officer McDonald concluded that the driver resembled the description of the robbery suspect, and the car was then pulled over.
Officer McDonald and another officer separately interviewed the defendant and his passenger. During the interview with Officer McDonald, defendant appeared nervous; he was perspiring and licking his lips, avoided eye contact with the patrolman and his hands trembled. Defendant stated that he had borrowed the car and that the car was owned by a man named Reyes. However, when the registration was produced, the owner was listed as Garsaro.
Comparing notes, the officers discovered that each had received very different versions regarding where the two men had met, where they were going and when they had left Denver. Returning to the men, the officers further inquired whether they possessed any large quantities of cash or had in their possession weapons or drugs. Defendant responded that he had $170, while the passenger had $800; both denied possessing weapons or drugs. Consent to search the vehicle was given, with defendant even offering to open the trunk. The search uncovered several bricks of marijuana in defendant's bag in the back seat and one brick in the passenger's bag, a total amount of approximately twelve pounds. Defendant and the passenger were then placed under arrest.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, and a hearing was held on August 25, 1994. After hearing testimony, the district court denied the motion finding reasonable suspicion for the stop of defendant's vehicle and allowed the marijuana into evidence.
At defendant's trial, in addition to the above, evidence was also introduced through the testimony of Clara Calderon, who had spoken to defendant while he was in jail awaiting trial, that defendant had admitted he knew the marijuana was in the car and that it was indeed his. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial, and now appeals that conviction.
Defendant contends that the marijuana should have been suppressed for several reasons: (1) Officer McDonald lacked reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop; (2) once it became clear that defendant did not meet the description of the robbery suspect, the officer had no further reasonable suspicion to continue his investigatory stop; (3) the officer's actions went beyond the scope of the reason for original detention; and (4) defendant's consent to search the vehicle was not freely given.
Evidentiary rulings of the trial court are not generally disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 934 (Wyo.1995); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo.1994). An abuse of discretion is said to mean an error of law committed by the trial court under the circumstances. Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo.1980). In the context of suppression hearings we have said:
Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378 (Wyo.1989); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo.1988). See W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) (effective March 24, 1992) (formerly W.R.Cr.P. 16). Since the district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to: assess the credibility of the witnesses; the weight given the evidence; and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's determination. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.1990). See Rands v. State, 818 P.2d 44, 46 (Wyo.1991). The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. See Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683-85 (Wyo.1982); Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Wyo.1981); and United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir.1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093, 112 S.Ct. 1168, 117 L.Ed.2d 414 (1992).
In previous opinions, this court has noted that there are three categories or tiers of interaction between police and citizens. See Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220; Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo.1993). The category concerned in this case is the investigatory stop which represents a seizure and, consequently, invokes Fourth Amendment protections. Wilson, at 220. However, because the seizure is of a less intrusive nature than an arrest, it requires only "the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime." Id. A law enforcement officer must possess the reasonable suspicion before making the seizure. Wilson, at 225.
Defendant contends, based on differences between his appearance and the description of the robbery suspect, that Officer McDonald lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. He also argues that even if the stop was justified, once it was determined that he was not the robber, the investigation still continued. In addition, he claims that the investigation by the officers went beyond the scope of the initial detention by asking questions relating to weapons and drugs and then seeking to search his vehicle.
Officer McDonald, at the time of his contact with defendant's vehicle, was confronted with the following:
Robbery Suspect Defendant
A White male An Hispanic male
Partial beard Partial beard
Blue shirt White shirt
Driving white Mercury Topaz, later Driving white Chevrolet Cavalier
changed to possibly a Honda Prelude
License plates with white background, Nebraska plates with white
dark blue or black lettering, possibly background and dark blue
from Wyoming lettering
These factors together with the reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom are the "specific...
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