Megginson v. Megginson
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | WILSON |
| Citation | Megginson v. Megginson, 367 Ill. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. 1937) |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 24196.,24196. |
| Parties | MEGGINSON v. MEGGINSON et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by Mabel T. Megginson against William B. Megginson and others. From a decree in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appeal.
Reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to enter decree dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint.Appeal from the Circuit Court, Morgan County; Walter W. Wright, judge.
Carl E. Robinson, of Jacksonville, for appellants.
Wilford H. Absher, of Jacksonville, for appellee.
By this appeal the validity of an antenuptial contract is presented for determination.
Pertinent facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence are as follows: Ralph W. Megginson, a widower, owned two farms consisting of 100 acres and 86 acres, respectively, east of Woodson, in Morgan county. Of these, he had acquired the larger one by inheritance from his father, and the other by purchase. Megginson lived on one of the farms when he met Mabel Thies in Jacksonville in the fall of 1919. On April 17, 1920, they became engaged to marry. More than 19 months later, namely, on December 9, 1921, they entered into an antenuptial agreement. Megginson, at that time, was 66 years of age and the father of nine children. Mabel Thies was 33 years of age. The agreement recited that it was made in contemplation of the impending marriage, and for the additional reason that Megginson's deceased wife and their children had assisted him in the accumulation of his estate. The contract provided that, in consideration of the proposed marriage, Megginson would concurrently execute and deliver to Mabel Thies his note for $5,000, payable to her upon his death, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. annuallyfrom that day until paid; that she would accept this sum, when paid, in lieu of all rights, including dower and homestead, which she might acquire through such marriage, to the property owned by Megginson; that any child or children born to the parties during the marriage would share equally in Megginson's estate with the children by his first marriage; and that no gift which he might make to his future wife should be deemed either partial or full payment of the sum attempted to be settled upon her. The concluding paragraph declares that Mabel Thies entered voluntarily into the agreement; that she had not been induced to agree to marry Megginson from mercenary motives, and, further, had not been misled as to the value of his property, ‘well knowing that he could make a settlement upon her many times larger than said sum of five thousand ($5000) dollars, if he deemed it equitable so to do.’ The contract was executed in duplicate under the hands and seals of the parties and its execution was acknowledged by each of them.
The parties to the agreement were married 11 days later, on December 20, 1921, and lived together as husband and wife thereafter. Two months after the marriage, Megginson purchased, from his wife's father, a residence in Jacksonville, costing between $4,000 and $4,500. Megginson and his wife occupied this property as a homestead. A daughter, Mary Elizabeth, born to the couple on May 7, 1924, lived with her parents in the homestead property. Mabel Megginson was adjudged incompetent on December 12, 1933, and on January 3, 1934, her husband was appointed her conservator. Megginson died on July 20, 1934, while his wife was still incompetent. She was restored to her property rights on November 8, 1934, and on November 27, her books and papers were turned over to her. Among them were a duplicate original of the antenuptial contract and the note, both of which were found in her husband's safety deposit box.
Megginson's will executed on January 24, 1930, and two codicils added on October 13, 1932, and October 23, 1933, were admitted to record in the county court of Morgan county. The testator devised his homestead property to Mabel Megginson during her widowhood, with the remainder to his ten children upon her death or remarriage. He also bequeathed to his wife all of his household goods and furniture. By the fourth section he bequeathed to her $5,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, payable annually from the date of his death. This section recited that the bequest was made conformably to the marriage contract and that the testator especially desired, and accordingly directed, payment of the bequest and interest thereon as promptly after his death as practicable. It was provided by the fifth section of the will that the residue of the personal property should be distributed in equal shares among testator's ten children, excepting that the share of his minor daughter by his second marriage be held in trust by his wife, as trustee. By the sixth section the executors, William B. and George T. Megginson, two of testator's sons, were appointed to manage his farms and to divide the net annual income therefrom among his ten children for 10 years after his death, unless prior thereto the land should attain the value of $200 per acre, when it should be sold. The same section further provided that the homestead property should not be sold so long as Mabel Megginson remained his widow. Like provision for distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the land was made as for the division of the residue of his personal property. The first codicil declared that Joseph Megginson, one of testator's sons, had received advances aggregating more than his proportionate share of the estate, and directed that he should not participate in its distribution. The second codicil recited that the burden of acting as trustee for their daughter would likely impair his wife's health, revoked her appointment as trustee, and appointed his executors, as trustees for the minor's share. On December 1, 1934, Mabel Megginson transmitted to the county court and filed in the office of the clerk her written renunciation of the provisions made for her in her husband's will, asserting that she elected to take her statutory share of his estate. She received a widow's award of $800 and an additional $200 for the support of her minor child.
On September 19, 1935, the plaintiff, Mabel T. Megginson, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Morgan county alleging that, owing to the birth of her daughter, a member of the household residing with her parents, prior to and at the time of Megginson's death, and her (plaintiff's) renunciation of the will, the antenuptial contract became void. The relief sought was the cancellation of the agreement and partition of the three parcels of real estate owned by Megginson. The heirs at law of the testator, with the exception of the disinherited son, and, in addition, assignees of certain heirs, were made parties defendant. On December 5, 1935, pursuant to leave granted, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The allegations are, in substance, those in the original pleading, with the exception that they omit mention of the antenuptial contract and the note executed contemporaneously therewith. The defendants, other than the guardian ad litem and the assignees, answered that plaintiff's only interest in the real estate was a homestead interest in the residence property. Their answer set forth the antenuptial contract, averred that it was in full force and effect, and hence binding upon plaintiff; that, in particular, it barred her dower interest in Megginson's property; and that the contract was partly executed prior to Megginson's death. Defendants also averred that the note for $5,000 was delivered to plaintiff, and that the executors had offered to pay and had tendered to her the amount due on the note, regardless of whether she was entitled to a homestead interest in the residence property. In her replication plaintiff admitted the execution of the agreement, but alleged that at the time of its execution, and during the period she and Megginson were engaged to marry, he owned the two farms and personal property having an aggregate value of $65,000; that the provision for her in the contract was disproportionate to the value of his property; and that the contract was therefore fraudulent as to her marital rights and not binding upon her. She denied that the note was delivered to her; that dower in the farms was barred by the contract; and that it was partially executed prior to her husband's decease. By their rejoinder defendants denied the new allegations and averred, on the contrary, that the contract was fairly and knowingly entered into between the parties with a complete understanding and appreciation, not only of its terms, but of the nature and extent of Megginson's property. Plaintiff's final pleading denied that the contract was fairly and knowingly entered into.
The cause was referred to the master in chancery. Before he heard the testimony, the executors tendered to plaintiff the sum of $5,000 in payment of the principal of the note previously mentioned, and an additional $500 interest thereon, from the date of Megginson's death. The tender was refused. After a hearing the master decided the issues against plaintiff and recommended that a decree be entered dismissing the amended complaint for the want of equity. Objections filed to the master's report were overruled and ordered to stand as exceptions. The chancellor, without hearing additional evidence, sustained the exceptions, and on February 19, 1937, entered a decree finding that plaintiff was entitled to a homestead interest and an undivided one-third part in fee of the homestead property and in each of the two farms, and that the trustees under Megginson's will owned an undivided two-thirds part in fee in the farms and the homestead property, subject to plaintiff's homestead interest in the latter. The ante nuptial contract and the note were directed to be canceled and partition of the farms ordered. The trustees, and three of the five adult children who had not assigned their interest in their father's...
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... ... 558, 283 ... P. 483; In re Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, ... 173 A. 303; Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 117 A ... 314; Megginson v. Megginson, 367 I11. 168, 10 N.E.2d ... 815; In re Enyart's Estate, 100 Neb. 337, 160 ... N.W. 120; In re Maag's Estate, 119 Neb. 237, 228 ... ...
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Kosakowski v. Bagdon
...34;Debolt v. Blackburn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790;Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497. In the recent case of Megginson v. Megginson, 367 Ill. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815, we said (page 819): ‘Megginson and plaintiff were engaged to be married at the time the contract was signed. A confident......
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...intelligent waiver of the statutory rights involved. See, e. g.,Guhl v. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E.2d 185 (1941); Megginson v. Megginson, 367 Ill. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815 (1937); Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 117 A. 314 (1922); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967); In re Estate of Ka......
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