Meints v. Huntington

• Decision Date: 03 September 1921
• Docket Number: 5727.
• Citation: 276 F. 245
• Parties: MEINTS v. HUNTINGTON et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

276 F. 245

MEINTS v. HUNTINGTON et al.

No. 5727.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 3, 1921

Arthur Le Sueur, of St. Paul, Minn. (Tom Davis, of Marshall, Minn and Earnest A. Michel, of Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief) for plaintiff in error.

Charles Bunn, of St. Paul, Minn. (E. H. Canfield, of Luverne, Minn and Butler, Mitchell & Doherty, of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before CARLAND, Circuit Judge, and LEWIS and COTTERAL, District judges.

LEWIS District Judge.

John Meints, a resident and citizen of South Dakota, brought this action against O. P. Huntington and others, residents and citizens of Rock County, Minnesota, to recover damages, on the charge that they deported him from Minnesota to South Dakota on the night of August 19, 1918, and maltreated him on the way. After a lengthy trial, exhibited here by 1100 pages of testimony, the greater part of which relates to the loyalty of the defendants and the disloyalty of plaintiff during the late World War, there was verdict and judgment for defendants.

The plaintiff was born in Illinois, went to Rock County Minnesota, and resided there in the town of Luverne for sixteen or seventeen years prior to the summer of 1918. In the spring of that year he was suspected of being interested in or of having contributed to the support of a Non-Partisan League newspaper printed and published in that town; on account of that, and also because it was claimed that he was disloyal, a large body of men, including some of the defendants, went to his house about midnight of June 19th, woke him up, compelled him to dress and come out, and some of them in automobiles took him across the State line into Iowa, a distance of about fifteen miles, told him not to return and left him there. He then went to St. Paul and reported the occurrence to a U.S. Government agent in the Department of Justice. That agent sent two men to Rock County to make an investigation, and on their report, Mr. Campbell of that Department advised plaintiff to return to Rock County but to go to the home of his two sons, some twelve miles out from Luverne, and remain there. He did return the latter part of July and went to his sons' home. On the night of August 3rd, men in eight or nine automobiles went out to the sons' house. Among them were the defendants Huntington, Connell, Ihlan, Miner, Turnbull and Kimmerling. They tried to enter the house by unlocking the doors with keys which they had, but were not able to do so, and finally obtained entrance by going through the cellar. They were hunting for plaintiff, but could not find him. In the late afternoon of August 19th some seventy-five to eighty men in about twenty-five automobiles, most of them from Luverne, met at a church about four miles from the sons' house, and proceeded from there in a body, arriving at the sons' house about dusk. The plaintiff and his sons saw them coming, went into the house and fastened the screen door on the inner side. The married son's wife and children were also in the house and shortly became greatly excited and alarmed, as their outcries demonstrated. Huntington and others went to the door and demanded to know where the plaintiff was, and that they be permitted to enter. The son who stood inside the door refused to open it and declined to admit them. The defendant Long at once forced the door open and a number of men immediately entered, including Long and Huntington. The son testified that he was assaulted by them and thrown out of the house. They denied that, and testified that his bloody face was caused by his own struggles while they held him to prevent violence on his part. The plaintiff stood at the head of the stairway with a gun and a fork handle. At first he refused to come down or to permit anyone to come up. The other son was induced by some of the defendants, or others with them, to go up and tell his father that they did not intend violence. The plaintiff sent back word by his son that the defendant Long might come up and he would talk with him. He then came down with Long and was taken in Huntington's automobile to Luverne. Huntington drove, and some of the other defendants were in the car with him and the plaintiff. Most of the crowd went with them, but a few turned west toward the South Dakota line before Luverne was reached. Plaintiff was held at Luverne until about eleven o'clock, and while there was refused permission to see his wife or to talk with her over the telephone. About that hour he was again put in Huntington's car. Defendants Huntington, Long, Michaelson and Smith also got in, and they started for the South Dakota line, some fifteen miles away, accompanied by another auto in which were defendants Turnbull, Connell, Kimmerling and McDermott. They reached the State line about midnight, and were stopped there by armed men whose faces were masked. They took Meints from Huntington's car, assaulted him, whipped him, threatened to shoot him, besmeared his body with tar and feathers, and told him to cross the line into South Dakota, and that if he ever returned to Minnesota he would be hanged.

The complainant alleges a conspiracy on the part of the defendants. The only purpose that such an allegation could serve would be to hold liable those of the defendants not present, if any, who had counseled or advised that the plaintiff should be deported. But there was no proof tending to show that any defendant was not present during some time on the night of August 19th and was joined as a party on the claim that he had advised and counseled the doing of what was done. In other words, plaintiff's case as made consisted of admissions by some of the defendants that they were present and participated, and of proof that others of them, though not all, were also present at times and took part in what was being done. And while the facts as to the meeting at the church, the moving of the seventy-five to eighty men in a body from there to the sons' home, the show there of aggregated power and coercive force, and the taking of the plaintiff from the sons' home, was ample proof to establish a conspiracy by them to do what was done, still the question as to whether there was a conspiracy became wholly immaterial; for as to each participant the law is unconcerned with the extent or degree of his activity when it comes to consider the question of liability, and places all on the same footing, each equally liable jointly and severally, regardless of whether a conspiracy theretofore had been entered into. Cooley on Torts (2d Ed.) p. 145, and cases cited; Howland v. Corn, 232 F. 35, 146 C.C.A. 227; James v. Evans, 149 F. 136, 80 C.C.A. 240; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N.J.Law, 284, 20 A. 485, 10 L.R.A. 184; 12 C.J. 585.

On the foregoing facts, openly admitted by many of the defendants,--and aside from what occurred on the nights of June 19th and August 3rd,-- there can be no doubt that from the time the crowd reached the sons' house and on up to the time Meints crossed the State line, he was coerced and compelled by a show of force to submit himself to the will of others, that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty,-- falsely imprisoned for the time being,-- and assaulted and abused, and that this was done by those who took part in it in execution of their common purpose to drive him from the State of Minnesota. And so we say at once that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct a verdict for the plaintiff and against all defendants who took part; for it cannot be maintained that because Meints may have been, in their opinion, disloyal, and was interested in and gave support to the Non-Partisan League Newspaper, that that would put him at the mercy of defendants and invest them with the right and power to adjudge and inflict punishment, nor would the fact that the defendants were loyal men, to establish which much evidence was introduced over plaintiff's objection, have the slightest tendency to excuse or justify in the eyes of the law the acts charged against them. Unlawful interference with or injuries to the liberty of a citizen is a violation of his natural, inherent and absolute rights, from which damage results as a legal consequence. Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 16 L.Ed. 696. Mr. Cooley, in his work on Torts, says: 'False imprisonment is a wrong akin to the wrongs of assault and battery, and consists in imposing, by force or threats, an unlawful restraint upon a man's freedom of locomotion. Prima facie any restraint put by fear or force upon the actions of another is unlawful and constitutes a false imprisonment, unless a showing of justification makes it a true or legal imprisonment.'

See Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43, 54 Am.Dec. 250.

It was an indictable offense at common law, 3 Blackstone, Com. 127, 4 Blackstone, Com. 218, and relief by the party aggrieved was obtained by an action in trespass vi et armis. The law implies force. 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 186; Rich v. McInerny, 103 Ala. 345, 15 So. 663, 49 Am.St.Rep. 32. Nor is it necessary to allege or prove malice or want of probable cause where the detention is extrajudicial, Colter v. Lower, 35 Ind. 285, 9 Am.Rep. 735; Nixon v. Reeves, 65 Minn. 159, 67 N.W. 989, 33 L.R.A. 506; Akin v. Newell, 32 Ark. 605; Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S.W. 223, 10 Am.St.Rep. 322, though in trespass on the case for malicious prosecution these elements, essential to recovery, must be alleged and proven. Barnes v. Viall (C.C.) 6 Fed. 661, where the difference is pointed out. We think the court erred in its refusal to so instruct the jury.

The court yielded to the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff could not recover for anything that was done prior to the assaults made upon him, when the State line was reached, on...