Meisinger v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 1928 |
| Docket Number | 23. |
| Citation | 142 A. 190,155 Md. 195 |
| Parties | MEISINGER v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
For majority opinion, see 141 A. 536.
The premises of the traverser were invaded by the sheriff, who there searched and seized intoxicating liquor, and utensils and material used in its making, which he took into his possession and removed. Upon the evidence so secured, the traverser was arrested, indicted, convicted, and sentenced. There was no statutory or other valid ground for the search warrant under which the sheriff acted, and the sheriff was a trespasser, and all he did unlawful. Notwithstanding this evidence was admittedly obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the traverser, the decision of this court holds this evidence admissible, on the ground that consideration of the question is foreclosed by the case of Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 63 A. 96. The doctrine of stare decisis makes for the interests of the state and of the individual and the proper administration of justice, by assuring stability and uniformity in the declaration and enforcement of law. But the application of the doctrine is not according to rigid rules, and must be determined in each case from its particular facts and circumstances. Thus it is most strictly applied when decisions have settled rules of property upon which rights are based, and under which titles have vested, especially when the decisions relate to realty, and where they have become the basis of contractual relations. If the decisions do not concern such matters, but deal with a question which affects the right or extent of personal liberty, the enforcement of the principle is less strict, and is governed by that general consideration which favors certainty and uniformity in the law.
The rule of stare decisis rests upon the primary assumption that the prior judicial determination of a legal principle is sound, and therefore must be followed; but, if no question affecting land, contract, vested interest, or right be involved, and if it appear that the court was in error, the fundamental basis and utility of the doctrine in the particular instance is gone; and so, in matters affecting vital or weighty public or private rights as defined above and the decision is to put them upon a fixed basis for the future, it is the duty and the right of the court to review its former decisions and to suffer no former error to control its judgment. If the doctrine were not thus limited, it would serve to perpetuate error by never permitting a mistake to be corrected. It is therefore strictly within the province of this appellate tribunal to examine its decision in Lawrence v. State, 103 Md 17, 63 A. 96, to see whether it was decided that, if the citizen's domicile be unlawfully invaded for the purpose of learning if a misdemeanor has been committed upon his premises, the evidence so procured may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
The difference between the facts in the case of Lawrence v State, supra, and the one at bar are significant. In the first case, the accused was under arrest on the charge of a conspiracy to defraud and in the custody of the police, who sent to the hotel where the prisoner had been and got the satchel which the accused had left there. In the presence of the prisoner, the police either took from this satchel according to their version, or from the person of the accused, as he testified, certain securities, which were later offered and admitted in evidence to show guilty knowledge. The accused was stopping temporarily at the hotel, and the satchel while there was in the possession of the hotel keeper as bailee, and the bailee could have been compelled to have produced the satchel under a subp na duces tecum, to be disposed of as the court directs. 1 Bishop's New Crim. Proc. § 211; Wharton's Crim. Pl. & Pr. (8th Ed.) § 60. Lawrence v. State, supra, quotes with approval this language of State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N.W. 935, 59 L. R. A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323:
Page 37 (63 A. 104).
Such a search of the person and seizure of property in the possession of the accused at the time of his arrest or in that of his bailee is an incident to a lawful arrest, and therefore does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the protection of the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights of Maryland, nor would the evidence so obtained be barred as compelling the traverser to testify. It follows that Lawrence v. State, supra, is, on its Jacts, not an authority supporting the prevailing opinion in the instant case, because here the traverser was not charged with a crime, nor was he under arrest when his premises were searched. The owner was not committing a crime nor exposing contraband goods in the presence of an officer of the law, but, because the state's attorney thought he had probable cause to believe that the local liquor law was being violated, he procured an illegal search warrant, whereby the sheriff unlawfully entered upon the traverser's premises for the sole purpose of discovering if a crime were being committed and of securing the evidence to convict the traverser, if his search and seizure proved successful. It therefore needs no argument to enforce the point that, because of wide and fundamental difference in facts, the decision in Lawrence v. State, supra, is not controlling, unless because it contains the declaration of some applicable principle of law.
The cases and authorities cited and quoted, and the language used by the court in argument and in declaring the principle or rule of law adjudged, must be construed in the light of the circumstances of Lawrence v. State, supra, since the statement of the law may have a restricted or enlarged construction by reason of its connection with the specific facts, which give character and definition to the finding of law. The reasoning of the court is directed to the particular circumstances of the case, and indicates no purpose to announce principles of law applicable to a different state of facts. If this were not true, the decision could be taken to hold that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party has been able to obtain the evidence, which is the construction given by the opinion of the majority of the court in the appeal at bar. 4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) §§ 2183, 2184. Should this principle be sound with reference to documents, chattels, and testimony obtained by illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article 26 of the Bill of Rights, why should it not be sound with respect to self-incriminatory evidence in the form of confessions obtained by unlawful or improper means from parties accused of crime in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article 22 of the Bill of Rights of Maryland? In both instances the parties are within the protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Although there are authorities to the contrary, this court has recognized the connection between the privilege against unreasonable searches and that against self-incrimination. In Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, it was said at page 382, 51 A. 26, 29 (56 L. R. A. 322):
"Moreover, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States which are in pari materia with articles 26 and 22 of our Declaration of Rights, have been held in Boyd v. U. S., 116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746] to be intimately related to each other and to throw great light on each other."
These constitutional guaranties are the outgrowth of analogous common-law principles, as is illustrated by this quotation from the opinion of Lord Camden in Enteck v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765):
"It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself, because the...
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