Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2020
• Docket Number: DA 19-0622
• Citation: 475 P.3d 748,2020 MT 284,402 Mont. 92
• Parties: Cody MEINE, Robert Meine, Dorothy Meine, Jerry Meine, Tamara Meine, Richard Meine, Linda Meine, Bobbie Mussard, Richard Blake, and Robert Blake, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HREN RANCHES, INC., a Montana Corporation, Jeff Nelson, Renee Klakken, Mike Klakken, Cheryl Hren, John Hren, Beverly Hren, and John Does 1-5, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

402 Mont. 92

475 P.3d 748

2020 MT 284

Cody MEINE, Robert Meine, Dorothy Meine, Jerry Meine, Tamara Meine, Richard Meine, Linda Meine, Bobbie Mussard, Richard Blake, and Robert Blake, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.HREN RANCHES, INC., a Montana Corporation, Jeff Nelson, Renee Klakken, Mike Klakken, Cheryl Hren, John Hren, Beverly Hren, and John Does 1-5, Defendants and Appellees.

DA 19-0622

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: May 20, 2020

Decided: November 10, 2020

For Appellants: David L. Vicevich, Amanda D. Hunter, Vicevich Law, Butte, Montana

For Appellees: John F. (Jack) Jenks, Capp, Jenks & Simpson, P.C., Missoula, Montana

Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Plaintiffs (the Meines), appeal from the 2019 judgments of the Montana Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, interpreting and modifying a prior 2014 judgment that previously adjudicated that they had established various prescriptive easement rights over the subject land before Defendants (the Hrens) acquired it in the mid-1980's. We address the following restated issues:

1. Whether the District Court erroneously concluded that M. R. Civ. P. 59 - 60 did not apply to the Hrens’ motions for subsequent interpretation and clarification of the 2014 judgment?

2. Whether the District Court erroneously construed the 2014 judgment as ambiguous?

3. Whether the District Court erroneously interpreted or clarified the effect of the 2014 judgment inconsistent with its original meaning and effect?

We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal arises from the third installment of the ongoing litigation between the Meines and the Hrens regarding disputed prescriptive rights across the Hrens’ property on and along the Small Horn Canyon Road (the Road) in Beaverhead County.¹ The Road and involved properties are generally located approximately ten miles south of Dillon, Montana, southwest of Interstate 15, ten miles east of Clark Canyon Reservoir.²

¶3 The Meines represent the current generation of the Meine family who originally homesteaded in Small Horn Canyon in the early 1920's. Various branches of the Meine family have since continually owned the various constituent tracts of the current Meines’ property.³ From its north terminus at the south end of Carriger Lane in Beaverhead County, the Road meanders south to the Bottom Gate location on the north boundary of the Hren property, at the lower end of Small Horn Canyon. It then ascends south to the Corral cattleguard/gate location,⁴ and then again south up the canyon to a location at the top of a narrow steep grade, i.e. , the Top of the Grade location. From the Top of the Grade, the Road continues south up the canyon to the Rebich Gate location at the south boundary of the Hren property, and then again south through various third-party tracts (i.e. , Mussard and Schuett tracts) to the north boundary of the current Meines’ property.⁵ As of 2014, the main segment of the Road terminated further south in the interior of the Meines’ property.⁶ The original 2011-13 evidentiary record indicates that, prior to 1979, there were wire or chain roadway gates across the Road at various times in the adjacent Hren property fence lines at the Bottom Gate, Corral, and Rebich Gate locations.

¶4 The Hren family first became involved with the Hrens’ property in the late 1970's when John Hren began leasing it as ranch range from the Crampton family. The Cramptons had owned the property dating back to the original Crampton family homestead in 1926-27.⁷ The Hrens, through John Hren, purchased the property from the Cramptons in the mid-1980's.⁸

¶5 Before the late 1970's, private landowners predominantly used their Small Horn Canyon tracts as a summer livestock range. The Meines and their invitees historically used the Meines’ property for that purpose as well as for seasonal hunting, fishing, and other recreational purposes. In the late 1970's, the Meines and the BLM also began using the Road as a logging transportation route necessitated by a large timber blow-down on the adjoining Meines and BLM properties at the south end of the canyon. The Meines also thereafter increasingly used the Road for third-party hunting, fishing, and recreational access related to their commercial outfitting and guest ranch operations.

¶6 When the Hrens purchased their property in the mid-1980's, they were fully aware of the Meines’ historical and ongoing use of the Road, and immediately adjoining areas, across their property. The Hrens thus did not challenge or attempt to interfere with the Meines’ use of the Road until 2007 when the Meines began grading it with heavy equipment through the Hrens’ property. The Hrens thereafter attempted to restrict the Meines’ use of the road by changing the lock(s) on one or more roadway gates without notice to the Meines and through manipulation of various cattleguards and gate locations. ⁹

The Meines responded by cutting gate locks, installing their own in-line gate locks, and disabling or removing new gates installed by the Hrens. The Hrens in turn filed "numerous complaints against the Meines with the Beaverhead County Sheriff's Office, alleging trespass and criminal mischief."¹⁰ The first round of the Meine-Hren litigation ensued in 2010 when the Meines filed a district court complaint asserting a prescriptive easement claim, with related requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.

¶7 In 2014, following a 2011 preliminary injunction hearing and two-day bench trial in 2013, the District Court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the Meines’ claim based on the combined 2011-13 evidentiary record. The judgment decreed that the Meines had established particularly described prescriptive easement rights over the Hrens’ property before the Hrens acquired it. In 2015, we affirmed. Meines I , ¶ 49.

¶8 Soon thereafter, the Hrens instituted a separate collateral action against two of the original Meine plaintiffs, later amended to include all of them, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Meines to close internal Hrens’ property gates and enjoining them from restoring cattleguards and gates as previously authorized under the 2014 judgment.¹¹ In opposition to the Meines’ motion for summary judgment, the Hrens asserted that various legal and factual issues precluded summary judgment, restated in essence, to wit:

(1) whether the Meines had a prescriptive right to leave the roadway Corral and Rebich gates open;¹²

(2) whether § 45-6-101(1)(b) and (d), MCA, required the Meines to close roadway gates at the Corral, Top of the Grade, and Rebich Gate locations;

(3) whether a recently Hrens-installed Top of the Grade roadway gate was a permitted retained use of the servient estate;

(4) whether the Meines had a prescriptive right to leave the new Hrens-installed Gate at the Top of the Grade open; and

(5) which "cattleguards and gates" did the 2014 judgment require the Hrens to restore.

Agreeing with the Meines, the District Court granted summary judgment in 2016 against the Hrens on the stated ground that res judicata and/or collateral estoppel procedurally barred the Hrens’ collateral attack on the 2014 judgment.

¶9 Meanwhile, the dispute continued on the ground, leading to criminal charges against Hren family members in 2016 for criminal mischief, theft, and assault related to their removal of a secondary off-road metal gate installed by the Meines adjacent to the Bottom Gate. The Hrens’ continued interference with the Meines’ use of the Road and adjoining areas under the 2014 judgment resulted in additional criminal charges against Hren family members in 2017-18. In November 2018, in advance of a pending criminal trial, the Hrens filed a motion in the original civil cause seeking various "interpretations and clarifications" of the 2014 judgment based on alleged ambiguities in the judgment. The Meines procedurally opposed the motion on the asserted ground that the Hrens untimely sought substantive alterations or amendments of the prior judgment precluded by the deadlines specified in M. R. Civ. P. 59 - 60. They additionally asserted that the law of the case (as established in the 2014 judgment and Meine I ), as well as res judicata or collateral estoppel based on the 2016 judgment in the collateral action, further precluded litigation of the related issues subsequently raised by the Hrens in 2018. Beyond those procedural objections, they substantively asserted that no interpretation or clarification was necessary because the 2014 judgment was not ambiguous in any event.

¶10 Agreeing with the Hrens, the District Court issued a preliminarily order in 2019 concluding that the 2014 judgment was ambiguous in two regards, thus necessitating the requested interpretation and clarification. The court concluded that M. R. Civ. P. 59 - 60 did not apply because the Hrens sought only interpretation and clarification rather than a substantive amendment or alteration. It further concluded that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because the 2016 judgment in the collateral action was not "a ruling on the merits" of the matters at issue. The court accordingly set the matter for a new evidentiary hearing to aid in the requested interpretation and clarification.

¶11 Later in 2019, after taking new evidence beyond the original evidentiary record, the District Court issued new findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment that, in pertinent part, altered or amended the 2014 judgment by:

(1) striking the express provision of the 2014 judgment that required the Hrens to either timely restore "all cattle guards and gates previously installed by [the Meines]" or reimburse the Meines for the same;

(2) decreeing that the Hrens have the right to "remove [or disable] any cattle guard ... situated within the boundaries of the easement road," thereby eliminating the Meines’ asserted need to trail stock off-road

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