Melendez v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1996
• Docket Number: 955661
• Citation: 135 L.Ed.2d 427,518 U.S. 120,116 S.Ct. 2057
• Parties: MELENDEZ v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

518 U.S. 120

116 S.Ct. 205

135 L.Ed.2d 427

MELENDEZ

v UNITED STATES

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

No. 95-5661.

Argued February 27, 1996

Decided June 17, 1996

Syllabus

After agreeing with others to buy cocaine, petitioner was charged with a conspiracy violative of 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 846, which carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. He ultimately signed a plea agreement providing, inter alia, that in return for his cooperation with the Government's investigation and his guilty plea, the Government would move the sentencing court, pursuant to Section(s) 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, to depart downward from the otherwise applicable Guideline sentencing range, which turned out to be 135-to-168 months' imprisonment. Although the agreement noted the applicability of the 10-year statutory minimum sentence, neither it nor the ensuing Section(s) 5K1.1 motion mentioned departure below that minimum. Pursuant to the motion, the District Court departed downward from the Guideline range in sentencing petitioner. It also ruled, however, that it had no authority to depart below the statutory minimum because the Government had not made a motion, pursuant 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3553(e), that it do so. It thus sentenced petitioner to 10 years, and the Third Circuit affirmed.

Held: A Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance in a criminal investigation and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable Guideline sentencing range does not also authorize the court to depart below a lower statutory minimum sentence. Pp. 3-11.

(a) Guideline Section(s) 5K1.1 does not create a "unitary" motion system. Title 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3553(e) requires a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence" before the court may impose such a sentence. Nothing in Section(s) 3553(e) suggests that a district court has the power to impose such a sentence when the Government has not authorized it, but has instead moved for a departure only from the applicable Guidelines range. Nor does anything in Section(s) 3553(e) or 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 994(n) suggest that the Commission itself may dispense with Section(s) 3553(e)'s motion requirement, or alternatively, "deem" a motion requesting or authorizing different action - such as a departure below the Guidelines minimum - to be a motion authorizing departure below the statutory minimum. Section 5K1.1 cannot be read as attempting to exercise this nonexistent authority. That section states that, "[u]pon motion of the government . . . the court may depart from the guidelines," while its Application Note 1 declares that, "[u]nder circumstances set forth in . . . Section(s) 3553(e) and . . . Section(s) 994(n) . . . substantial assistance . . . may justify a sentence below a statutorily required minimum sentence." One of the circumstances set forth in Section(s) 3553(e) is that the Government has authorized the court to impose such a sentence. The Government is correct that the relevant statutory provisions merely charge the Commission with constraining the district court's discretion in choosing a specific sentence once the Government has moved for a departure below the statutory minimum, not with "implementing" Section(s) 3553(e)'s motion requirement, and that Section(s) 5K1.1 does not improperly attempt to dispense with or modify that requirement. Pp. 3-10.

(b) For two reasons, the Court need not decide whether the Government is correct in reading Section(s) 994(n) to permit the Commission to construct a unitary motion system by providing that the district court may depart below the Guidelines range only when the Government is willing to authorize the court to depart below the statutory minimum, if the court finds that to be appropriate. First, even if the Commission had done so, that would not help petitioner, since the Government has not authorized a departure below the statutory minimum here. Second, the Commission has not adopted this type of unitary system. Pp. 10-11. 55 F. 3d 130, affirmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which O'Connor and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which O'Connor, J., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue here is whether a Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance in a criminal investigation and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines also permits the district court to depart below any statutory minimum sentence. We hold that it does not.

I.

Petitioner and several others entered into an agreement to buy cocaine from confidential informants of the United States Customs Service. As a result, petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, see Section(s) 406, 84 Stat. 1265, as amended, 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 846, a crime that carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, see Section(s) 841(b)(1)(A). Plea negotiations ensued, and petitioner ultimately signed a cooperating plea agreement. The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that in return for petitioner's cooperation with the Government's investigation and his guilty plea, the Government would "move the sentencing court, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range." App. 9. The agreement noted that the offense to which petitioner would plead guilty "carries a statutory mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment." Id., at 6. The agreement did not require the Government to authorize the District Court to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum, nor did it specifically state that the Government would oppose departure below the statutory minimum.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charged conspiracy. The probation officer determined that the Guideline sentencing range applicable to petitioner's crime was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. In a letter to the court, the Government described the assistance rendered by petitioner and moved the court to impose "a sentence lower than what the [c]ourt ha[d] determined to be the otherwise applicable [sic] under the sentencing guidelines." Id., at 13-14. The letter specifically noted that "[t]his motion is made pursuant to Section 5K1.1." Id., at 13. The Government did not request a sentence below the statutory minimum, although, again, it did not state that the Government opposed such a departure. The District Court granted the Government's motion and departed downward from the sentencing range set by the Guidelines. However, because the Government had not also moved the District Court to depart below the statutory minimum pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3553(e), the court ruled that it had no authority to so depart; it thus imposed the 10-year minimum sentence required by statute.

On appeal, petitioner contended that the District Court had erred in concluding that it had no authority to depart below the statutory minimum. A Section(s) 5K1.1 motion, he argued, not only allows the court to depart downward from the sentencing level set by the Guidelines but also permits the court to depart below a lower statutory minimum. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Section(s) 5K1.1, p. s. (Nov. 1995) (USSG). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed the 10-year sentence. 55 F. 3d 130 (1995). A petition for rehearing was denied, with six judges dissenting.

As we noted in Wade v. United States, 504 U. S. 181, 185 (1992), the Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether a Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines also permits the district court to depart below any statutory minimum. ¹

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 516 U. S. ___ (1995). We now hold that such a motion does not authorize a departure below a lower statutory minimum.

II.

The question presented involves two subsections of federal statutes and a policy statement of the Guidelines. Title 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3553(e) provides:

"(e) Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. - Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code."

Title 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 994(n), in turn, states:

"(n) The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a...