Medway v. Cate
| Decision Date | 17 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10–cv–0276 BEN (BLM). |
| Citation | 756 F.Supp.2d 1280 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | Samuel Lee MEDWAY, Petitioner,v.Matthew CATE, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Samuel Lee Medway, Imperial, CA, pro se.
Attorney General, Kevin R. Vienna, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner, an inmate at Centinela State Prison, filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). On September 16, 2010, Magistrate Judge Barbara Major submitted a Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court enter an order: (1) granting the Petition; (2) releasing the Petitioner immediately; and (3) directing that Petitioner's parole term be reduced and Petitioner receive term credit. Respondent filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docket Nos. 17, 19.) The merits of the Petition are now before this Court.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in part the Report and Recommendation and DENIES the Petition.
In 1977, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and other felonies and was sentenced to a prison term of seven years to life. This habeas petition does not challenge Petitioner's conviction, but rather challenges a decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) on November 24, 2008 that found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Tr. 1; Lodgment 7.) The 2008 hearing was Petitioner's fifteenth parole hearing and was conducted after the Governor of California reversed a prior grant of parole. Prior to filing the Petition, Petitioner sought habeas relief at all three state court levels, but without success. (Lodgment Nos. 2, 4, 6.) While Petitioner was pursuing his state collateral relief, the Board held another parole hearing. (Lodgment 8.) However, the Board again denied parole. Id.
The facts cited herein are largely undisputed and were obtained from the transcript of the 2008 parole hearing and the record in this case:
In May 1977, a 33–year old homeless man knocked on Petitioner's door and asked for a glass of water. Petitioner invited the man inside. Soon thereafter, Petitioner accused the man of pulling a knife on Petitioner's friend some months earlier. Over the next several hours, Petitioner and other individuals repeatedly beat and kicked the man, stripped him of his clothes, urinated into his open mouth, and forced him to drink urine from a bath. The participants also attempted to hang the man in the bathroom with a belt and smother him with a towel. On at least three separate occasions, the participants told the man they were going to kill him, pointed a gun at his face, and pulled the trigger. However, on each occasion, the gun was empty. These events occurred at various times throughout the evening, interspersed by breaks where the participants drank wine and beer and sniffed paint.
The participants then became concerned that the man would turn them into the police. At midnight, the participants carried the man to a vacant lot and placed him under a trailer, where they shot him first in the head, then in the neck, and then in the stomach. The participants returned to the apartment, disposed of the man's belongings, and cleaned up the blood. An autopsy showed that the victim had been severely beaten prior to his death and that his death was due to a bullet wound behind his left ear. Among other injuries, the victim had six fractured ribs on the left and two on the right, a fractured skull, two broken cheekbones, and a broken nose and jaw. There were also abrasions and lacerations.
On December 1, 1977, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and other felonies. He was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of seven years to life. At the time of the offense, Petitioner was twenty-three years old. (Lodgment 9.)
Petitioner's prior criminal history includes convictions in March 1974, July 1974, August 1975 and July 1976. (Pet., Ex. G; Lodgment 5, p. 5–6; Lodgment 7, p. 34–36.) In March 1974, Petitioner was convicted of being a minor in possession of alcohol. In July 1974, Petitioner was convicted of prowling. In August 1975, Petitioner was convicted of being under the influence of narcotics and resisting arrest. And, in July 1976, Petitioner was convicted of entering without consent. Each of these offenses resulted in a misdemeanor conviction and a prison sentence or probation. Id. Petitioner emphasizes that these convictions were for non-violent offenses. (Lodgment 5, p. 5–6.) The record shows Petitioner has also been arrested for several other offenses, including burglary, robbery, and theft. (Lodgment 7, p. 34–36, 111–12.)
During the first thirteen years of Petitioner's prison term, Petitioner received three serious rule violations and several misconduct reports. (Lodgment 7, p. 49.) Since then, however, Petitioner's conduct has been “consist [sic] in positive institutional behavior.” Id. Among other things, while incarcerated, Petitioner earned trade certifications for janitorial services, dry-cleaning, and mill and cabinetry work. (Lodgment 7, p. 50.) He also participated in self-help and therapy programs, including Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous and Anger Management. Id. Petitioner has received multiple laudatory reports from various institutional staff as well as favorable psychological work and counselor evaluations. (Lodgment 7, 9.)
The Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized that a state prisoner possesses a federal liberty interest if parole is denied in the absence of “some evidence” that the prisoner is currently dangerous. Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 562 (9th Cir.2010); see also Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 608–09 (9th Cir.2010). In reviewing a habeas petition, the Court must “decide whether the California judicial decision approving the [Board]'s decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’ ” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)); Pearson, 606 F.3d at 608. Contrary to Respondent's Objection, and as concluded in the Report and Recommendation, this Court is not limited to merely evaluating the parole review procedures utilized by the state to ensure fairness. (Report, p. 6–11.) Id.
Where, as here, there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court looks through to the last reasoned decision of the state court denying relief to the petitioner. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). In this case, the last reasoned state court decision is the San Bernardino County Superior Court's order dated October 14, 2009, finding that “some evidence” supported the Board's parole denial. (Lodgment 2; compare with Lodgment 4, 6.) Although the court suggested that Petitioner's failure to fully accept responsibility for his crime, as well as the nature of Petitioner's offense and his pre- and post-incarceration history provided “some evidence” supporting the Board's decision, the court did not clearly explain which of the Board's findings supported the denial of parole. (Lodgment 2.) Instead, as the Report and Recommendation notes, the court appeared to largely defer to the Board's judgment. Id. Accordingly, just as the Magistrate Judge did, this Court examines the Board's reasons for denying parole in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the superior court's decision. Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.2010). Having conducted a de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Section 2254(d)(2) applies and rejects Respondent's arguments to the contrary. However, after reviewing the record, this Court concludes there is “some evidence” of current dangerousness such that habeas relief is not warranted.
State parole regulations apply in determining whether an inmate poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. These regulations enumerate factors tending to show suitability for parole, as well as unsuitability for parole. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2281(c)-(d). Pirtle v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir.2010) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562). After applying the parole factors, the Board denied parole on the following grounds: (1) Petitioner's bad attitude and failure to meaningfully participate in rehabilitation programs since 2003; (2) the heinous nature of the commitment offense; (3) Petitioner's failure to accept full responsibility for the crime or show full insight or remorse; (4) Petitioner's inadequate parole plans; (5) Petitioner's unstable social history and prior criminal history; and (6) the opposition to release. (Traverse, p. 6; Lodgment 7, p. 109–124.) Cal.Code Reg., tit. 15 § 2281(b).
First, the Board found that Petitioner exhibited a bad attitude and insistence on doing things his way, as evidenced in part by his failure to meaningfully participate in rehabilitation programs since 2003. (Lodgment 7, p. 115.) At the parole hearing, Petitioner stated he last attended the prison's rehabilitation programs, in particular...
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