Meek v. Meek

• Decision Date: 26 August 2011
• Docket Number: 2091110.
• Citation: 83 So.3d 541
• Parties: Tiffany Sasser MEEK v. William Patrick MEEK.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

83 So.3d 541

Tiffany Sasser MEEK

v.William Patrick MEEK.

2091110.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 24, 2011.Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 2011.Certiorari Denied Nov. 10, 2011

Alabama Supreme Court 1101443.

Lynn F. McConnell, Fairhope, for appellant.

Debbie Lindsey Jared of Jared & Brunson, Elba, for appellee.

BRYAN, Judge.

Tiffany Sasser Meek (“the wife”) appeals from a judgment entered by the Baldwin Circuit Court (“the trial court”) that divorced her from William Patrick Meek (“the husband”).

Procedural History

This is the second time these parties have been before this court. In Meek v. Meek, 54 So.3d 389 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), we dismissed the wife's initial appeal because it was taken from a nonfinal judgment. We set forth the pertinent facts and procedural history in Meek, supra, as follows:

“The parties married on March 11, 1995, and one child was born of the marriage, a girl born in May 2003 (‘the child’). On June 1, 2006, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility of temperament and an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. In his complaint, the husband requested that the trial court equitably divide the marital assets and liabilities of the parties. On June 26, 2006, the trial court entered a ‘standard’ order (‘the June 2006 order’) that addressed issues such as child support, visitation, the financial obligations of the parties, and the disposal of assets during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. The case was initially set for trial on September 26, 2006, but it was continued several times throughout 2006 and 2007.

“On November 26, 2007, the husband filed a motion seeking to hold the wife in contempt because, he alleged, the wife had restricted his visitation with the child in violation of the visitation provisions in the June 2006 order. The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing on the pending divorce complaints and the husband's motion for contempt on May 2, 2008, on July 31, 2008, and on November 12, 2008.

“On April 14, 2009, the wife filed an ‘Instanter Motion to Require Compliance with [the June 2006 order]’ (‘the wife's motion for contempt’). In that motion, the wife alleged that the husband was in contempt of paragraph four of the June 2006 order, which ordered the parties ‘to pay debts incurred during the marriage and any other regular, recurring monthly financial obligations ... in the same manner and from the same sources as they have customarily been paid during the marriage.’ The wife also alleged that the husband was in contempt of paragraph five of the June 2006 order, which ordered that ‘[t]he parties shall not dispose of assets acquired during the marriage without leave of court, except where necessary in the normal and reasonable course of business.’ As noted in the wife's motion for contempt, the June 2006 order was still in effect because the trial court had not entered another order changing or amending the provisions in the June 2006 order.

“The trial court conducted a hearing on the wife's motion for contempt on May 4, 2009. A transcript from that hearing is in the record on appeal, and, during the hearing, the trial court stated that a ‘draft order’ had been sent via electronic mail (‘e-mail’) to the parties' attorneys shortly after the final ore tenus hearing in November 2008; apparently, the draft order contained certain provisions that the trial court wanted to include in the final judgment. The trial court determined that the draft order sent via e-mail was as effective as if the decisions set forth in the draft order had been ‘verbally ordered ... from the bench.’ The record indicates that the trial court determined that the wife's motion for contempt had been filed after a decision had been rendered, apparently referring to the draft order that was sent via e-mail. Thus, according to the trial court, the June 2006 order was no longer in effect at the time that the wife's motion for contempt was filed. Following the hearing on the wife's motion for contempt, the trial court entered an order that stated: ‘The [wife]'s [motion for contempt] will be taken as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate upon the entry of the Final Decree in this matter.’ ”

Id. at 391–92 (footnotes omitted).

The trial court purported to enter a final judgment of divorce on June 26, 2009 (“the June 2009 order”), but it did not rule on the husband's or the wife's pending contempt motions. The wife appealed that purported judgment to this court, and we concluded that the trial court's June 2009 order was nonfinal and unappealable because the trial court had failed to rule on the pending contempt motions. Id. at 393–94.

After the dismissal of the wife's appeal, the trial court conducted further proceedings on August 12, 2010, and entered a final judgment of divorce on August 13, 2010. Pursuant to that judgment, the wife was awarded legal and physical custody of the child, subject to the specific visitation rights of the husband. Regarding child support, the trial court stated that it had deviated from the child-support guidelines set forth in Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., due in part to the child's special diet, and awarded the wife $1,500 a month in child support, but the trial court allowed the husband to claim the income-tax exemption for the child until the wife was employed for more than six months. The husband was ordered to provide health insurance for the child, and he was ordered to pay all the child's unpaid medical expenses. The husband was also ordered to pay one-half of the wife's COBRA insurance for 24 months.

The wife was awarded 24 months of rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $2,700 a month. The trial court reserved the right to award the wife permanent periodic alimony in the future. The trial court awarded the husband all right, title, and interest in and to the martial residence, ordered the husband to pay off any liabilities secured by the marital residence, and ordered the marital residence to be sold. However, the wife was awarded all the equity in the marital residence after the residence sold, less the husband's expenses for making necessary repairs to the marital residence. The trial court awarded the husband all right, title, and interest in and to all real property in his name, and it found that such property was not marital property.

The wife was awarded 100% of the funds in the husband's retirement account as of November 12, 2008, excluding the husband's loan against the account. The husband was awarded his vehicle, and the wife was awarded 100% of the equity in her vehicle after it was sold and the remaining debt on the vehicle was paid. Each party was responsible for debts in his or her name from November 12, 2008, forward, each party was awarded the personal property in his or her possession, except the husband was awarded a pitcher, a miniature yacht, and family photographs that were in the wife's possession. The husband was ordered to pay $10,000 toward payment of the wife's attorney's fees.

The husband's November 2007 motion for contempt and the wife's April 2009 motion for contempt were denied. However, the trial court found that the husband had failed to pay all sums due pursuant to the June 2006 order, and the trial court ordered the husband to pay $14,413 to the wife. The wife timely appealed.

Issues

The wife raises four issues for this court to consider on appeal: (1) whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in fashioning the husband's visitation rights in light of the evidence presented; (2) whether the trial court erred by determining that the husband owed only $14,413 pursuant to the June 2006 order; (3) whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in dividing the parties' property and awarding her only 24 months of rehabilitative alimony; and (4) whether the trial court erred by awarding the husband the income-tax exemption for the child until she maintained employment for six months.

Facts

The parties separated in May 2006, after 11 years of marriage. At that time, the husband was approximately 38 years old, the wife was approximately 36 years old, and the child was 3 years old. The child had been born approximately 20 weeks premature, and she suffered from numerous medical maladies, as well as autism. The wife maintained that the child was severely autistic and that the child was required to maintain a strict gluten/casein-free diet in order to prohibit autistic regression. It was undisputed that, at the time of trial, the child required near constant care.

The husband indicated, throughout his testimony, that he was unsure if the child was autistic. The husband did not deny that the child had special needs or that she was required to maintain a gluten/casein-free diet, but he believed that the child's medical condition was because of her extremely premature birth. The husband stated that he had seen great improvements in the child and that, despite her developmental delays, he believed that the child would be able to care for herself at some point in the future.

The wife testified that the progress the child had made was due to a stable environment and a rigorous schedule of therapy, including six hours a week of speech therapy, seven hours a week of hyperbaric therapy, two hours a week of occupational therapy, and two hours a week of physical therapy. The wife stated that each hyperbaric treatment, which the child received three times a week, cost $100 but that the child's doctor had not been charging her for treatment until after the divorce was finalized. The wife stated that she wanted the funds in the husband's retirement account to be utilized to purchase a hyperbaric chamber that she could use at home, which she estimated would cost between $16,000 and $18,000.

The wife estimated that the child's special diet cost approximately $1,000 a month. The wife testified that she had allowed the child to eat ice cream on her third birthday and that it had caused the child to...