Meek v. State
Decision Date | 08 June 1933 |
Docket Number | 25,647 |
Citation | 185 N.E. 899,205 Ind. 102 |
Parties | Meek v. State of Indiana |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. PROPERTY---Definition.---Generally the word "property" in its legal sense means a valuable right or interest in a thing rather than the thing itself. p 105.
2. DEAD BODIES---Property Rights---Nature Thereof.---A widow's interest in the dead body of her husband, which would seem to be a. property right, is the right to have the body remain undisturbed in its grave. p. 105.
3. THREATS---To Disinter Dead Body---Threat to Injure Body Unnecessary.---Threatening a widow with removal of the dead body of her husband from its grave constitutes actionable blackmail without any threat of injury to the body itself since a removal would injure and interfere with her right to have the body remain undisturbed. p. 105.
4. DEAD BODIES---Property Rights---Surviving Kinsmen.---Bodies of the dead are subject to rights in the surviving kinsmen, which the courts will protect. p. 106.
5. THREATS---Injury to Person or Property---Statute Construed.---In 2440, Burns 1926, declaring against threats "to do any injury to the person or property of any one," the words "to the person" are not used in the limited sense of "personal injury" but the phrase must be construed to include a threat to invade any right for the invasion of which an action in damages would lie for injury to the person or property. p. 106.
6. DEAD BODIES---Destruction of---Actionable Damages.---The damages that would result to a widow from the disinterment, removal or destruction of the body of her deceased husband consists principally, at least, in physical and mental pain, anguish and suffering, and to that extent is an "injury to the person" and actionable as such. p. 106.
7. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Identity of Defendant's Companion.---In a prosecution for blackmail, upon testimony of sheriff that he did not know person he saw come with defendant to get money, but that he afterward learned his name and that it was the same person he had seen with defendant, it was proper to permit the witness to name such person. p. 107.
From Owen Circuit Court; Herbert A. Rundell, Judge.
Ralph Meek was convicted of blackmail, and he appealed.
Affirmed.
James W. Noel, Hubert Hickam, Alan W. Boyd, Robert D. Armstrong and William A. Stuckey, for appellant.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General, and Bernard A. Keltner, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
OPINION
The appellant was convicted of blackmail. Section 2440, Burns 1926, is as follows:
"Whoever, either verbally, or by any letter or writing, or any written or printed communication, demands of any person, with menace of personal injury, any chattel, money, or valuable securities; or whoever accuses or threatens to accuse, or knowingly sends or delivers any letter or writing or any written or printed communication, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any letter, mark or designation, accusing or threatening to accuse, any person of any crime punishable by law, or of any immoral conduct, which, if true, would tend to degrade and disgrace such person, or in any way subject him to the ridicule or contempt of society; or whoever threatens to do any injury to the person or property of any one, with intent to extort or gain from such person any chattel, money or valuable security, or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with any intent to compel the person threatened to do any act against his will, with the intent aforesaid, is guilty of blackmailing, and shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the state prison not less than one year nor more than five years, to which may be added a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars."
The affidavit, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:
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