Megan Thomas Law, PLLC v. Syracuse Reg'l Airport Auth.

• Docket Number: 5:25-CV-01114 (AJB/ML)
• Decision Date: 15 January 2026
• Citation: Megan Thomas Law, PLLC v. Syracuse Reg'l Airport Auth., 5:25-CV-01114 (AJB/ML) (N.D. N.Y. Jan 15, 2026)
• Parties: MEGAN THOMAS LAW, PLLC, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, JASON MEHL, and JASON TERRERI Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

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MEGAN THOMAS LAW, PLLC, Plaintiff,
v.
SYRACUSE REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, JASON MEHL, and JASON TERRERI Defendants.

No. 5:25-CV-01114 (AJB/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

January 15, 2026

APPEARANCES: MEGAN THOMAS LAW, PLLC Attorneys for Plaintiff HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP Attorneys for Defendants KAPLAN KIRSCH LLP Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL: MEGAN KATHERINE THOMAS, ESQ. LINDSEY H. HAZELTON, ESQ. JOHN T. MCCANN, ESQ. STEVEN L. OSIT, ESQ. SUBASH S. IYER, ESQ.

DECISION & ORDER

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge

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I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 8) and defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 25). For the reasons below, plaintiff's motion will be GRANTED, and defendants' motion will be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Megan Thomas Law, PLLC (“Thomas” or the “Firm”) is an employment law firm. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 2. It represents workers facing discrimination and sexual harassment. Id. Defendant Syracuse Regional Airport Authority (“SRAA”) is a public benefit corporation that operates the Syracuse Hancock International Airport; defendant Jason Terreri is the SRAA's Chief Executive Officer, and defendant Jason Mehl is its Chief Commercial Officer (collectively, the “Authority”).^[1] Defs.' Resp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Dkt. No. 20 at 8; Mehl Decl., Dkt. No. 20-2 ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 20 at 5; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 25-1 at 5. The Authority earns money by selling space for advertisements. Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Dkt. No. 20 at 5.

In late June 2025, Thomas emailed the Authority, expressing interest in advertising at the airport. Dkt. No. 1 at 14; Dkt. No. 20 at 7; see Compl., Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1 (“I run an employment law firm geared towards employees facing a multitude of issues in the workplace, including discrimination and harassment. I am interested in putting up a billboard at the airport. Could you please give me a call to discuss?”).

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In mid-July, following a tour of the space, the parties contracted to display an advertisement of the Firm's for six months, to begin August 1, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1 at 11-13; Compl., Ex. C, Advertising Agreement, Dkt. No. 1-3.

Advertisers are to follow the Authority's ad policy. At the outset of this dispute, that policy was brief: It prohibited ads that were “inappropriate, immoral, offensive, or objectionable” and those with “political [or] religious messages.” Defs.' Resp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 20-15 at 4 (2023 advertising policy).

The Authority claims plaintiff's proposed ad, shown below, broke these rules.

(Image Omitted)

Dkt. No. 1 at 2.

According to the Authority, “[t]he majority of the Firm's ad was acceptable[.]” Dkt. No. 20-2 ¶ 13. “[W]e had no concerns with listing the legal services that the Firm provides, including for sexual harassment and no objection to the proposed ad's other content, including the tag line ‘No Fear, No Shame, Just Justice,' or any of the Firm's web-based content . . . linked through display of a QR code.” Id. “Specifically problematic was its tag line-‘When HR called it harmless flirting . . . We call it EXHIBIT A.' and the potential for disruption presented by this type of accusatory and inaccurate statement.” Dkt. No. 20-2 ¶ 12.

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Hence, the Authority refused to display the ad. Plaintiff says the ad did not violate any policy; rather, the Authority's contrary assertions were, and continue to be, simply cover for unconstitutional censorship.

As a result, plaintiff filed this action on August 15, 2025, alleging breach of contract and, in six counts, violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1.^[2] On August 29, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 8.

Two weeks later, on September 12, the Authority changed its ad policy. Defs.' Resp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. C, Dkt. No. 20-16 at 2 (2025 advertising policy). It now lists fourteen types of prohibited content. Id. at 5-6. These include, for example, ads for tobacco and marijuana, ads with profanity, and ads that “disparage[]” or are “false, misleading, or deceptive.” Id. at 6.

On September 16, the Authority sent the Firm a letter. See Defs.' Resp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. E, Dkt. No. 20-18. It had reconsidered the Firm's ad and rejected it once more:

The Authority has determined that it must reject the proposed advertising copy as Prohibited Advertising Content under the Policy because the tag

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line - “When HR called it Harmless Flirting We Called it Exhibit A” (the “Tag Line”) - reasonably “disparages, demeans, ridicules, is abusive or hostile to, or reflects negatively on the character, integrity, or standing (or could reasonably be interpreted as such) of any individual, group, entity, business/profession, religion, organization, or governmental entity, including advertising that portrays such individuals, entities, or groups as inferior, evil, unlawful, objectionable, or contemptible.” In addition and alternatively, the Tag Line “is false, misleading, or deceptive” Prohibited Advertising Content per the Policy as it references/implies the applicability of an incorrect, misleading and/or specious legal standard.

Id. at 2.

Less than a week after changing the ad policy, the Authority filed its response to the Firm's motion for injunctive relief; and, on October 2, it filed a motion to dismiss under Rule12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 20; Dkt. No. 25. Both motions are fully briefed.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 79 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted). “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show ‘(1) irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.'” St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. v. Am. Anesthesiology of Syracuse, P.C., 131 F.4th 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018)).

“[A]s a general matter, there is a presumption of irreparable harm when there is an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” Matthews v. Barq, 2019 WL 1025828, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting V.W. by & through Williams v. Conway, 236 F.Supp.3d 554, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)).

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However, “the favorable presumption of irreparable harm arises only after a plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the constitutional claim.” Brock v. City of New York, 2022 WL 479256, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022) (citing Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996)).

“In other words, ‘because the violation of a constitutional right is the irreparable harm asserted here, the two prongs of the preliminary injunction threshold merge into one: in order to show irreparable injury, plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits.'” A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 511 F.Supp.3d 482, 497 (D. Vt. 2021) (quoting Turley v. Giuliani, 86 F.Supp.2d 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 985 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2021) (“In cases alleging constitutional injury, a strong showing of a constitutional deprivation that results in noncompensable damages ordinarily warrants a finding of irreparable harm.”).

“The Second Circuit has concluded that, where a plaintiff alleges constitutional violations, the balance of hardships tips decidedly in the plaintiff's favor despite arguments that granting a preliminary injunction would cause financial or administrative burdens on the Government.” Deide v. Day, 676 F.Supp.3d 196, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); see also Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Seggos, 288 F.Supp.3d 530, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (D'Agostino, J.) (The government is “in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional.”).

Furthermore, “[i]t is always in the public interest to protect First Amendment liberties.” Robar v. Vill. of Potsdam Bd. of Trs., 490 F.Supp.3d 546, 574 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (Kahn, J.) (collecting cases). Ergo, here, the “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits is . . . ‘the dominant, if

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not the dispositive, factor.'” A.H. by & through Hester, 985 F.3d at 176 (quoting New York Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013)).

B. Merits of Constitutional Claims

1. First Amendment Principles

“The first issue to be addressed in any challenge to the constitutional validity of a rule under the First Amendment is whether a First Amendment right exists, for if it does not, we need go no further.” Potanovic v. Town of Stony Point, 651 F.Supp.3d 677, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), aff'd, 2024 WL 3159221 (2d Cir. June 25, 2024). “Thus, ‘[i]n evaluating § 1983 claims for First Amendment violations, courts first inquire whether the activity in question is protected . . . under the First Amendment.” Potanovic, 651 F.Supp.3d at 682 (quoting Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F.Supp.2d 491, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).

Plaintiff's ad plainly qualifies as protected speech. “Lawyer advertising is commercial speech that is protected by the First Amendment.” Hayes v. Zakia, 2002 WL 31207463, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (citing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995)); see also Eastchester Tobacco & Vape Inc. v. Town of Eastchester, 618 F.Supp.3d 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Commercial speech, such as advertising, is . . . protected by the First Amendment, and...