Meek v. Miller, 277 Civil.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 277 Civil.,277 Civil.
• Citation: 38 F. Supp. 10
• Parties: MEEK v. MILLER.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

38 F. Supp. 10

MEEK v. MILLER.

No. 277 Civil.

District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

April 15, 1941.

Albert Houck, of Lewistown, Pa., for plaintiff.

O'Malley, Hill, Harris & Harris, of Scranton, Pa., for defendant.

JOHNSON, District Judge.

This is a civil action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of defendant's automobile. The case was tried before the court and jury, and a verdict rendered for the defendant. Plaintiff now moves for a new trial.

On July 24, 1937, automobiles driven by plaintiff and defendant collided head-on upon a highway near State College, Pennsylvania. The accident occurred about the middle of the afternoon during the course of a heavy rainstorm. Each party charged negligence.

Plaintiff has assigned eleven reasons for a new trial which may be summarized in two points under which they will be considered:

(1) The action of counsel for defendant in bringing to the attention of the jury that plaintiff had received compensation on account of his injury, that the plaintiff was protected by insurance, and that plaintiff's insurance company had admitted plaintiff's negligence by paying insurance claims of the defendant; and

(2) The verdict is against the weight of the evidence and is contrary to incontrovertible physical facts.

In the cross-examination of plaintiff, defendant's counsel, in attacking plaintiff's medical bills, asked who paid the bills, and the plaintiff answered that the State Compensation Fund paid part of them, and that some of the original bills were in the hands of the Compensation Board.

At most, the admission of this testimony might prejudice the jury's minds in determining the amount of damages to be awarded, but they found a verdict for defendant, finding specially that both parties were negligent. The jury was carefully instructed that before they could consider damages they must find, first, that defendant was negligent, and secondly, that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Since the jury never reached the point of considering the amount of damages, the admission of this testimony could not have prejudiced plaintiff's case: Rice v. Shenk, 293 Pa. 524, 527, 143 A. 231; Sperry v. White Star Lines, Inc., 315 Pa. 361, 363, 172 A. 646. No error resulted, therefore, from the admission of this testimony.

Later a Mr. Eason was called as a witness for plaintiff to prove that defendant had admitted to him that he was traveling 40 to 45 miles an hour at the time of the accident. On cross-examination, in attacking his credibility, defendant's counsel brought out that Eason represented plaintiff's insurance company. Then came the following question:

"Q. And as a result of your investigation of this accident, isn't it a fact that your company—

"(Counsel for plaintiff objects)

"Q. (Continuing) That your company found that the injuries that these two people, the Millers, sustained as a result thereof —

"The Court: I have very grave doubt about the propriety of that question.

"(By the questioner): Your Honor, here is the point. It all goes to the interest and credibility of this witness. If this investigation revealed certain facts, we have a right to inquire what his subsequent conduct was and then just what the result of his investigation was and whom it placed the blame upon. This is the purpose of it.

"The Court: However, any insurance company, or any agent, or any payment, how is that going to determine whether this man that was injured is entitled to recover? How can a gentleman of any other company determine the right of this plaintiff? The whole question is, was this plaintiff injured by the negligent operation of the defendant's car, without any contributory negligence of his own? That is all there is to it. All these collateral issues amount to nothing, excepting as proper ones may bear upon that question of the negligent operation of the car. * * * The question of insurance — insurance hasn't any bearing on the question. The fact is, ordinarily if you brought that out I would have to discontinue this case.

"Q. No other questions, Mr. Eason.": Trial Record, pages 53, 54.

The question is whether this line of cross-examination resulted in prejudice to plaintiff's case. The question was not completed, and no answer was given, but the statement of defendant's counsel in the hearing of the jury clearly brought to their attention the purpose of the question together with a clear implication of the anticipated answer that plaintiff's insurance company had determined plaintiff was at fault, and had paid defendant's claim against this plaintiff.

The twelfth paragraph of the affidavit of defense filed in this action alleged payment by plaintiff's insurance company of defendant's claim against the plaintiff, "the plaintiff thereby admitting...