Meek v. Springfield Police Dept.
| Decision Date | 13 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-3354.,97-3354. |
| Citation | 990 F.Supp. 598 |
| Parties | Walter W. MEEK, Jr., Plaintiff, v. SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, Chief John Harris, the City of Springfield, Illinois, and Mayor Karen Hasara, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Ralph E. Williams, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff.
Robert M. Rogers, Springfield, IL, for Defendants.
A sordid affair.
A police officer — on duty — involved in despicable conduct.
In June 1996, a Sangamon County, Illinois, grand jury indicted Springfield Police Officer Walter W. Meek, Jr., on the offense of official misconduct in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(b).1 The indictment alleged that Meek had solicited oral sex from a prostitute on October 12, 1995, in exchange for not issuing her a traffic citation.
On April 9, 1996, law enforcement officials arrested Meek at his residence while he was off-duty and in civilian clothes.
On December 5, 1996, a trial jury found Meek not guilty of official misconduct.
However, on April 13, 1996, the City of Springfield placed Meek on administrative leave with pay pending an investigation of the prostitute's allegation. On July 11, 1996, Chief of Police John Harris suspended Meek without pay pending his termination. Finally, on August 1, 1996, Chief Harris terminated Meek's employment with the Springfield Police Department.
After Meek was acquitted by the jury, he asked Chief Harris and Mayor Karen Hasara to reinstate him as a Springfield Police Officer and reimburse him for the wages which he lost during his suspension. Although the parties entered into private negotiations regarding his reinstatement as a Springfield Police Officer, no settlement agreement was reached. Furthermore, Meek alleges that he was never afforded a hearing, allowed to present evidence, or permitted to cross-examine witnesses against him prior to his termination. Accordingly, Meek has filed this case alleging that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir.1987). Although a complaint is not required to contain a detailed outline of the claim's basis, it nevertheless "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984). Mere conclusions, without supporting factual allegations, are insufficient to support a claim for relief. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir.1978). Dismissal should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Likewise, in ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir.1995); Rueth v. USEPA, 13 F.3d 227, 229 (7th Cir.1993). On the other hand, the Court may review extraneous materials to resolve factual disputes regarding the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Roman v. United States Postal Serv., 821 F.2d 382 (7th Cir.1987). A dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(1) if the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.
In his Complaint, Meek asserts that Defendants violated both his federal due process rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his state due process rights protected by the Illinois Constitution. Furthermore, he claims that Defendants conspired together to interfere with his civil rights. Finally, Meek argues that Defendants wrongfully terminated him from his position as a Springfield Police Officer. Accordingly, he argues that his Complaint should not be dismissed.
Defendants argue that Meek's Complaint should be dismissed because it is deficient in several respects. Specifically, they assert that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or (6) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint and because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, Chief Harris and Mayor Hasara assert that they are protected from liability based upon the doctrines of qualified immunity and/or public official immunity.
The Springfield Police Department argues that it is not a suable entity, positing that it is merely an organizational division of the City of Springfield and, therefore, does not enjoy an independent legal existence. Accordingly, the Springfield Police Department asks the Court to dismiss it as a party to this suit.
Meek acknowledges that the Springfield Police Department is not a proper party in this suit. Thus, the Springfield Police Department's motion to dismiss is allowed, and it is dismissed as a party to this suit. Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F.Supp. 1126, 1133 (N.D.Ill.1994); Jordan v. City of Chicago Dep't of Police, 505 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (N.D.Ill. 1980); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 435 F.Supp. 1289, 1294 (N.D.Ill.1977).
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Meek's Complaint because this matter is not yet ripe for adjudication. Defendants assert that although his claim for reinstatement and back pay has been submitted to binding arbitration, the arbitrator has not yet rendered a final decision on the matter. Accordingly, Defendants claim that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the above-captioned case until the arbitrator has decided whether or not Meek was discharged for just cause.
However, since Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Arbitrator Steven Briggs — in an exceptionally professional and able opinion — has determined that Meek was discharged for just cause. Therefore, Defendants' argument is now moot.
Counts I, II, and III of the Complaint allege that Defendants denied Meek his federal due process rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Defendants argue that Meek was afforded due process in that he was provided with both a pre-deprivation and a post-deprivation hearing. Defendants assert that Meek was provided with a post-deprivation hearing on September 3 and 4, 1997, before a neutral arbitrator. Defendants further assert that Meek was provided with written notice of the charges against him and with written notice of the time and place of the pre-deprivation hearing but that Meek waived his right to such a hearing, choosing instead to answer the charges in writing. Accordingly, Defendants argue that Meek was afforded his procedural due process rights.
Furthermore, Defendants argue that Meek has failed to plead a constitutional injury caused by any of their policies or customs. They also assert that Meek has failed to allege that his available state law remedies are inadequate to satisfy his procedural due process rights. Finally, Defendants claim that they are protected from liability based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Although Defendants provided him with both a pre and a post-deprivation hearing, Meek claims that the due process which he has afforded was illusory. Meek argues that had he participated in the pre-deprivation hearing to save his employment, he would have effectively waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in his criminal trial on the charges pending against him. Meek asserts that his foremost concern at the time was the criminal charges pending against him and the possibility of being imprisoned if convicted. Meek states that if he had attended the pre-deprivation hearing it could have jeopardized his criminal trial and further argues that Defendants purposefully timed his pre-deprivation hearing so as to place him in such a predicament. Thus, Meek asserts that although he was provided due process in theory, in reality, he had no opportunity to tell his side of the story except at the criminal trial.
"Liability under § 1983 requires proof of two essential elements: that the conduct complained of (1) `was committed by a person acting under color of state law' and (2) `deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.'" Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir.1994), quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). There seems to be little doubt that Defendants were acting under color of state law when terminating Meek. Moreover, the right of which Meek was allegedly deprived was his procedural due process right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, Meek has alleged liability pursuant to § 1983.
However, "[w]hen a plaintiff brings an action under § 1983 for procedural due process violations, he must show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in `life, liberty, or property' without due process of law." Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 1997 WL 691032, *5 (7th Cir.1997); Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir.1997)( that "[i]n order to show a violation of procedural due process, [a] plaintiff[] [must] show that [he] possessed a protected life, liberty, or property interest ... as a matter of substantive law and that the process offered by the state did not meet constitutional...
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