Meikle v. Nurse

• Decision Date: 27 April 2016
• Docket Number: SJC–11859.
• Citation: Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 49 N.E.3d 210 (Mass. 2016)
• Parties: Garth MEIKLE v. Patricia NURSE.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

474 Mass. 207

49 N.E.3d 210

Garth MEIKLE

v.Patricia NURSE.

SJC–11859.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Submitted Nov. 5, 2015.

Decided April 27, 2016.

Louis Fisher(Patricia Whiting with him) for the defendant.

Garth Meikle, pro se.

Peter Vickery, for Worcester Property Owners Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Maureen McDonagh & Julia Devanthéry, for City Life/Vida Urbana, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.

Opinion

HINES, J.

In this appeal we decide whether a tenant may assert a violation of the security deposit statute, G.L. c. 186, § 15B, as a defense to a landlord's claim for possession in a summary process action brought under G.L. c. 239, § 1A.The issue arises from a Housing Court judge's disposition of a summary process action brought by Garth Meikle, the landlord, against Patricia Nurse, the tenant.After a trial, the judge ruled that the tenant properly could assert a violation of the security deposit statute as

a counterclaim for damages, but that a counterclaim on this basis is not a defense to the landlord's claim for possession.The tenant appealed, arguing that the plain language of G.L. c. 239, § 8A, buttressed by its legislative history, establishes that a violation of the security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a landlord's claim for possession and that the judge erred in rejecting this interpretation of the statute.We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.¹

We conclude that a violation of the security deposit statute is encompassed within the definition of “counterclaim or defense” in G.L. c. 239, § 8A, and that a counterclaim or defense on that basis may be asserted as a defense to a landlord's possession in a summary process action under G.L. c. 239, § 1A.Therefore, we reverse the Housing Court judgment granting possession to the landlord and remand for a hearing in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par.²

Background.We summarize the judge's findings of fact, which we accept unless they are clearly erroneous.Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC,467 Mass. 1, 8, 2 N.E.3d 885(2014).In October, 2011, Nurse moved into a residential building owned by Meikle.The parties executed a one-year lease under which Nurse paid a security deposit in the amount of $1,300, equivalent to one month's rent.Meikle failed to give Nurse a receipt acknowledging acceptance of the deposit, failed to provide Nurse with a receipt indicating the bank account into which he deposited the funds, and failed to pay Nurse interest earned.On expiration of the lease, Nurse continued to live in the premises as a tenant at will until Meikle terminated the tenancy in April, 2014, to provide housing to members of his extended family.Meikle then instituted a no-fault summary process action for possession of the premises, G.L. c. 239, § 1, and for recovery of monies due for use and occupancy, G.L. c. 239, § 2, for the months of May, June, and July,

2014.Nurse counterclaimed,³ alleging violations of G.L. c. 186, § 15B(security deposit statute), and G.L. c. 93A, in addition to improper termination, insufficient notice to quit, retaliation, and breach of the warranty of habitability.

After a two-day bench trial, the judge found for Meikle on all but the security deposit claim, ruling that his failure to provide Nurse with an acceptance receipt, a bank deposit receipt, and the interest earned from the security deposit violated G.L. c. 186, §§ 15B (2)(b ),⁴(3)(a ),⁵ and (3)(b ),⁶ respectively.The judgment awarded possession and unpaid rent ($3,900) to Meikle, to be offset by the amount due to Nurse on her security deposit counterclaim ($1,304.61), resulting in net damages to Meikle in the amount of $2,595.39.Nurse's motion to reconsider was denied, and she timely appealed.

Discussion.1.Standard of review.“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.”Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.,447 Mass. 478, 481, 852 N.E.2d 1061(2006).Here we apply the “general and familiar rule ... that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its

words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.”Lowery v. Klemm,446 Mass. 572, 576–577, 845 N.E.2d 1124(2006), quotingHanlon v. Rollins,286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606(1934).The language of a statute is interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, and if the “ language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature.”Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester,446 Mass. 123, 124, 842 N.E.2d 926(2006), citingCommonwealth v. Clerk–Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't,439 Mass. 352, 355–356, 787 N.E.2d 1032(2003).Also, insofar as relevant here, “a remedial statute ... should be given a broad interpretation ... in light of its purpose and to ‘promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design.’ ”Seller's Case,452 Mass. 804, 810, 898 N.E.2d 494(2008), quotingNeff v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs.,421 Mass. 70, 73, 653 N.E.2d 556(1995).

2.Violation of the security deposit statute as a defense to possession.The trial judge, without explaining her reasoning, ruled that the tenant's counterclaim for violation of the security deposit statute, while properly asserted as a claim for damages, did not constitute a defense to Meikle's action for possession.This was error.

General Laws c. 239, § 8A, sets forth in broad outline the defenses and counterclaims available to a tenant in a summary process action and, in certain circumstances, authorizes a prevailing tenant to retain possession of the premises.More specifically, G.L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., provides in relevant part:

“There shall be no recovery of possession under this chapter if the amount found by the court to be due the landlord equals or is less than the amount found to be due the tenant or occupant by reason of any counterclaim or defense under this section.If the amount found to be due the landlord exceeds the amount found to be due the tenant or occupant, there shall be no recovery of possession if the tenant or occupant, within one week after having received written notice from the court of the balance due, pays to the clerk the balance due the landlord, together with interest and costs of suit, less any credit due the tenant or occupant for funds already paid by him to the clerk under this section.”(Emphasis added.)

Drawing from the plain language of the statute, a tenant may retain possession only if two conditions are met: (1) the tenant prevails on a counterclaim or defense brought “under this section”; and (2) the damages on that defense or counterclaim exceed the amount due the landlord, or if the damages are less than the amount due the landlord, the tenant pays to the court the amount due within one week.The matter of damages is purely a factual question and needs no further explanation.Therefore, we focus on the specific issue of statutory interpretation presented here: whether we may deem the tenant's counterclaim for violation of the security deposit statute to have been brought “under this section.”

To begin the analysis, we accept that the only logical interpretation of the “under this section” language in G.L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., is as a reference to G.L. c. 239, § 8A, first par., the sole statutory provision describing the counterclaims or defenses that may be asserted by a tenant in a summary process action.The reference to “counterclaim[s] or defense[s][brought] under this section” without further explication necessarily connects the two provisions.They are to be read together in determining whether, in a given case, a tenant may defeat a landlord's claim for possession.We turn then to the definition of counterclaims and defenses in G.L. c. 239, § 8A, first par., taking note that “[w]here the Legislature uses the same words in several sections which concern the same subject matter, the words ‘must be presumed to have been used with the same meaning in each section.’ ”Commonwealth v. Wynton W.,459 Mass. 745, 747, 947 N.E.2d 561(2011), quotingInsurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins.,356 Mass. 184, 188–189, 248 N.E.2d 500(1969).

a. General Laws c. 239, § 8A, first par.Section 8A, first par., specifies that a tenant who faces eviction in a summary process action for nonpayment of rent, or because the tenancy is terminated without fault of the tenant, has the right to raise certain defenses or counterclaims in that proceeding.It provides, in relevant part:

“In any action under this chapter to recover possession of any premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes, brought pursuant to a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent, or where the tenancy has been terminated without fault ..., the tenant or occupant shall be entitled to raise, by defense or counterclaim, any claim against the plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a breach of any material provision of the rental agreement, or for a violation of any other law ”(emphasis added).

Based on the plain language of the statute, an actionable counterclaim or defense under this provision must meet two requirements: (1) the defense or counterclaim must “relat[e] to or aris[e] out of” the tenancy; and (2) the subject matter of the defense or counterclaim must be based on either “a breach of warranty,”“a breach of any material provision of the rental agreement,” or “a violation of any other law.”Id.

The first requirement, that a counterclaim or defense be related to or arise out of the tenancy or occupancy, reflects the Legislature's concern that summary...