Medvid v. State

Decision Date31 January 1977
Docket NumberNo. 3--775A137,3--775A137
Citation359 N.E.2d 274,172 Ind.App. 27
PartiesJohn MEDVID, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

James E. Foster, Hammond, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., K. Richard Payne, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GARRARD, Judge.

Appellant Medvid was charged with, and convicted by a jury of, the delivery of a controlled substance in violation of IC 1971, 35--24.1--4--1.

The evidence favoring the verdict discloses that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on May 6, 1974, Officer Leyva of the Hammond Police Department and an informant, Frank Breski, drove to Medvid's residence with intent to make a controlled purchase of narcotics. Breski was admitted to the house, remained inside for five to ten minutes, and returned without having purchased any drugs. After conversing with Breski, Leyva decided that Medvid was not going to sell any drugs. Leyva and Breski then drove to a telephone booth where Breski, at Leyva's direction, called Medvid. Breski told Medvid over the telephone that he had a 'sick' friend who needed drugs. 1 (Initially Leyva testified that he instructed Breski to make such representations, but he later changed this testimony.) At approximately midnight, Leyva and Greski returned to Medvid's home where they honked the horn of their automobile. Medvid came out, got into the car, and was introduced to Leyva. Under Medvid's directions, the three then drove to another house. Medvid took sixty dollars from Leyva, entered the house and returned after two or three minutes. He then handed Breski two packets which were later established to contain heroin. The 'street price' of the heroin delivered was sixty dollars. The three then returned to Medvid's house where Medvid shook Leyva's hand and received Leyva's thanks. At trial Medvid admitted the delivery but asserted the defense of entrapment. Breski did not appear as a witness for the state. His identify as the informer was disclosed to Medvid on the day the jury was impaneled.

Medvid initially asserted there was no probable cause to suspect he was engaged in selling drugs so as to justify the police in initiating the scheme. He requested that this be determined by the court out of the presence of the jury. This request was denied. When the state's evidence was adduced Medvid preserved error by timely objection. The evidence produced by the state to establish that the police had probable cause to suspect Medvid and that Medvid had a predisposition to commit the offense consisted of the testimony of Officer Leyva. He was permitted to testify to the following: (1) that when Breski returned to the automobile after his first visit to Medvid's home, Breski had said they were 'shooting up' in the house and had offered for him to participate; (2) that prior to the night in question, Breski had told Leyva that Medvid was involved in drug traffic without mentioning any specific instances; and that on one occasion Leyva had also heard from some unnamed person in the Hammond Police Department that Medvid was engaged in drug traffic.

It was prejudicial error to present this evidence to the jury over timely objection. We must therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

At the time Medvid was tried, when entrapment appeared as an issue in a criminal prosecution, two distinct obligations devolved upon the state. Payne v. State (1976), Ind.App., 343 N.E.2d 325, trf. den.

One concerned the substantive proof necessary for conviction. In Gray v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 629, 231 N.E.2d 793, our Supreme Court held that where the evidence established no more than a sale (or delivery) of contraband made in response to a solicitation by government agents as a part of a plan initiated by the government to reveal a violation of the criminal law, a reasonable doubt regarding entrapment existed as a matter of law. Thus, when entrapment is an issue the state must produce evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact may reasonably infer that the accused possessed the necessary subjective intent to sustain a conviction. Payne, supra. See, also, Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413. Such evidence is frequently referred to as predisposition evidence.

The second obligation under Indiana law derived from Walker v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641, and was concerned, in reality, with the quality of the government's conduct in implementing its scheme or plan. See, Payne, supra; Hauk v. State (1974), Ind.App., 312 N.E.2d 92. In Walker the Court held that where the state embarks upon a plan with a specific individual as its objective, and in pursuit of the plan government agents make a direct...

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  • Mason v. Hanks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 27 Agosto 1996
    ...(see, e.g., Head v. State (1982), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 44), we believe the testimony was prejudicially irrelevant. See Medvid v. State (1977), 172 Ind.App. 27, 359 N.E.2d 274. The State was able to place before the jury testimony that O'Grady was dealing, a fact not necessary to establish that ......
  • Dockery v. State
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    • 19 Dicembre 1994
    ...390 N.E.2d 1018, 1022; Koke v. State, (1986), Ind.App., 498 N.E.2d 1326, 1330 n. 3, reh'g denied, trans. denied; Medvid v. State (1977), 172 Ind.App. 27, 30, 359 N.E.2d 274, 276, reh'g denied, trans. denied. If the defendant shows police inducement and the State fails to show predisposition......
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    ...288, 270 P.2d 1079.2 We are required to look at the law at the time the decision on the motion to dismiss was rendered. Medvid v. State (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 274; Wallace v. Board of Commissioners of Shelby County (1910), 46 Ind.App. 695, 92 N.E. 660 (on petition for rehearing). Alth......
  • Townsend v. State
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    ...inducement. Gray v. State, supra, 231 N.E.2d 793; Davila v. State (3d Dist.1977) Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 283, 286; Medvid v. State (3d Dist.1977) Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 274, 275. The problem before the Court was whether the State had carried its burden of proof, not how that burden was first In ......
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