Meeks v. Morrow
| Decision Date | 14 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1120688. |
| Citation | 151 So.3d 1069 |
| Parties | John MEEKS and Oretha Meeks v. Roderick MORROW and Merchants & Farmers Bank. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Guy V. Martin, Jr., of Martin, Rawson & Woosley, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants.
John A. Russell III of Russell & Russell, P.C., Aliceville, for appellee Roderick Morrow.
I. Drayton Pruitt, Jr., of Pruitt & Pruitt, Livingston; and Wilbor J. Hust, Jr., of Zeanah, Hust, Summerford & Williamson, Tuscaloosa, for appellee Merchants & Farmers Bank.
The opinion of December 20, 2013, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
John Meeks and Oretha Meeks appealed from a partial summary judgment in favor of Roderick Morrow and Merchants & Farmers Bank (“the Bank”). Because it appeared that the judgment from which the Meekses purported to appeal was not a final judgment, this Court's clerk's office remanded the cause to the trial court, which then certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Having examined the case, this Court now concludes that the trial court's certification was not proper and that the judgment was not made final. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
In 1993, the Freedlander Bankruptcy Trust (“Freedlander”) deeded certain property in Greene County (“the property”) to Henry Lewis, who did not record his deed until January 2006. In 1995, Lewis deeded the property to his grandmother, Bessie Lard, whose deed also was not recorded until January 2006.
In 1998, Mrs. Meeks noticed a house on the property that appeared to be empty. The house was “only a shell” at the time and was “far from being in ‘move in’ condition.” Meekses' brief, at 15. At that time, the Meekses were unable to obtain the financing they needed to buy the house and renovate it. Consequently, the Meekses and Lard “worked out” an agreement by which the Meekses would take possession of the house and spend the money necessary to complete it, although they had not purchased it. The agreement provided that when the house was complete and the Meekses could obtain financing, they would pay the purchase price of $58,000 and obtain a deed to the property.
In 1999, the Meekses and Lard signed a document styled as a “work-out agreement,” in which the parties agreed to sell the house and the property to Mrs. Meeks on the condition that “this Work–Out Agreement must be ended by January 31, 2006.” The work-out agreement also provided that in the event Lard died before the end of the agreement, Lewis had the right to sign or print her name, apparently for the purpose of finalizing the sale. Lard told Mrs. Meeks to make the payments for the purchase price to Lewis.
Immediately after signing the work-out agreement, the Meekses began working on the property. They bought the supplies they needed to fix the house and did the work themselves. The work necessary to renovate the house included “plumbing, electrical, extension of gas lines, installation of flooring, roof repair, installation of sinks, toilets, and cabinets.” Meekses' brief, at 17. The Meekses planted grass, trees, and flowers around the house, paved the driveway, and sloped the yard using a bulldozer. Lewis helped with the renovation and was paid by the Meekses in cash. The Meekses contend that, following their work on the house, the property was appraised at $240,000 and later at $250,000.1 The house was complete enough by October 2004 that the Meekses could officially move in. The Meekses contend that “[s]ince early fall of 2004, anyone passing by our home would have been able to see that we lived there.” Meekses' brief, at 18.
In 2004, the Bank recorded a judgment against Lewis. One of the Bank's directors, Ralph Liverman, performed a title search. He advised the Bank that Freedlander held record title to the property.
In 2006, the Meekses felt that the house was complete and obtained a mortgage to finance their purchase of the house. Lard had died in 2003, so Lewis signed her name to the deed purporting to convey the property from Lard to the Meekses. In 2006, Lewis recorded the deed conveying the property from Freedlander to him, as well as the deed conveying the property from him to Lard. The Meekses thereafter recorded their deed. Thus, all the deeds were recorded by the end of 2006. The Meekses also obtained a title-insurance policy insuring their title as free of any liens.
On December 13, 2006, the Bank initiated proceedings to conduct a sheriff's sale on the property. The Meekses learned of the sale on Friday, January 9, 2009. The sheriff held the sale on Monday, January 12, 2009, after which the sheriff deeded the property to Roderick Morrow as the highest bidder. Morrow's bid was $48,000.
On January 29, 2009, the Meekses sued Morrow, seeking to redeem the property and a temporary restraining order preserving their possession of the house. On June 2, 2009, Morrow answered and filed a counterclaim, asking the trial court to order the Meekses to vacate the premises, to declare the deed conveying the property from Lard to the Meekses to be a nullity, to declare that the Meekses had no right of redemption, and to award Morrow damages for the Meekses' refusal to vacate the property and for any damage resulting from the Meekses' failure to vacate.
On July 10, 2009, the Meekses amended their complaint, adding as defendants the Bank and Lewis,2 alleging claims of slander of title against the Bank and Morrow and wrongful execution, negligence, “gross negligence,” and wantonness against the Bank. The Meekses also requested, in the alternative, that an equitable lien be placed on the property. Morrow filed a cross-claim against the Bank, alleging misrepresentation and suppression and requesting compensatory damages, punitive damages, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs in the event that the trial court found the Meekses' title to be superior to Morrow's.
Morrow moved for a summary judgment in 2009. The Meekses opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on September 30, 2009, and gave Morrow more time to respond to the Meekses' cross-motion for a summary judgment. The trial court never ruled on either summary-judgment motion.
The Meekses filed their second amended complaint on May 4, 2010, adding a count of breach of fiduciary duty against the Bank. The Meekses filed a third amended complaint on August 19, 2011, requesting a judgment declaring that the Meekses were bona fide purchasers of the property and seeking damages for mental anguish against the Bank and Morrow and requesting, in the alternative, that the sheriff's sale be set aside or that they be granted damages for breach of warranty of title by Lewis. The Meekses filed a fourth amended complaint on August 28, 2012, requesting, in the alternative, that the trial court declare the amount needed to redeem the property and also, in the alternative, if the deed conveying the property to the Meekses was invalid, requesting specific performance from Lewis to convey the property to the Meekses. Morrow and the Bank moved to strike the third and fourth amended complaints. The parties have not briefed this Court on whether the trial court ruled on those motions to strike, but it appears from the trial court's order of February 26, 2013 (see infra ), that it has not ruled on those motions.
The Meekses moved for a summary judgment again on July 6, 2012, before they filed their fourth amended complaint. On December 6, 2012, the Bank moved for a summary judgment as to the Meekses' claims against the Bank. Likewise, Morrow moved for a summary judgment as to the Meekses' claims against him. The trial court held a hearing on those motions on January 28, 2013.
On February 26, 2013, the trial court denied the Meekses' summary-judgment motion and granted Morrow's and the Banks' summary-judgment motions. The trial court found that the unrecorded deed conveying the property from Lewis to Lard was void as to the judgment the Bank recorded against Lewis. The trial court also found that the deed conveying the property from Lard to the Meekses was void on its face and that the work-out agreement had not been properly executed. The trial court concluded:
Meekses' brief, Appendix B (capitalization in original).
The Meekses appealed. On July 22, 2013, this Court's clerk's office sent an order to the trial court stating, in relevant part:
The trial court replied, in relevant part, as follows:
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