Meighan v. US Sprint Communications Co.

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: REID; BIRCH
• Citation: Meighan v. US Sprint Communications Co., 942 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1997)
• Decision Date: 07 April 1997
• Parties: Joe C. MEIGHAN, Jr., for himself, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 476

942 S.W.2d 476

Joe C. MEIGHAN, Jr., for himself, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville.

April 7, 1997.

Donald K. Vowell, Robert R. Carl, Rainwater, Humble & Vowell, A. James Andrews, Thomas A. Snapp, Knoxville, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ben W. Hooper, III, Campbell & Hooper, R.J. Tucker, Newport, Tom Jessee, Jessee & Jessee, Johnson City, for Plaintiffs Lawrence E. McCumber and Patricia Ann McCumber.

John B. Rayson, Adrienne L. Anderson, Kramer, Rayson, Leake, Rodgers & Morgan, Knoxville, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

REID, Justice.

The case is before the Court on a petition for writ of mandamus. This is one of three cases ¹ in which landowners have filed suit against U.S. Sprint Communications Company (Sprint), asserting claims for inverse condemnation and trespass and seeking certification as a class action. Buhl v. Sprint and the instant case, Meighan, have been before this Court on appeal. ² The relief sought is an order directing the trial court in McCumber v. Sprint to vacate its order certifying a class action and to defer to the trial court in this case on that issue. The Court, heretofore, entered an order staying the proceedings in all three cases pending this hearing.

I

These legal proceedings against Sprint began on October 18, 1988 when John G. Buhl, et al., landowners in Anderson County and outside Anderson County, filed a suit in the chancery court for Anderson County, in which the named plaintiffs, "for themselves and all others similarly situated," sought certification of a statewide plaintiffs' class consisting of the owners of land in Tennessee across which Southern Railway Company maintains a railroad right-of-way and across which Sprint has constructed a fiber optics communications system. On appeal from cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court held in Buhl that Sprint's use of the property constituted the taking of an interest therein for which the landowners were entitled to be compensated. Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn.1992). Certification of the class action was not an issue on appeal of the Buhl case. After deciding the issues of law presented, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including the issue of class certification. The opinion was filed on October 26, 1992.

On June 5, 1990, while the Buhl case was on appeal, Joe C. Meighan, Jr., a landowner in Knox County, filed the instant suit against Sprint in the circuit court for Knox County in which he, "for himself and all others similarly situated," asserted the same claims as those made in the Buhl case. Meighan had sought to be named a representative plaintiff in the Buhl case, but his claim was dismissed by the trial court because his property was not located in Anderson County. Meighan did not appeal the dismissal of his claim in the Buhl case. The trial court on remand stayed the proceedings in the Buhl case, pending a decision in this case.

In this case, the Knox County Circuit Court denied plaintiff Meighan's prayer for certification of a statewide class, finding lack of jurisdiction, but granted certification of a class limited to the owners of land located in Knox County. It dismissed the claim based on trespass. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Knox County class action certification and affirmed the dismissal of the action for trespass. This Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the class to owners of land located in Knox County and that the Court of Appeals also erred in dismissing the cause of action based on trespass. Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn.1996). The opinion was released on April 29, 1996. A petition to rehear was denied on July 1, 1996.

On June 6, 1996, while the Meighan case was pending before this Court on a petition to rehear, Lawrence and Patricia Ann McCumber, landowners in Cocke County, filed a suit against Sprint in the circuit court of Cocke County "for themselves and all others similarly situated." The allegations are identical to those in the Meighan complaint except for the named plaintiffs and the requested class, which is all of Tennessee excluding Knox County. On the same date the McCumber complaint was filed, and without any notice, a conditional order was entered by the Cocke County court certifying a class which included all of Tennessee except Knox County. In the order certifying the case as a class action, the Court relied upon the decision of this Court in Meighan for its finding that the allegations in McCumber were "sufficient to justify certification." In excluding Knox County, the Court found "that a prior class has been certified as to Knox County, Tennessee only."

The appeal in Meighan was concluded when the petition to rehear was denied on July 1, 1996. This Court ordered that the trial court "should consider the numerous justifications for allowing the maintenance of a class action in this case including judicial economy, financial feasibility, and consistent verdicts, and should not base any future class determinations on venue alone." Id. at 639. However, the trial court, on remand, refused to consider certification of a statewide class, finding that alternative had been precluded by entry of the certification order in McCumber, while Meighan was on appeal.

On the petition before the Court, Meighan seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Cocke County court to vacate its order for class certification and defer to any decision on that issue which may be made by the trial court in this case. McCumber responds that mandamus does not lie in this case, and, further, there has been no error committed in any of the trial courts. Sprint's position is that the class certification issue should be determined by the Anderson County court in the Buhl case.

II

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that there are a number of technical defects in the petition for the writ. The suit was not prosecuted in the name of the state on the relation of the petitioner, as is required. See Whitesides v. Stewart, 91 Tenn. 710, 20 S.W. 245, 246 (1892). Also, the petitioners did not institute this suit against the judge upon whom it seeks a writ to issue, as is required. See State v. Thompson, 118 Tenn. 571, 102 S.W. 349, 351 (1907). Nevertheless, the Court elects not to dismiss the petition because of technical defects.

III

Whether a suit should be certified as a class action in a particular case is a matter of judicial discretion or judgment to be determined by the application of established legal principles to the facts and circumstances of the case. After discussing the prerequisites to a class action, the Court noted in Meighan, "the determination of whether an action should proceed as a class action is a matter which is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Meighan, 924 S.W.2d at 637. The question of whether the suit should proceed as a class action was presented in each of these three cases. The complaint in each case was filed on behalf of the named plaintiffs and "all others similarly situated" and sought certification of a statewide class of plaintiffs. A subsidiary issue presented in each case was whether the class to be certified would be statewide or limited. The focus of this petition is the trial court's decision in McCumber to certify a statewide class except for those landowners "similarly situated" in Knox County.

Plaintiff McCumber properly states that the decision regarding the certification of a class action lies within the trial court's judicial discretion, but his insistence that the court's discretion is not subject to review on a petition for writ of mandamus overstates the rule.

The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, whose purpose is to exert the revisory appellate power over the inferior courts where there is no other plain, adequate, and complete method of obtaining the relief to which one is entitled. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); 52 Am.Jur.2d Mandamus § 12 (1970). Mandamus generally will not be issued if the petitioner has a legal remedy that is equally convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective, but the remedy which would preclude mandamus must be equally as convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective as mandamus, and must also be sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury. 52 Am.Jur.2d Mandamus §§ 46, 49 (1970). Although the writ is more often addressed to ministerial acts, rather than discretionary acts, the writ may be addressed to discretionary acts when the act is done in an "arbitrary and oppressive manner" or where there has been a "plainly palpable" abuse of discretion. Peerless Const. Co. v. Bass, 158 Tenn. 518, 524, 14 S.W.2d 732, 733 (1929).

The need for the writ to be exercised by an appellate court may require an analysis different from that made by a trial court. In considering a petition addressed to a trial court, this Court stated: The "essential purpose [of the writ] is to execute a ministerial function, not adjudicate a legal issue." Paduch v. Johnson City, 896 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tenn.1995). The essential purpose of the writ utilized by appellate courts was discussed in the recent case of State v. Irick:

It is well-settled, however, that the appellate courts of this state have limited mandamus jurisdiction in circumstances under which the writ is necessary to aid the exercise of the appellate function. State v. Sneed, 105 Tenn. 711, 58 S.W. 1070 (1900); State v. Baby John Doe, 813 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991); Blanton v. Tennessee Central Ry. Co., 4 Tenn.App. 335 (1926); Hyde v. Dunlap, 3 Tenn.App. 368 (1926). In Sneed, this Court explained the rule as follows:

The granting of a writ of mandamus is the exercise of an original, and not an appellate,...