Meehl v. Wise

• Decision Date: 07 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 14-07-00592-CV.,14-07-00592-CV.
• Citation: Meehl v. Wise, 285 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App. 2009)
• Parties: Debra J. MEEHL, Mark Meehl, Individually and as Officers and Agents of the Maureen J. Meehl Bipolar/BPD Foundation, Inc., and the Maureen J. Meehl Bipolar/BPD Foundation, Inc., an Arizona Not For Profit Corporation a/k/a the "Meehl Foundation", Appellants, v. Alfred M. WISE, Jr., Katherine D. Wise, John P. Hundl, Donna G. Hundl, Wilmer Conner, Margie Ann Alexander, John T. Horn, Martha G. Horn, John T. Horn, Jr., Christopher Blake Broadway, Paula Lee Broadway, James Zimmer, Mildred Zimmer, Robert Galiley, Patricia Galiley, Billy G. Phillips, Bonnie Kay Phillips, Frank Hlavinka, Barbara Hlavinka, Homero Cardenas, Janie Cardenas, Billie A. Pirtle, Richard Allen, Joyce Allen, George E. Hurst, Thelma Hurst, Gary Fruidenberg, A.J. Lowery, Jr., Ronald Korczynski, Kathy Korczynski, Matthew Mouton, and Annette Mouton, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

285 S.W.3d 561

Debra J. MEEHL, Mark Meehl, Individually and as Officers and Agents of the Maureen J. Meehl Bipolar/BPD Foundation, Inc., and the Maureen J. Meehl Bipolar/BPD Foundation, Inc., an Arizona Not For Profit Corporation a/k/a the "Meehl Foundation", Appellants, v. Alfred M. WISE, Jr., Katherine D. Wise, John P. Hundl, Donna G. Hundl, Wilmer Conner, Margie Ann Alexander, John T. Horn, Martha G. Horn, John T. Horn, Jr., Christopher Blake Broadway, Paula Lee Broadway, James Zimmer, Mildred Zimmer, Robert Galiley, Patricia Galiley, Billy G. Phillips, Bonnie Kay Phillips, Frank Hlavinka, Barbara Hlavinka, Homero Cardenas, Janie Cardenas, Billie A. Pirtle, Richard Allen, Joyce Allen, George E. Hurst, Thelma Hurst, Gary Fruidenberg, A.J. Lowery, Jr., Ronald Korczynski, Kathy Korczynski, Matthew Mouton, and Annette Mouton, Appellees.

No. 14-07-00592-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

April 7, 2009.

Sarah Regina Guidry, Houston, Garth A. Corbett, Austin, for appellants.

Keith Vaughan, Houston, for appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices GUZMAN and BROWN.

MAJORITY OPINION

ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in enforcing a 1965 deed restriction to prevent homeowners from allowing a nonprofit corporation to operate a community home for persons with bipolar disorder in the homeowners' residence. We hold that the actual or attempted enforcement of the deed restriction neither violates the federal Fair Housing Act nor the Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act. We therefore dissolve the trial court's order enjoining such operations, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties own property in the Carleton Acres Subdivision in Brazoria County, Texas. With the exception of two lots that are not at issue in this case, the deeds to the properties in the subdivision incorporate a Declaration of Restrictions executed in 1965 and renewed in ten-year increments thereafter. The Declaration of Restrictions provides that "no tract, lot, parcel or building site in said subdivision shall be used for any purpose other than that of a single family residence...."

In January 2006, Mark and Deborah Meehl purchased two adjoining lots in the subdivision conveyed by warranty deed expressly subject to the Declaration of Restrictions. The Meehls immediately began constructing a 3800-square-foot structure. According to a newspaper article published in The Facts on January 21, 2006, the Meehls planned to operate the facility as a "retreat, resource and educational center" for persons with bipolar disorder, and would be operated "in a bed-and-breakfast style with four luxury guest suites...." Nearly all of the Meehls' neighbors opposed the operation of the facility in the subdivision. On March 23, 2006, appellees ("the Neighbors") filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and injunction prohibiting its further construction or promotion. As defendants in the suit, the Neighbors named the Maureen J. Meehl Bipolar/BPD Foundation, Inc. ("the Foundation") and the Meehls, individually and as officers of the Foundation. The trial court temporarily enjoined the Meehls and the Foundation from continuing construction, promotion, or advertisement of the facility. On July 6, the Meehls, individually and as officers of the Foundation, filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. The case was tried without a jury on August 2, 2006. Final judgment in favor of the Neighbors, permanently enjoining the Meehls from constructing and operating a community home, was entered on November 5, 2007.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The Meehls and the Foundation present eleven issues on appeal. In their first and tenth issues, they contend that the trial court erred in denying their requests for declaratory relief and for a permanent injunction pursuant to the Texas Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act ("the Community Homes Act"). They assert in their second issue that the trial court erred in determining that the Community Homes Act does not apply in this case. In their third and fourth issues, they challenge the trial court's ruling enforcing the restrictive covenant and permanently enjoining them from operating a community home on the property. They argue in their fifth issue that the trial court erred in concluding that the Meehls are not a protected class within the meaning of the federal Fair Housing Act. In their sixth and seventh issues, they challenge the trial court's conclusion that the strict enforcement of the restrictive covenant would not constitute discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act. Appellants contend in their eighth issue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that their operation of a community home would constitute a wrongful act, and thus, the trial court erred in enjoining their operation of a community home. In their ninth issue, appellants argue that the trial court's final judgment is so broad that it precludes them from engaging in lawful activities that are a proper exercise of their rights. In their eleventh and final issue, they argue that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence relevant to their defense against the Neighbors' claims.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We independently evaluate the trial court's conclusions of law and will uphold them if the trial court's judgment can be sustained on any theory supported by the evidence. See Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). The trial court's findings of fact, however, are not conclusive when there is a complete statement of facts in the record. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), writ ref'd n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1985) (per curiam). Nevertheless, unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). We review challenged findings for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, applying the same standards we use when reviewing the evidence supporting a jury's answer. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005). We credit all favorable evidence that a reasonable factfinder could and disregard unfavorable evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. at 827. If there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting a finding of fact, we will overrule a legal sufficiency challenge. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.1998). If no evidence supporting the judgment remains after this review, reversal is required as a matter of law.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence and set aside a finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1996). Inferences may support a judgment only if they are reasonable in light of all of the evidence. Id. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 615-16 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if we would reach a different answer on the evidence. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.1998).

We review a permanent injunction for clear abuse of discretion. Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). A movant seeking an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant is "not required to show proof of irreparable injury." Id. at 849 (citing Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied)). To enjoin the performance of an act that would breach a restrictive covenant, the movant is only required to prove that the respondent "intends to do an act that would breach the restrictive covenant." Id. We review a trial court's interpretation of the law de novo. In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2009). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or properly applying the law. Id. If the trial court fails to properly interpret the law or applies the law incorrectly, it abuses its discretion. Id. at 642-43.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Property Code and Community Homes Act

We begin our analysis with chapter 202 of the Texas Property Code. Section 202.002, which pertains to enforcement of restrictive covenants, provides as follows:

(a) This chapter applies to all restrictive covenants regardless of the date on which they were created.

(b) This chapter does not affect the requirements of the Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act (Article 1011n, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes).

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.002 (Vernon 2007).

Section 202.003(b) further provides:

In this subsection, "family home" is a residential home that meets the definition of and requirements applicable to a family home under the Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act (Article 1011n, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes). A dedicatory instrument or restrictive covenant may not be construed to prevent the use of property as a family home. However, any restrictive covenant...