Meister v. Moore
Decision Date | 01 October 1877 |
Citation | 96 U.S. 76,24 L.Ed. 826 |
Parties | MEISTER v. MOORE |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
This was ejectment, brought Oct. 9, 1873, by Bernard L. Meister, for the possession of certain lots of ground in Pittsburg, Pa.
Both parties claimed under William Mowry, the plaintiff, as the alience of the alleged wife and daughter of said William, and the defendants, as the vendees of his mother, in whom the title of the property vested, if he died unmarried and without issue.
The plaintiff, to maintain the issue on his part, introduced evidence tending to prove that, some time in the year 1844 or 1845, said William went from Pittsburg to the Saginaw Valley, in the State of Michigan, and there became acquainted with Mary, the daughter of an Indian named Pero; that, in the latter part of the year 1845, Mowry and Mary were married, and thereafter lived and cohabited together as man and wife, and had one child born to them, named Elizabeth; that said Mowry died intestate, some time in 1852, at Pittsburg, leaving no issue living at his death save said Elizabeth, who afterwards married one Isaacs; and that they, Aug. 27, 1873, conveyed the demanded premises to the plaintiff.
The defence was——
1. That the plaintiff's evidence, even if true, did not, under the statute of Michigan, regulating the solemnization of marriage, establish a valid marriage between William Mowry and the Indian woman.
2. That that evidence utterly failed to establish a valid marriage at common law.
The Revised Statutes of Michigan upon the subject of the solemnization of marriages, adopted in the year 1838, and in force at the time of the alleged marriage, enact as follows:——
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' . Rev. Stat. 1838, pp. 334, 335.
The court below charged the jury that the validity of the alleged marriage must be determined by the laws of Michigan; and that, if they found that neither a minister nor a magistrate was present thereat,—and such was the plaintiff's proof,—it was invalid under the statute of that State, and their verdict should be for the defendants.
There was a verdict for the defendants. Judgment was rendered accordingly, whereupon the plaintiff brought the case here.
Mr. H. W. Weir for the plaintiff in error.
A statute regulating the forms of marriage is merely directory, and, unless it contains an express clause of nullity, a marriage per verba de praesenti is valid. 1 Bishop, Mar. & Div., sects. 277 a, 279, 280, 283 et seq.; The State v. Worthington, Chicago Legal News, June 16, 1877; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 11 Bush (Ky.), 679; 2 Greenl. Evid., sects. 461, 462. Such is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Michigan. Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126; Proctor v. Bigelow, Jan. Term, 1878, not yet reported.
Mr. M. W. Acheson, contra.
The judgment below is not erroneous. People v. Slack, 15 Mich. 198; Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 525; Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48; Ligonia v. Buxton, 2 Me. 95; Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53; The State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) Eq. 177; State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. (N. C.) L. 346; Bashaw v. State of Tennessee, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 177; Grisham v. State of Tennessee, 2 id. 589; Robertson v. The State, 42 Ala. 509.
Affirmative statutes which introduce a new rule or prescribe a specific mode of doing a thing imply a negative of all that is not within their purview. Slade v. Drake, Hob. 298; Stradling v. Morgan, Plowd. 206.
A contract in contravention of statutory provisions which contain nothing from which its validity can be inferred, is void. Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 118; Bank v. Haldeman, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 233.
The learned judge of the Circuit Court instructed the jury, that, if neither a minister nor a magistrate was present at the alleged marriage of William A. Mowry and the daughter of the Indian Pero, the marriage was invalid under the Michigan statute; and this instruction is now alleged to have been erroneous. It certainly withdrew from the consideration of the jury all evidence, if any there was, of informal marriage by contract per verba de praesenti. That such a contract constitutes a marriage at common law there can be no doubt, in view of the adjudications made in this country, from its earliest settlement to the present day. Marriage is everywhere regarded as a civil contract. Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the mode of entering into the contract, but they do not confer the right. Hence they are not within the principle, that, where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive. No doubt, a statute may take away a common-law right; but there is always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention, unless it be plainly expressed. A statute may declare that no marriages shall be valid unless they are solemnized in a prescribed manner; but such an enactment is a very different thing from a law requiring all marriages to be entered into in the presence of a magistrate or a clergyman, or that it be preceded by a license, or publication of banns, or be attested by witnesses. Such formal provisions may be construed as merely directory, instead of being treated as destructive of a common-law right to form the marriage relation by words of present assent. And such, we think, has been the rule generally adopted in construing statutes regulating marriage. Whatever directions they may give respecting its formation or solemnization, courts have usually held a marriage good at common law to be good notwithstanding the statutes, unless they contain express words of nullity. This is the conclusion reached by Mr. Bishop, after an examination of the authorities. Bishop, Mar. and Div., sect. 283 and notes. We do not propose to examine in detail the numerous decisions that have been made by the State courts. In many of the States, enactments exist very similar to the Michigan statute; but their object has manifestly been, not to declare what shall be requisite to the validity of a marriage, but to provide a legitimate mode of solemnizing it. They speak of the celebration of its rite rather than of its validity, and they address themselves principally to the functionaries they authorize to perform the ceremony. In most cases, the leading purpose is to secure a registration of marriages, and evidence by which marriages may be proved; for example, by certificate of a clergyman or magistrate, or by an exemplification of the registry. In a small number of the States, it must be admitted, such statutes have been construed as denying validity to marriages not formed according to the statutory directions. Notably has this been so in North Carolina and in Tennessee, where the statute of North Carolina was in force. But the statute contained a provision declaring null and void all marriages solemnized as directed, without a license first had. So, in Massachusetts, it was early decided that a statute very like the Michigan statute rendered illegal a marriage which would have been good at common law, but which was not entered into in the manner directed by the written law. Milford v. Worcester, 7...
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