Meier v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1870
• Citation: 64 Pa. 225
• Parties: Meier <I>versus</I> The Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

64 Pa. 225

Meier versus The Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 11, 1870.

July 7, 1870.

February 11th 1870.

Before READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ. THOMPSON, C. J., at Nisi Prius

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: Of July Term 1869, No. 111 I. Hazlehurst, for plaintiff in error.—The relation between the plaintiff and defendants was a contract by which they engaged to provide a safe railroad, roadworthy cars, and competent management: Sullivan v. Railroad, 6 Casey 239. The provisions for the safety of a passenger should be not merely the best that can be procured, but absolutely perfect: Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. R. 246; Railroad Co. v. Kennard, 9 Harris 204. A railroad company is not relieved by proof of ordinary care: Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr 479; Penna. Railroad v. Aspell, 11 Harris 147; Readhead v. Railroad, 2 Queen's B. 412. There is a warranty that the carriage is in every respect roadworthy and fit to perform the journey: White v. Boulton, 1 Peake's Cas. 91; Israel v. Clarke, 4 Esp. R. 257; Bremner v. Williams, 1 Car. & Payne 414; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. R. 321; Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. R. 79; Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 331; Alden v. Railroad, 26 N. Y. R. 102. Undertaking a service is a consideration to create a duty in the performance of it: Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 529; Gray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 108; Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144; Okell v. Smith, 1 Stark. 107 (86); Bluett v. Osborne, Id. 384 (308); Brown v. Eddington, 2 M. & G. 279; Abbott on Shipping 218; Lyon v. Mells, 5 East 428; Gibson v. Small, 4 H. of L. Cas. 404; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. N. Y. 1; Sherman and Redfield on Negl. 298.

T. Cuyler, for defendants in error.—Extraordinary care, and the highest degree of prudence, foresight and precaution, practically applied, constitute the duty of the carrier: 2 Redfield on Railways 170-190. Carriers of passengers are not liable for injuries happening from unforeseen accidents or misfortune where there has been no negligence or default in the driver: Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. 533; Hall v. Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. 326; Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Peters 150; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Hegeman v. The Railway, 16 Barb. 353; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer 241; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Galena and Chicago Railway v. Fay, 16 Ill. 558; Wilkie v. Bolster, 3 E. D. Smith 327; Chicago & Burl. Railroad v. Hazzard, 26 Ill. 373; Tuller v. Talbot, 23 Id. 357; Bowen v. N. Y. Cent. Railroad, 18 N. Y. 408; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer 241; Curtis v. The Rochester and Syracuse Railroad, 18 N. Y. 534; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 236; Camden & Amboy Railroad v. Burke, 13 Id. 620; Hegeman v. Western Railroad, 16 Barb. 353; S. C., 3 Kernan 9; Wilkie v. Butler, 4 E. D. Smith 327; Holbrook v. The Railroad, 2 Kernan 236.

The opinion of the court was delivered, July 7th 1870, by AGNEW, J.

It is agreed on all hands, says Judge Redfield, in his work on Railways, ed. 1867, p. 174, that carriers of passengers are liable only for negligence either proximate or remote, and that they are not insurers of the safety of their passengers, as they are as carriers of goods and baggage of passengers. The numerous cases cited from which this result is drawn, justify this statement: Alden v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 26 N. Y. 102, holding that a carrier is bound absolutely to provide a safe vehicle, irrespective of any question of negligence, is not in accord with the American cases generally, or the modern English decisions. It is reviewed in Readhead v. Midland Railroad Co., 2 Law Rep. C. B. 412, and therein said not to be founded in good reason. See the cases collected in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (1869) 299, § 267.

The language of Judge Gibson, taken from N. Jersey Railroad Co. v. Kennard, 9 Harris 204, that a carrier of either goods or passengers, is bound to provide a carriage or vehicle perfect in all its parts, in default of which he becomes responsible for any loss or injury that may be suffered, has no relation to the question now before us. The case he was considering was that of a car made without guards at the windows to prevent the arms of passengers being thrust out, to their injury, which he considered a defect in the construction of the car, making the carrier liable for negligence. The car was not perfect in its parts as he thought. The car was imperfect in construction and therefore not adapted to the end to be attained, to wit, security. It may not be amiss to say that this opinion of the Chief Justice as to window guards, was not sustained by the court in banc, and has since been overruled in Pittsburg & Connellsville Railroad Co. v. McCleary, 6 P. F. Smith 294. The doctrine we are now asked to sustain, is that though the car is perfect in all its parts, if imperfect from some latent and undiscoverable defect, which the utmost skill and care could neither perceive nor provide against, the railway company must still be held responsible for injury to passengers, on the ground of an absolute liability for every defect. The plaintiff in error in effect contends, that the defendants were warrantors against every accident, but even in the case referred to, Judge Gibson denied this rule. He said of the carrier, he is bound to guard him (the passenger) from every danger which extreme vigilance can prevent. This expresses the true measure of responsibility. He answered a point in these words, "That the company is responsible only for defects discoverable...