Megiel-Rollo v. Megiel
| Decision Date | 17 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D14–4037.,2D14–4037. |
| Citation | 162 So.3d 1088 |
| Parties | Denise L. MEGIEL–ROLLO, Individually and as Trustee of the P.M. Revocable Trust dated July 29, 1997, Appellant, v. Sharon J. MEGIEL, Robert Michael Megiel, Daniel Megiel, and Andrea Megiel, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Douglas R. Bald of Fergeson, Skipper, Shaw, Keyser, Baron & Tirabassi, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellant.
Will W. Sunter and Fletcher H. Rush of Farr, Farr, Emerich, Hackett and Carr, P.A., Punta Gorda, for Appellee, Sharon Megiel.
Jeffery M. Backo of Mellor and Grissinger, North Port, for Appellee, Robert Megiel.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
Denise Megiel–Rollo, individually and as Trustee of the P.M. Revocable Trust dated July 29, 1997 (the Trust), appeals a final summary judgment determining that the Trust is not subject to reformation under the provisions of section 736.0415, Florida Statutes (2013), to add to it a contemplated schedule of beneficial interests that the draftsman of the Trust had neglected to prepare and to incorporate into the trust instrument when it was executed. Because section 736.0415 is a remedial statute that authorizes the court to reform the terms of a trust to conform the terms to the settlor's intent, we reverse the final summary judgment.
Before her death, Margaret J. Megiel (the Decedent) owned a residence located in Punta Gorda. The underlying basis of the parties' dispute is whether that residence will be distributed under the terms of the Decedent's Last Will and Testament or under the terms of the Trust. However, the primary issue that we are called upon to determine in this case is whether the Decedent's Trust is subject to reformation to correct an alleged drafting error.
The Decedent had three children: Denise L. Megiel–Rollo, Sharon J. Megiel, and Robert Michael Megiel.1 The Decedent executed her Last Will and Testament on July 16, 1992. The Will does not include a specific bequest of the Punta Gorda residence. Notably, the Will provides for a gift of the residue of the Decedent's estate in equal shares to her three children, Denise, Sharon, and Robert.2
Approximately five years after she had executed her Will, the Decedent executed a document known as the “P.M. Revocable Trust,” dated July 29, 1997.3 The Decedent executed the Trust in Charlotte County, Florida. In general terms, the Trust was in form a typical revocable living trust of the type that are “widely used will-substitute devices that provide flexibility in managing the settlor's assets during his or her lifetime.” Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The parties agree that the Decedent executed the Trust with the requisite formalities for the execution of a will. See § 737.111(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (repealed 2007, 2008) (current version at § 736.0403(4), Fla. Stat. (2014) ).
The Trust instrument referred to the Decedent as “Donor” and as “Trustee.” The Decedent was designated as the initial Trustee of the Trust. The Trust named Denise as the successor Trustee. With an exception for periods during which the Decedent might be incapacitated, the Decedent reserved the right to amend or to revoke the Trust during her lifetime. Under the terms of the Trust, the Trustee was required to pay to Donor whatever part of the income and principal of the Trust that Donor might direct in writing. In the event of Donor's incapacity, the Trustee was authorized to “use, apply, or expend for [D]onor's direct or indirect benefit, whatever part or parts or all of the income and principal, or both, of the trust fund the said Trustee shall think best.” If the Decedent transferred real property constituting her principal residence to the Trust, the Trustee was to hold the property for Donor's benefit and the Donor would retain an absolute possessory interest in the property and the right to occupy the property as her principal residence for the remainder of her life. In fact, the Decedent executed a warranty deed transferring the Punta Gorda residence to herself as Trustee on the same day that she executed the Trust. The warranty deed was promptly recorded in the public records of Charlotte County.
With regard to the issues raised in this appeal, the provisions of the Trust concerning the designation of the beneficiaries are of particular interest. Article I of the Trust provides as follows:
The term “Beneficiaries” wherever used herein shall mean the [B]eneficiary or [B]eneficiaries listed in the Schedule of Beneficial Interest[s] this day executed and filed with the Trustee or in the revised Schedule of Beneficial Interests, if any, from time to time executed and filed with the Trustee.
Furthermore, the Trust provides that it is to terminate upon the death of the Donor. With regard to the distribution of the Trust assets upon the Donor's death, Article V of the Trust provides as follows:
Unfortunately, the draftsman of the Trust neglected to prepare the schedule of beneficial interests referenced in Article I when the Decedent executed the trust instrument. When the Decedent died in August 2012, the omission to prepare the schedule of beneficial interests led directly to the current dispute among the parties concerning the ownership of the Punta Gorda residence that had been transferred to the Trust.
The litigation began when Sharon filed a complaint against her siblings, Denise and Robert, seeking declaratory relief. In an amended complaint, Sharon sought a declaration that the Trust was void for lack of beneficiaries and that the Punta Gorda residence passed to the three siblings in accordance with the terms of the Will executed in 1992.4
Denise answered the amended complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking a judicial reformation of the Trust. In her counterclaim, Denise alleged, in pertinent part, as follows:
Denise asked the circuit court to enter judgment reforming “the P.M. Revocable Trust Agreement dated July 29, 1977 to include the Schedule of Beneficial Interest[s] naming Denise L. Megiel–Rollo and Robert Michael Megiel as sole beneficiaries.”
Ultimately, Sharon and Denise filed cross motions for summary judgment. In connection with these motions, Denise filed two affidavits—her own affidavit and the affidavit of her husband, Vincent P. Rollo. Sharon did not file any affidavits.
In her affidavit, Denise stated that before the Decedent executed the Trust, the Decedent had “informed [Denise] that she wanted only [Denise] and Robert to receive equal ownership of [the Punta Gorda residence] upon her death.” Denise also offered the Decedent's stated reason for not wanting Sharon to receive an ownership interest in the Punta Gorda residence.
Mr. Rollo is admitted to practice law in both Massachusetts and Florida. He prepared both the Trust and the warranty deed that transferred the Punta Gorda residence into the Decedent's name as Trustee. In his affidavit, Mr. Rollo stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
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