Meins v. Meins

• Decision Date: 18 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12720.,12720.
• Citation: 288 Ill. 463,123 N.E. 554
• Parties: MEINS et al. v. MEINS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

288 Ill. 463

123 N.E. 554

MEINS et al.

v.MEINS et al.

No. 12720.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Whiteside County; Emery C. Graves, Judge.

Suit by Edna L. Meins and others against Lizzie Meins and others for the construction of a will. From a decree construing the will in favor of the latter, the former appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

R. W. E. Mitchell and Henry C. Ward, both of Sterling, for appellants.

Carl E. Sheldon, of Sterling, for appellees.

has received her share of $10,000, the remainder

The only question involved in this case is the construction of the second, third, and fourth clauses of the will of Meino Meins, deceased. The testator left an estate of 240 acres of land in Whiteside county, of the value of approximately $30,000, and $800 in cash. The first clause of the will provides for the payment of debts. The other clauses are as follows:

‘Second-After the payment of such funeral expenses and debts, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Lizzie Meins, all of my property, both real and personal, which I may die possessed of.

‘Third-It is my wish, and I hereby direct, that three years after the death of my wife, Lizzie Meins, $10,000 of my said estate shall be given to my daughter, Annie Oltmans.

‘Fourth-After my daughter, Annie Oltmans, has received her share of $10,000 the remainder of my estate I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Albert Meins.

‘Lastly-I nominate and appoint my wife, Lizzie Meins, to be executrix of this my last will and testament.’

The chancellor construed the will as vesting an estate in fee in the widow, Lizzie Meins, by the second clause of the will, and decreed accordingly. Albert Meins died, and his widow, Edna L. Meins, personally and as administratrix of his estate, together with her daughters, Mildred A. and Grace E., are appellants herein.

It is the contention of appellants that the second, third, and fourth clauses of the will should be construed as one clause, creating a life estate in the widow, with remainder in fee to Albert Meins, now vested in Mildred A. and Grace E. Meins, his daughters, subject to the dower interest of Edna L. Meins, their mother, and charged with the payment of $10,000 to Annie Oltmans not later than three years after the death of Lizzie Meins, widow of the testator. On the other hand, the appellees contend that the widow, Lizzie Meins, took a fee simple estate by the second clause of the will, unlimited by the third and fourth clauses thereof; that, by reason of the passing of the fee-simple title under the second clause, the third and fourth clauses of the will are mere precatory words, and are therefore void.

The rule is that a simple devise of land without any words of inheritance is sufficient, under section 13 of the Conveyances Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 30), to convey an absolute estate in fee, unless a contrary intent is shown in other parts of the will. It is the disposition of courts to adopt such a construction as will give an estate of inheritance to the first devisee. Therefore, when the fee is devised by one clause of the will, and other portions or clauses of the will are relied upon as limiting or qualifying the estate thus given, they should be such as show a clear intention on the part of the testator to thus qualify the estate granted. Giles v. Anslow, 128 Ill. 187, 21 N. E. 225;Jones v. Jones, 124 Ill. 254, 15 N. E. 751;Walker v. Pritchard, 121 Ill. 221, 12 N. E. 336. Where a testator by his will employed language sufficient to pass the fee-simple title to land, in the absence of the expression of a clear intention to cut down the fee to a life estate, an estate in fee simple will pass. Bowen v. John, 201 Ill. 292, 66 N. E. 357. If it is clearly shown by other clauses or parts of the will that the testator intended to limit the fee thus granted, such intention will prevail, and it is wholly immaterial in what part of the will such intention is manifested. Rose v. Hale, 185 Ill. 378, 56 N. E. 1073,76 Am. St. Rep. 40; Giles v. Anslow, supra; Huffman v. Young, 170 Ill. 290, 49 N. E. 570;Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N. E. 553,28 L. R. A. 149, 47 Am. St. Rep. 181; 2 Jarman on Wills (5th Am. Ed.) 53.

The principal rules of construction are: The intention of the testator, if not inconsistent with the established rules of law or public policy, must govern. This intention must be gathered from the whole will, and all its parts taken together. Every clause and provision, if possible, should have effect given to it according to the intention of the maker. Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 81 N. E. 1105;Lander v. Lander, 217 Ill. 289, 75 N. E. 487;Hamlin v. United States Express Co., 107 Ill. 443;Henderson v. Blackburn, 104 Ill. 227, 44 Am. Rep. 780;Bland v. Bland, 103 Ill. 11;City of Peoria v. Darst, 101 Ill. 609; Giles v. Anslow, supra; Boyd v. Strahan, 36 Ill. 355. A later clause of a will, when repugnant to a former provision, is to be considered as intending to modify or abrogate the former. Harris v. Ferguy, 207 Ill. 534, 69 N. E. 844; Hamlin v. United States Express Co., supra.

In the case of Hamlin v. United States Express Co., supra, the devise was to the wife for her own use, with full power to dispose of any of the estate, real or personal, and to convey the real estate by conveyance in fee simple. Elsewhere in the will it was provided that such of the testator's real estate as his wife had not sold during her lifetime should be sold after the death of the wife and divided in the manner therein specified. This court in that case said:

‘The wife is given everything, with full power to use, enjoy, and dispose of the same, and convey the real estate by absolute conveyance in fee simple. This, if unqualified, would, of course, vest a fee simple in the real estate; but, being qualified, in order to give the language of the qualification any effect, this language must be restricted to the life of the wife of the testator. * * * The latter part of the will is to be considered, no less than the former part, and to the extent there is repugnance the language of the former part is to be read as modified by that of the latter part.’

In Boyd v. Strahan, supra, where the testator left property to his wife with the power of disposition, but by later phraseology limited her estate, it was held that, as a general rule, where a will bequeaths personal property to be at the absolute disposition of the legatee, such legatee, in the absence of all clauses showing a contrary intent on the part of the testator, becomes the absolute owner; that the rule which controls in the interpretation of a will is that the intention of the testator to be gathered from the entire will must govern. It was there said:

‘There is no other class of written instruments known to the law in which so little importance is to be attached to the technical sense of language in comparison with that sense in which the apparent object of the writer indicates his words to have been used. So far is this principle carried, that the court say in 3 Wills. 141: ‘Cases on wills may guide us to general rules of construction; but unless a case cited be, in every respect, directly in point, and agree in every circumstance, it will have little or no weight with the courts, who always look upon the intention of the testator as the polar star to direct them in the construction of wills.’'

To the same effect is Lander v. Lander, supra.

This court said in Fifer v. Allen, supra:

‘The purpose of courts in construing a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator, so that such intention may be given effect, if not prohibited by law. The...