Meerwarth v. Meerwarth

• Decision Date: 26 April 1974
• Citation: 128 N.J.Super. 285,319 A.2d 779
• Parties: Priscillia S. MEERWARTH, Plaintiff, v. Ralph N. MEERWARTH, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 285

128 N.J.Super. 285

319 A.2d 779

Priscillia S. MEERWARTH, Plaintiff, v. Ralph N. MEERWARTH, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division.

April 26, 1974.

Bernard F. Conway, Morristown, for plaintiff.

Gary N. Skoloff, Newark, for defendant (Skoloff & Wolfe, Newark, attorneys).

MacKENZIE, J.J. & D.R. Ct., Temporarily Assigned.

Plaintiff Priscilla S. Meerwarth and defendant Ralph N. Meerwarth were divorced by judgment of this court dated July 18, 1973, which judgment additionally provided for alimony to be paid to plaintiff in the amount of $25,000 a year and for equitable distribution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34--23. Plaintiff now seeks an order of this court permitting her to obtain, at her expense, life insurance on defendant's life, and directing defendant to cooperate with same to the extent of submitting to physical examination and signing all necessary papers.

Defendant argues that (1) plaintiff has waived her right to raise this issue now by her failure to raise same during litigation which stretched over about 15 months; (2) defendant does not believe in life insurance or its necessity, and there was no life insurance in effect at any time during the marriage; (3) plaintiff is financially secure both for the present and for the anticipated future and (4) defendant has a constitutional right not to submit to a physical examination.

The waiver argument cannot be permitted to prevent the court from proceeding to an adjudication on the merits. Although it is correct that 'a waiver connotes a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or claim,' Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 115 N.J.Super. 189, 197, 278 A.2d 531, 535 (Ch.Div.1971), it is clear that plaintiff's request is grounded in 'the continuing duty to support' which can neither be bargained away nor waived. Price v. Price, 33 N.J.Super. 545, 547, 111 A.2d 96 (Ch.Div.1955).

Proceeding to substance, it is argued by defendant that to permit plaintiff this life insurance would serve to prolong the obligation to pay support beyond his death, in contravention of the rule expressed in Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 70, 275 A.2d 132, 135 (1971). See also, Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 354, 122 A.2d 352 (1956). However, this rule is grounded in the public policy favoring the prompt settlement of a decedent's estate, and does not apply in this case where the payment after death would come from a collateral third-party source, namely an insurance company.

On the other hand, this court does not agree with plaintiff's argument that such an order as here sought is permitted under authority of Grotsky v. Grotsky, 58 N.J. 354, 277 A.2d 535 (1971). In that case life insurance in effect at the time of the divorce was required to be continued for the benefit of the children of the marriage. See Note, 67 Harv.L.Rev. 1074 (1954), expressing the rationale for this rule as the continuing obligation for support of children, which obligation is of paramount court concern and is derived from common law, while the alimony obligation is statutory.

Considering that plaintiff does have an insurable interest in the life of defendant, Novern v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 107 N.J.Super. 570, 577, 259 A.2d 504 (Law Div. 1969), it is not improbable that, even absent children, an insured could be ordered to maintain life insurance in existence at the time of divorce for the sole benefit of a spouse; but there is no existing life insurance in this case. Cf. N.J.S.A. 17B:24--1; Mooney, 'Insurance in Divorce Cases: Unsettled Rights Mean Future Litigation,' 41 A.B.A.J. 315 (1955).

Def...