Mehnert v. U.S. Bank Nat'Lass'N

• Decision Date: 23 April 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17-4985 (JMV)
• Parties: LINDA MEHNERT, Plaintiff, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR PROF-2013-S3 REMIC TRUST VII, ET AL. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

LINDA MEHNERT, Plaintiff, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,AS TRUSTEE FOR PROF-2013-S3 REMIC TRUST VII, ET AL. Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-4985 (JMV)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

April 23, 2018

Not for Publication

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

In this case, pro se Plaintiff Linda Mehnert seeks damages from Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for PROF-2013-S3 REMIC Trust VII ("Defendant" or "U.S. Bank"), and John and Jane Does 1-100, related to a 2016 state court foreclosure judgment on her home. The present matter comes before the Court on U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). D.E. 7. This motion was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. The Court has considered Defendant's submission¹ and grants Defendant's motion to dismiss all counts without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND²

On October 19, 2007, Plaintiff executed a Note to First Horizon Home Loans, a division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. ("First Horizon") for $200,000.00. Compl at 2; Def. Br, Ex. A ("Gross Cert."). Plaintiff states that after she signed the mortgage, "a warranty deed was signed over to Plaintiff by her ex-husband." Compl. at 4. Plaintiff continues that "[t]his created title issues and problems with equitable distribution with the impending divorce. There was an issue with a failure to acquire title insurance, and left (sic) liens on the property and an unauthorized delivery of a warranty deed to Plaintiff's ex-spouse for his signature." Id. Plaintiff claims that "[t]here were many irregularities in the mortgage, resulting in complaints to a number of government agencies, including the New Jersey Board of [B]anking and Insurance, and that State's Attorney General's office." Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff claims that First Horizon was made aware of these issues. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff asserts that the loan was eventually purchased or assigned to Freddie Mac. Id. at 4 ("[T]he loan was eventually assigned to Freddie Mac, which then became the owner of the Note and at which time it became the servicer of the mortgage."); Id. ("Freddie Mac purchased the loan."). Plaintiff claims that "Freddie Mac has very strict guidelines with regard to loans owned and serviced [by] them. Once they were made aware of the defective nature of the alleged loan,the[y] required the prior owner to re-purchase the loan back for breach of warranty, as it was in violation of State and Federal laws and statutes." Id. at 4-5

A foreclosure action on Plaintiff's Property was initiated on May 19, 2014 when First Horizon filed a complaint, First Horizon Home Loans, a Division of First Tennessee Bank, NA v. Linda Mehnert, et al., Case No. F-020001-14, in the Superior Court for New Jersey, Chancery Division, Hudson County. Def. Br., Ex. B. On December 19, 2014, the State Superior Court granted summary judgment against the Plaintiff, and Defendant U.S. Bank was substituted as the plaintiff in the state foreclosure action. Def. Br., Ex. B. On October 24, 2016, the State Superior Court entered an uncontested order for final judgment and a writ of execution against Plaintiff. Def. Br., Ex. C. Plaintiff appealed the state court foreclosure judgment. Her motion requesting an exception to the entire controversy doctrine was denied on January 11, 2017. Def. Br., Ex. D. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, No. 17-18971-VFP. Def. Br., Ex. E.

Plaintiff then filed her Complaint before this Court on July 7, 2017. D.E. 1. Plaintiff brings claims for violations of (1) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (Count One); (2) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (Count Two); (3) the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8, et seq. (Count Three); and (4) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Four). Plaintiff also mentions that she brings claims for "common law fraud . . . and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress," but does not further plead these claims. Compl. at 1.

On July 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. D.E. 1. On September 13, 2017, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. D.E. 7. Plaintiff filed no opposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

a. Rule 12(b)(1)

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack because the distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed.³ A facial attack "contests the sufficiency of the complaint because of a defect on its face," whereas a factual attack "asserts that the factual underpinnings of the basis for jurisdiction fails to comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites." Elbeco Inc. v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 128 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Moore v. Angle's List, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 806 (E.D. Pa. 2015)). When a party moves to dismiss prior to answering the complaint, as is the case here, the motion is generally considered a facial attack. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).

For a facial attack, "the Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true," much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., No. 09-6447, 2010 WL 2521091, at *8 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006)). The burden is on the Plaintiff to prove the Court has jurisdiction. Id. (citing Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302).

"Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). One key aspect of this case-or-controversy requirement is standing. See id. "The standing inquiry focuses on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed." Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 360. To establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test,showing: "(1) an 'injury in fact,' i.e., an actual or imminently threatened injury that is 'concrete and particularized' to the plaintiff; (2) causation, i.e., traceability of the injury to the actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability of the injury by a favorable decision by the Court." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gov. of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 218 (3d. Cir. 2013).

b. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to dismiss a count for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content "that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must "allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of [his] claims." Id. at 789.

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is "not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, after viewing the allegations in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismissthe complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., 2010 WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and holds him to a less stringent standard than those filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the "Court need not . . . credit a pro se plaintiff's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions.'" D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 2010 WL 3719623, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant first argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Younger abstention doctrine, the Entire Controversy Doctrine, and the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Def. Br. at 7-16. Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state any viable claims for relief against Defendant pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Def. Br. 16-24. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her Complaint. Def. Br. at 24-25.

a. 12(b)(1)

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine⁴

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine⁵ precludes lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely withthe United States Supreme Court." In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006)); see also Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit has ruled that the doctrine applies when "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the...