Meidel v. Anthis

• Decision Date: 31 January 1874
• Parties: JOHN MEIDELv.MARIA ANTHIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

71 Ill. 241

1874 WL 8650 (Ill.)

JOHN MEIDEL

v.MARIA ANTHIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1874.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. JOSEPH GILLESPIE, Judge, presiding.

Mr. CHARLES P. WISE, for the appellant.

Mr. G. M. COLE, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action before a justice of the peace of Madison county, under the fifth section of the act of January 13, 1872, entitled “An act to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors in this State,” in force July 1, 1872. We had occasion, at the last September term of this court, to examine and construe this section in the case of Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496, which was a case like this, except that defendant had a license to sell intoxicating liquors, from the proper authorities. That fact, however, did not enter into the judgment of the court.

It was held in that case that the statute, being highly penal in its character, and introducing remedies unknown to the common law, in which the person prosecuting had decided advantages over the party defending, should receive a strict construction. It was held there that anguish or mental pain of the wife was not an element of damage to be considered. The statute contemplates only injury in person or property or means of support. It was also held, the jury could not give exemplary damages, unless actual damages were proved and found.

In support of this, Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. R. 98, was cited. It was also held, that exemplary damages could not be awarded as punishment, for the reason the statute itself provides the public shall avail of its punitive provisions by indictment, §§ 6, 8; that putting money in the pocket of the plaintiff would be no satisfaction to the public for violation of a penal statute.

Appellee in this case insists such damages can be awarded; that the statute allows exemplary damages. This is true, but not damages by way of punishment, but exemplary damages such as will operate as an example, or a warning to deter the party or others from similar transactions, and aggravating circumstances must be shown.

Appellee says such damages are allowed in actions of tort at common law. Granted, but this is not an action of tort at common law, and the idea of the statute does not seem to be, as it has provided a punishment for the public wrong, that a complaining party in a civil suit should pocket money by way of punishment for the offender. This right to claim exemplary damages is coupled, in the statute, with the person or persons owning, renting, leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be sold therein, or who, having leased the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the sale of any intoxicating liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person selling or giving such liquors, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary damages.

Exemplary damages are here for the first time, and the only time, and in this connection, spoken of or alluded to, and it would seem, in order to allow them, the owner of the premises must be a party to the suit, against whom, whether sued jointly or severally with the seller, exemplary damages may be given, for in no other portion of the statute is he made subject to action or damages, whilst the seller, by the sixth, seventh and eighth sections, is liable to fine, and, by indictment, to imprisonment.

But be this as it may, actual damages must be proved, as ground for exemplary damages against the seller. The record is barren of any evidence on this point. There is no proof whatever that any actual damages of any kind have been sustained by the plaintiff. It is not sufficient her husband abused her, in a drunken mood, with his tongue, or threatened her. There must be actual violence to the person. Schneider v. Hosier, supra; Mulford v. Crowell, 21 Ohio St. 191.

No damage has been done to the person.

Has there been any damage to the property of the wife? The record shows nothing of the kind. Has there been any damage proved, to her means of support? Have they been diminished below what is reasonable and proper for a person in her position, and what was usual? At this point the consideration of defendant's instructions arises. The court gave all as asked, except the sixth and seventh, which, after being modified, were given by the court.

The sixth is as follows: “Although the jury may believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff took care of her husband, and spent her time in nursing and taking care of him, yet she can not, in this suit, recover for her time so spent, and the jury, in making up their verdict, will entirely disregard it, and as to this they must find for the defendant.”

The modification by the court consisted in adding these words, “unless the loss of time thus spent injured her in property or means of support.”

The objection to this modification is, there was no evidence on which to base it. The plaintiff testified she relied on her husband for support--had no income from any other source--depended wholly upon his labor for support. On her cross-examination, she testified her husband leased land, and the preceding year they raised between three and four thousand bushels of corn alone. He took good care of his family when sober, had plenty to live upon and there was plenty around them--is a good husband and father to his family when sober. When his leg was broke, his family were supplied as usual.

There was no proof that one dollar was expended in his care, or that plaintiff's property was in any respect injured, or that her means of support were diminished in any degree by the act of defendant in selling the liquor to her husband. The same objections exist to the modification of the seventh instruction.

This statute applies, in terms, to her means of support, and she must show they have been diminished in some degree and to some extent to enable her to recover damages. This is not to be left to conjecture. Into that vast field the jury is not permitted to roam. If they were, no man's property would be worth having.

Whilst we are not disposed to give the statute the narrow construction claimed for it by appellant, we must give it such a construction as its words will bear, taking them in connection with the object and purpose of the act. Appellant contends the words, “means of support,” imply present actual means, not a future prospect. We are disposed to hold, with the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Schneider v. Hosier, supra, as to the interpretation of this phrase. In its general sense, it embraces all those resources from which the necessaries and comforts of life are or may be supplied, such as lands, goods, salaries, wages or other sources of income. In a...