Meier v. SENECAUT III
Decision Date | 27 February 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 00-0114.,00-0114. |
Citation | 641 N.W.2d 532 |
Parties | Loretta MEIER, Appellee, v. Voltaire Senecaut, Defendant, and Voltaire SENECAUT III, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Hayward L. Draper and W. Don Brittin, Jr., of Nyemaster, Goode, Voigts, West, Hansell & O'Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark S. Pennington of Kutmus & Pennington, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
In this interlocutory appeal, we find appellant failed to preserve error on one of the issues raised on appeal but further find the district court erred in failing to dismiss the petition based on a claim of abusive delay in service of process which was properly preserved for our review. We reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal.
The proceedings in this case stem from an automobile accident between Loretta Meier and Voltaire Senecaut III (Senecaut III) on May 13, 1997. On January 20, 1999, Meier filed a petition at law seeking damages for injuries she allegedly suffered from the accident. The petition named "Voltaire Senecaut" as the defendant. It did not include the designation "III." Contemporaneously with the filing of the petition, the clerk of court issued an original notice naming "Voltaire Senecaut" as the defendant. The notice listed Senecaut's address as 1449 E. 23rd Street, Des Moines. This was the address of Senecaut III's grandfather, whose name is Voltaire Senecaut (Senecaut). Senecaut III did not live with his grandfather at any time during these proceedings.
In preparing the original notice, counsel for Meier did not use the address listed for Senecaut III in the police report completed following the accident. The police report listed Senecaut III's address as 1904 E. 14th Street, Des Moines, but did not include the designation "III." Instead, Meier's counsel obtained the address used on the original notice from the November 1998/1999 U.S. West telephone directory. The telephone book covered the city of Des Moines and the surrounding area. There was only one listing for "Voltaire Senecaut," and it did not include "III." Meier retained a private investigator, Charles Glenn, to serve the notice and petition. Glenn unsuccessfully attempted service at the E. 23rd Street address on thirteen different occasions between January 21, 1999 and March 27, 1999.
On April 19, Glenn discovered Senecaut and his wife were vacationing in Monroe County, Florida. On May 4, counsel for Meier directed the Monroe County Sheriff's office in Florida to serve Senecaut in Florida. Senecaut informed the deputy sheriff who attempted service that the notice was intended for his grandson. He also provided the deputy sheriff with his grandson's address in Iowa. The deputy did not serve Senecaut. In the return of service, the deputy included Senecaut III's new address in Norwalk, Iowa. Although Senecaut III had moved from the E. 14th Street address listed in the police report, he was residing at the Norwalk address at the time the petition was filed. Senecaut III provided his Norwalk address to the United States Post Office in Des Moines when he moved to Norwalk.
Despite notice from the deputy sheriff in Florida concerning the mistake in the identity of Voltaire Senecaut, Meier's counsel again instructed Glenn to serve the original notice and petition at Senecaut's East 23rd Street address in Des Moines. After returning from her Florida vacation on May 18, Senecaut's wife accepted service. However, she immediately called Meier's counsel listed on the original notice to inform him of the mistake in the identity of the two Senecauts. She also provided counsel with her grandson's current Norwalk address, which matched the address provided by the deputy two weeks earlier. Senecaut III lived in an apartment complex in Norwalk with his wife.
Glenn then attempted to serve process on Senecaut's grandson at his apartment in Norwalk. Between May 18 and June 30, Glenn tried to serve Senecaut III approximately twelve times at the Norwalk location. Glenn subsequently made five more unsuccessful attempts to serve Senecaut III at his residence between August 18 and August 25, before finally serving Senecaut III on August 25. The notice served on Senecaut III was an altered photocopy of the original notice issued by the clerk of court on January 20. The E. 23rd Street address had been covered in white-out and replaced with 1121 Main Street # 8, Norwalk. In addition, the notice attached a copy of the January 20 petition.
While Glenn was attempting to serve process on Senecaut III, Senecaut began litigating the action. On June 7, Senecaut filed an answer to the petition. He denied all of Meier's allegations. Furthermore, he responded to Meier's interrogatories and moved for summary judgment. In each of these documents, he consistently contended he was not the owner or the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident.
On September 23, the day prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Meier's counsel filed a pleading entitled "dismissal." The body of the pleading simply stated Meier dismissed "the above-captioned matter." The next day counsel filed a motion entitled "amended motion to dismiss." In this "motion," Meier asserted she only dismissed the action against the elder Senecaut and clarified that the action would continue to proceed against Senecaut III. Minutes later, counsel filed a second "amended motion to dismiss," explaining the September 23 dismissal was due to a "scrivener's error." Contemporaneously with the second motion, the district court entered an ex parte order reinstating the action against Senecaut III. It found the pleading filed on September 23 that dismissed the case was a mistake attributable to a scrivener's error.
Senecaut III filed a motion to dismiss and to quash service. He contended the district court had no jurisdiction to reinstate the petition after Meier filed the unconditional dismissal of the petition on September 23. He also argued the length of time between the filing of the petition and his service of process constituted abusive delay. Finally, he claimed that service of the altered original notice failed to conform to rule 49(a) and (c).
The district court denied the motion in a lengthy written ruling, but did not specifically address the jurisdictional issue based on the voluntary dismissal of the petition. It found good cause for the delay in service of process and further found that the alteration of the original notice did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction or require that the service be quashed.
We granted Senecaut III's application for interlocutory appeal. He raises the same issues on appeal as he did before the district court. Meier claims Senecaut III failed to preserve error on the reinstatement issue by failing to request a specific ruling.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of Supervisors, 595 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1999); McCormick v. Meyer, 582 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1998). Although we are not bound by the district court's legal conclusions, we are bound by the court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. McCormick, 582 N.W.2d at 144.
We must first consider whether Senecaut III preserved error on his claim that the district court did not have jurisdiction to reinstate the action following the voluntary dismissal of the petition. He asserts error was preserved when he raised the issue in the motion to dismiss and the district court overruled the motion.
It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal. Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (); Peters v. Burlington N. R.R., 492 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1992) (). The reason for this principle relates to the essential symmetry required of our legal system. It is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue "without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination[]." Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1534, 118 L.Ed.2d 153, 172 (1992) (quoting Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 1336 n. 3, 108 L.Ed.2d 504, 515 n. 3 (1990)). When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal. Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pflibsen, 350 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984).
Senecaut claims he was not required to move for a specific ruling to preserve error on the issue of the jurisdiction of the district court to reinstate the petition for two reasons. First, he claims the rule that allows parties to file motions to enlarge a ruling does not apply to legal issues, such as jurisdiction. Second, he claims the district court necessarily decided the issue by overruling the motion to dismiss. We will address the two arguments in the order presented.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) permits a party to file a motion to request the district court to amend or enlarge its findings and conclusions, and to enable the court to modify its judgment or enter a new judgment. Iowa R. Civ. P. 179(b). Thus, it is a procedural mechanism that permits parties to request reconsideration of a ruling, and authorizes the court to change its ruling. See Beck v. Fleener, 376 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1985) ( ); Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984) (...
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