Meeker v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company
Decision Date | 05 November 1923 |
Parties | AMANDA MEEKER, Respondent, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant. * |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Buchanan County.--Hon. L. A. Vories Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Case reversed and cause remanded.
Miles Elliott and Duvall & Boyd for respondent.
Luther Burns, John E. Du Mars and John E. Dolman for appellant.
This is an action for damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment in the sum of $ 5000 and defendant has appealed.
Plaintiff was injured on June 28, 1922, while a passenger upon one of defendant's trains near the town of Alvo, Nebraska. The injury was caused by the derailment of the coach in which plaintiff was a passenger. She was taken to Lincoln Nebraska, on a relief train and shortly after her injury was induced by one of defendant's claim agents to sign a release for her injuries in consideration of the payment to her of the sum of $ 25.
Plaintiff testified that the claim agent approached her at the station in Lincoln and asked her if she was injured; that she told him that she was and he asked her to come into another room in the station, where she discovered what he wanted. She told him that she had only thirty-five cents with her and needed some money to get to her home in Phillipsburg, Kansas; that he asked her if twenty-five dollars would help her and that she replied it would; that he then took a statement from her concerning the accident and her injuries and asked her to sign a receipt for the twenty-five dollars, which she did in order to show that she had received the money he had given her as expense money. She testified that she did not read the papers that she signed; that her mental and physical condition was such that she would have been unable to have understood their meaning had she read them.
Plaintiff further alleged that she pays into court the sum of twenty-five dollars and tendered same to the defendant. The petition was not verified. The evidence shows that at the time plaintiff paid the filing fee, the sum of twenty-five dollars was deposited with the clerk of the circuit court for the use and benefit of the defendant.
The answer is as follows:
The answer was verified, the affidavit stating "that the release hereto attached is a full, true and complete copy of the original release, signed and executed by plaintiff as hereinbefore stated." A copy of the release is filed with the answer. The reply consists of a general denial unverified. Thereafter defendant filed a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, which was overruled. The case went to trial before a jury.
We think the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been sustained. Section 1415, Revised Statutes 1919, provides as follows:
"When any petition or other pleading shall be founded upon any instrument in writing, charged to have been executed by the other party and not alleged therein to be lost or destroyed, the execution of such instrument shall be adjudged confessed, unless the party charged to have executed the same deny the execution thereof, by answer or replication, verified by affidavit."
Defendant having pleaded the release and plaintiff having failed to deny the execution of the release under oath, the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been sustained. [Leahy v. Mercantile Trust Co., 247 S.W. 396, 402.] There are some instances where a release is set up in the answer and fraud in the procure ment of the release is pleaded in the reply, it is not necessary for the reply to be verified. Nothing is set up in the reply in this case in the way of fraud in the procurement of the release, the reply merely consisting of a general denial. The reply need not be verified when it admits the execution of the release but attempts to avoid the same on the ground of fraud as an inducement to the procurement of the release. [Childeris v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 218 S.W. 441.] In that case the reply admitted the signing of the release but sought to avoid the same on the ground of fraud. In the case at bar there is no admission of the signing of the release, either in the petition or in the reply. Plaintiff, in answering defendant's point that she should have tendered the twenty-five dollars to the defendant prior to the institution of her suit if she sought to avoid the release on the ground of fraud, contends that fraud in the procurement of the release in the case at bar was inherent in the execution of the instrument and therefore there was no meeting of the minds of the parties and, hence, no contract. Consequently, plaintiff argues under the authority of Malkmus v. Cement Co., 150 Mo.App. 446, and Loveless v. Cunard Mining Co., 201 S.W. 357, she was not required to tender the twenty-five dollars before bringing her suit. This, for the reason that there was no...
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