Mehic v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
| Citation | 587 F.Supp.3d 1327 |
| Decision Date | 14 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-cv-03949-JPB |
| Parties | Enesa MEHIC, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Calvin David Williamson, Law Office of Calvin D. Williamson, Lawrenceville, GA, for Plaintiff.
Marvin Dewayne Dikeman, Melissa Cordell McMullen, Webb Zschunke Neary & Dikeman, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company's ("Allstate") Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 9. Having reviewed and fully considered the papers filed therewith, the Court finds as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Enesa Mehic ("Mehic") filed a complaint for breach of contract alleging that she was insured under a policy issued by Allstate at the time she lost her home in a fire, but Allstate denied her request for benefits.
The record shows that Mehic purchased a home located at 872 Pin Oak Way, Lawrenceville, Georgia in 2008 (the "Home"). ECF No. 13-3, ¶ 2. Allstate provided a Homeowners Insurance Policy ("Policy") for the Home beginning in 2008, and Mehic thereafter paid annual premiums to Allstate, including on December 3, 2019. Id.
Mehic states that she lived in the Home until mid-2017, when she left the Home and moved in with her son. Id. ¶ 3. Her nephew and his family subsequently rented the Home from Mehic until mid-2019. Id. ; ECF No. 14, ¶ 14. After the nephew moved out, Mehic split her time between the Home and her son's home, which is nearby. ECF No. 13-3, ¶ 3. It is undisputed that Mehic never notified Allstate of any of these changes in use of the Home.
On February 29, 2020, a fire occurred at the Home, and Mehic notified Allstate of the fire. ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 2-3. Allstate asserts that during its investigation of the fire, it observed that "the [Home] was ... riddled with evidence of vandalism, including graffiti, broken windows, and generalized intentional damage to the [Home]." ECF No. 9-1 at 6. Allstate's investigation concluded that: (1) at the time of the fire, the Home had been vacant and unoccupied for more than thirty days; (2) Mehic did not "reside" at the Home at the time of the fire and had not resided at the Home for over a year; and (3) the fire was intentionally set by vandals. Id. at 5.
Allstate further asserts that Stephen Knowles, a Gwinnett County Department of Fire and Emergency Services investigator, conducted a "parallel, independent investigation into the origin and cause of the [f]ire," ECF No. 9-5, ¶ 5, and likewise concluded that the fire was intentionally set by vandals; the Home was vacant and unoccupied at the time of the fire; and the owner did not reside at the Home at the time of the fire, ECF No. 10-1, ¶ 5.
Allstate contends it is not required to cover the loss, and it is entitled to summary judgment on Mehic's claims for three independent reasons: (1) Mehic did not reside at the Home when the claimed loss occurred; (2) Mehic failed to notify Allstate of changes in use or occupancy of the Home, which is a condition precedent to coverage; and (3) the Policy excludes coverage for vandalism of a vacant home. ECF No. 9-1 at 2.
Mehic disputes that the Home was vacant and unoccupied for any time between December 2012 and the day of the fire. ECF. No. 14, ¶ 6. She states that although the Home did not have water service at the time of the fire, it had electric service, and she had personal items there. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. Mehic explains that the Home appeared vacant because she was in the process of remodeling it. ECF No. 13 at 3.
Mehic further argues that the changes in the use of the Home that occurred prior to the fire are immaterial to coverage for the fire loss because the "legally salient period ... is the 30 days prior to the fire." Id. at 3. Mehic also asserts that "there is no credible evidence" to explain Allstate and Knowles’ conclusion that the fire was caused by vandalism. ECF No. 14, ¶ 11.
In sum, Mehic contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because (1) the Home was not vacant or unoccupied during the thirty days immediately preceding the fire; (2) her failure to notify Allstate regarding the change in use of the Home is irrelevant since it occurred well before the fire; and (3) the fire was not the result of vandalism. ECF No. 13 at 2-5.
As relevant here, the Policy contains the following provisions:
ECF. No. 9-2 at 13 (emphasis in original).
II. DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence, including depositions, sworn declarations, and other materials, shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach , 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ) (quotation marks omitted). A material fact is any fact that "is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A genuine dispute exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Ultimately, "[t]he basic issue before the court ... is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ " Allen , 121 F.3d at 646 (citation omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, "and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the burden of showing specific facts indicating summary judgment is improper because a material issue of fact does exist. Id. In carrying this burden, "[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby , 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Also, Evans v. Stephens , 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). But "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
In sum, if the record taken as a whole cannot lead "a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation omitted).
Georgia law1 is clear that "construction [of a contract] is a matter of law for the court." Envision Printing, LLC v. Evans , 336 Ga.App. 635, 786 S.E.2d 250, 252 (2016) ; see also Gans v. Ga. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 179 Ga.App. 660, 347 S.E.2d 615, 618 (1986) (). Insurance contracts are treated like any other contract and "are interpreted by [the] ordinary rules of contract construction." Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. , 269 Ga. 326, 498 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1998).
Construction of a contract requires three steps:
First, the trial court must decide whether the language is clear and unambiguous. If it is, no construction is required, and the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms. Next, if the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the court must apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. Finally, if the ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by a jury.
Envision Printing , 786 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting
General Steel v. Delta Bldg. Sys. , 297 Ga.App. 136, 676 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2009) ).
With respect to the first step, "[t]he court [initially] looks to the four corners of the agreement to ascertain the meaning of the contract from the language employed." Brogdon v. Pro Futures Bridge Cap. Fund, L.P. , 260 Ga.App. 521, 580 S.E.2d 303, 306 (2003). In that analysis, "[w]ords generally [are...
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