Medrano v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-1245C |
| Parties | LAURA MEDRANO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Don J Foty, Hodges & Foty, LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs. With him on briefs were David W. Hodges, Hodges & Foty LLP, Houston, TX, and Anthony J. Lazzaro, The Lazzaro Law Firm, LLC, Moreland Hills, OH.
David M. Kerr, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Defendant, United States. With him on briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., as well as John T LeMaster, Senior Counsel, Staff Training Academy, Glynco, GA.
Plaintiffs - current and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at various federal correctional facilities throughout the United States - seek overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and premium pay under the Federal Employees Pay Act ("FEPA"), plus related forms of relief, for allegedly compensable pre- and post-shift activities. Defendant's motion to dismiss is ripe for disposition.[1] particular, Plaintiffs' claims involving time spent in pre-shift security screenings and certain claims over which this Court lacks jurisdiction - the remainder sets out well-pleaded facts sufficient to state claims upon which relief can be granted. See RCFC 12(b)(6). The motion is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs request backpay and liquidated damages under FLSA, as well as interest on their backpay under the Back Pay Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 5596, premium pay under FEPA, 5 U.S.C. § 5545, [2] attorneys' fees, and declaratory relief. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108-15, 128-37, 149. The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts.
Plaintiffs are current or former correctional workers at federal prisons throughout the United States. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-24. Plaintiffs allege that their "primary job duty … was to manage and oversee the inmate population at the prison centers, to ensure safety at the prisons, and to maintain security at the prisons." Id. ¶ 39. To perform that duty, Plaintiffs allege that they "searched for contraband and provided security, count[ed], fe[d], and supervised detainees and inmates." Id.
Plaintiffs' workdays are organized into 8-hour shifts at assigned duty posts. Id. ¶ 34. "Most of the posts at the prison facilities are staffed for 16 or 24 hours per day, although some may be staffed for only 8 hours per day." Id. "There is no scheduled overlap" between 8-hour shifts. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that "because the scheduled shift is for 8 hours, Defendant only pays for 8 hours even if the correctional officer performs work lasting longer than 8 hours." Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs allege that various pre- and post-shift activities are unpaid. See id. ¶¶ 32, 38, 85.
The pre- and post-shift activities at issue include (1) pre-shift security screening, [3] (2) gathering and donning equipment, (3) walking to the assigned post and completing a pre-shift briefing with the outgoing officer(s), and (4) completing a post-shift briefing with the oncoming officer(s) and walking from the post to return equipment at the end of the day. I set out Plaintiffs' principal allegations concerning those activities in turn.
On arrival at their respective prisons, Plaintiffs must pass through a screening site in the prison's lobby and participate in a mandatory "security screening to ensure that they did not inadvertently bring contraband or anything harmful into the facility." Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs allege that undergoing the security screening was "necessary to the principal work" they performed, i.e., "to provide security in the prisons and to search for contraband." Id. ¶¶ 46, 48; see also id. ¶ 47 (). If security screenings were dispensed with, Plaintiffs allege, "officers could inadvertently or intentionally bring weapons or other contraband into the prison … resulting] in … a less secure prison and … impairing] the officers' ability to provide security, supervise the inmates/detainees, and search for contraband." Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiffs allege that it took them on average "10-20 minutes per day" to clear the security screening. Id. ¶ 44.
2. Waiting in Line, Gathering Equipment, and Donning Equipment
Once through security, Plaintiffs must "collect their duty belts and other required equipment to perform their work for Defendant, including radios, handcuffs, pepper sprays, and keys." Id. ¶ 52. The Plaintiffs "gather this equipment from the equipment booth located in the [C]ontrol [C]enter." Id. According to Plaintiffs, collecting and donning the equipment is essential to their work of ensuring "the overall safety of the prison[s]," id. at ¶ 56, because the equipment is necessary for them to do their jobs, id. ¶ 57. Plaintiffs allege that they can only gather and don their equipment after the security screening "because the Plaintiffs … cannot bring this equipment into the facility, cannot clear the metal detector while wearing the equipment, and th[e] equipment is in the possession of the Defendant to ensure that all needed equipment for the safety and security of the prisons is properly maintained." Id. at ¶ 52. Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he time it takes to wait in line, gather the equipment, and put on the equipment" is "approximately 10-15 minutes." Id. ¶ 53.
3. Walking to the Assigned Post and Completing a Pre-Shift Briefing
"After being assigned and donning their equipment," Plaintiffs may then walk to their posts. Id. ¶ 60. While on the way to their posts, "Plaintiffs … have to remain vigilant at all times, observe and correct inmate behavior, respond to any security breaches, and identify any safety issues." Id. And "[i]f an alarm sounds while … walking to their posts," Plaintiffs "have to immediately respond to the emergency." Id.
Once at their duty posts, Plaintiffs are "required by their supervisors to attend a pre-shift briefing with the correctional officers they [are] relieving." Id. ¶ 61. The outgoing officers tell the incoming officer about any significant "security incidents" or concerns from the prior shift and "current proceedings at the facility." Id. Plaintiffs allege that it took "approximately 10-15 minutes" to walk to their posts and complete the pre-shift briefing. Id. ¶ 62.
4. Post-Shift Activities
Plaintiffs lastly allege that they perform some of the same activities, also without compensation, when their shifts end. Plaintiffs allegedly must conduct a security briefing "with the incoming officer who [relieves] them," "walk from [their] post[s] back to the Control Center," and "return [their] equipment at the Control Center." Id. ¶¶ 85-86. While completing these activities, "Plaintiffs … were required to remain vigilant at all times, observe and correct inmate behavior, respond to any security breaches, and identify any safety issues." Id. ¶ 86. "If an alarm sounded … while walking to the Control Center," Plaintiffs "were required to immediately respond to the emergency." Id. Plaintiffs allege that these activities typically took "10-15 minutes." Id. ¶ 87.
The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to adjudicate "any claim against the United States founded … upon … any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department … in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Because the Tucker Act is "a jurisdictional statute [that] does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages," United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-07 (1967)), parties asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction must "identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States, separate from the Tucker Act itself." Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That requires a "money-mandating" source of law, i.e., a statute or regulation that "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained and is reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotes and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983), and United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)).
Plaintiffs' claims for uncompensated work time arise under FLSA, which is a money-mandating source of law. See Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[4] Because Plaintiffs are government employees seeking backpay and related relief under FLSA, they have standing to raise those claims. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 113, 149.
"[T]he special statute of limitations governing the Court of Federal Claims requires" that timeliness be considered a jurisdictional question, calling for "sua sponte consideration." John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008). FLSA claims must be brought within two years of alleged violations, or within three years if the violations were willful. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Plaintiffs appear to claim that the challenged pay practices were in...
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