Melecio v. Hinthorne
| Decision Date | 07 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19 C 50280,19 C 50280 |
| Parties | EPIGMENIO MELECIO (M12640), Petitioner, v. CHERRYLE HINTHORNE, Warden, Illinois River Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, Epigmenio Melecio, currently incarcerated at Illinois River Correctional Center, is serving a thirty-five year sentence for murder. Melecio has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Melecio acknowledges in his reply that he has not sufficiently presented his claim that his extradition from Mexico constituted a denial of due process and it does not appear that Melecio could obtain habeas relief based on his extradition had he properly presented this claim. The Court finds that with regard to the remainder of Melecio's claims, he has either procedurally defaulted them or the claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Thus, the Court denies Melecio's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court presumes that the state court's factual determinations are correct for the purpose of habeas review because Melecio has not pointed to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2002).The Court thus adopts the state court's recitation of the facts and begins by summarizing the facts relevant to Melecio's habeas petition.
In March 1981, Melecio was charged with murder in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County. The court released him on bond on June 12, 1981, and he stopped appearing in court by September 1981. Thereafter, the State sought to try Melecio in absentia.2 In response, Melecio's counsel moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that Melecio was not mentally competent to stand trial and that the State had not shown that Melecio was willfully avoiding trial. Melecio's counsel represented that Melecio was receiving psychiatric treatment in Mexico at the time. After determining that Melecio was competent to stand trial,3 the court granted the State's motion for a trial in absentia in June 1982 and denied Melecio's motion to dismiss in July 1982. The case proceeded to a jury trial in September 1982, at the end of which the jury found Melecio guilty in absentia. Melecio's counsel moved to vacate the verdict, arguing that Melecio did not have the mental capacity to willfully avoid trial. The court denied the motion, concluding that Melecio knew of the trial date but willfully remained in Mexico, and that the State had unsuccessfully attempted extradition. The court sentenced Melecio to thirty-five years in jail. In reaching this sentence, the court addressed the aggravating and mitigating statutory factors, stressing that Melecio repeatedly stabbed an unarmed, peaceable victim. Melecio filed two appeals, both of which were later dismissed.
In November 2008, Mexican authorities arrested Melecio after he applied for a visa to work in the United States. In April 2010, Melecio appeared in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County and moved to vacate the verdict and sentence.4 Melecio contended that he had not been advised that he could be tried and sentenced in absentia. Melecio also sought an evidentiary hearing under 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-4.1(e)5 on whether his absence from trial was without fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. The court denied Melecio's motion, thereby reaffirming that his absence from trial was willful and voluntary, and declined to hold a hearing. Melecio appealed the court's order. Because § 115-4.1(e) entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a hearing under that section.6
On remand, Melecio testified through an interpreter. Melecio indicated that he knew that he had a murder case pending against him and that he had to appear for every court date as a condition of his bond. Melecio claimed, however, that he did not understand everything happening in court, particularly in instances where he did not have an interpreter. Melecio further testified that, in October 1981, his retained counsel, Genaro Lara, took him to the airport and ordered him to return to Mexico. Lara was capable of communicating with Melecio in Spanish. Melecio claimed he did not want to leave the United States but that he was not in a good mental state. Around the time of his departure, Melecio claims he was not sleeping andwas communicating with voices he was hearing. According to Melecio, Lara represented that he had taken care of everything and would "fix the problem." Doc. 17-6 at 3. Melecio later acknowledged that he did not tell anyone he left the United States against his will.
Melecio also testified that, while in Mexico, he lived on his parents' farm, sought psychiatric treatment, and spent time in an inpatient facility. The trial court noted the absence of evidence supporting Melecio's claims regarding psychiatric treatment and his inability to return to the United States for trial. Defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact medical professionals who treated Melecio in Mexico. Defense counsel did speak to Melecio's family members, but Melecio's family also could not verify his treatment. The trial court did not hear from Lara, despite the State expressing some interest in locating him. After hearing Melecio's testimony, the court found no evidence to corroborate Melecio's claims about his mental state and denied his motion to vacate. The court also did not find Melecio's testimony that Lara sent him to Mexico against his will credible.
Melecio again appealed the court's denial of his motion to vacate, arguing that he met the criteria for a new trial set forth in § 115-4.1(e). He also argued that the court improperly used a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation at sentencing, specifically, that the court made reference to the fact that Melecio inflicted serious bodily harm to another as part of a murder. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the motion to vacate and that Melecio was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Melecio then raised the same two arguments in a petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") to the Illinois Supreme Court. Melecio's PLA also made a single reference to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Melecio's PLA on November 28, 2018. Melecio then filed the present habeas petition on September 27, 2019.
A habeas petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if the challenged state court decision is either "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court or if the state court decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). An "unreasonable application" of federal law occurs if the state court correctly identified the legal rule but unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. See id. at 407. The Court uses an objective standard to determine whether a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent is unreasonable. Id. at 409; Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 624 (7th Cir. 2011).
Melecio claims in his habeas petition that he was denied due process because: (1) he was tried and sentenced in absentia, and the state court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate given that his failure to appear at trial was due to circumstances beyond his control; (2) the sentencing court used a factor inherent in the offense in sentencing him to thirty-five years in prison; and (3) his extradition from Mexico did not comply with treaty obligations. Melecio also claims that the cumulative errors discussed in Claims 1-3 amount to a denial of due process.7 Although Claim 1 is cognizable on federal habeas review, Melecio procedurallydefaulted that claim. Claim 2 is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Melecio acknowledges that he has not sufficiently provided a basis to obtain relief under Claim 3, and the Court also cannot conceive of a meritorious basis for that claim given the facts it has before it. And having found no single denial of due process, this Court need not consider Melecio's claim of cumulative deprivation of due process.
Melecio first claims that his trial in absentia violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because his absence was without fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. Respondent argues that this claim is not cognizable. "To say that a petitioner's claim is not cognizable on habeas review is thus another way of saying that his claim 'presents no federal issue at all.'" Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1991)). Federal courts may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions," Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991), meaning that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law," Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Instead, to be cognizable, a claim must raise a "violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Respondent characterizes Claim 1 as a challenge to the state court's decision to deny Melecio's motion to vacate. Under Respondent's...
To continue reading
Request your trial