Melgar v. Barr, Civil No. 18-1956 (DWF/BRT)

• Court: United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Minnesota
• Writing for the Court: DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge
• Citation: 379 F.Supp.3d 783
• Parties: Gilma Geanette MELGAR and Aurelia Concepcion Martinez, Plaintiffs, v. William P. BARR, Kirstjen Nielsen, Lee Cissna, Donald Neufeld, Robert Cowan, Leslie Tritten, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defendants.
• Docket Number: Civil No. 18-1956 (DWF/BRT)
• Decision Date: 02 April 2019

379 F.Supp.3d 783

Gilma Geanette MELGAR and Aurelia Concepcion Martinez, Plaintiffs,
v.
William P. BARR,¹ Kirstjen Nielsen, Lee Cissna, Donald Neufeld, Robert Cowan, Leslie Tritten, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defendants.

Civil No. 18-1956 (DWF/BRT)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed April 2, 2019

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Brittany S. Bakken, Esq., and David L. Wilson, Esq., Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, counsel for Plaintiffs.

Anna Emily Juarez and Erin M. Secord, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States, Attorney's Office, counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a question of statutory interpretation between the interplay of two provisions under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. : (1) the designation of Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") under § 1254a, and (2) the adjustment of status to Lawful Permanent Resident ("LPR") under § 1255(a). The Court now considers Plaintiffs Gilma Geanette Melgar and Aurelia Concepcion Martinez's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") First Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 23) and Defendants William P. Barr, III, Kirstjen Nielsen, Lee Cissna, Donald Neufeld, Robert Cowan, Leslie Tritten, U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss.² (Doc. No. 16.)

The sole issue before the Court is whether TPS beneficiaries are deemed "inspected

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and admitted" to satisfy the threshold requirement for adjustment of status to LPR. For the reasons discussed below, the Court holds that they are. Consequently, the Court grants Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court remands the matter to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") for adjudication consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

BACKGROUND

There is no dispute as to the facts asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs are each TPS beneficiaries whose applications for status adjustment to LPR were denied by USCIS. (Compl. ¶¶ 55, 69.) Plaintiff Gilma Geanette Melgar. ("Melgar") is a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States unlawfully without inspection in February 1992. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 46.) Plaintiff Aurelia Concepcion Martinez ("Martinez") is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States unlawfully without inspection in November 1996. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 60.) The Attorney General designated both El Salvador (March 9, 2001) and Honduras (January 5, 1999) as TPS countries. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.) Following the corresponding designations, Plaintiffs each timely applied to USCIS for TPS. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 62.) Plaintiffs both disclosed to USCIS that they entered the United States without inspection. (Doc. Nos. 26 ¶ 3, 27 ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs were each approved for TPS and subsequent extensions by USCIS. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50, 63-64.) In early 2018, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, terminated TPS for El Salvador and Honduras effective September 9, 2019 and January 5, 2020, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.)

In December 2016, Melgar's adult daughter, who is a United States citizen, petitioned for an immigrant visa for Melgar as an immediate relative. (Id. ¶ 51.) Likewise, on August 27, 2017, Martinez's adult daughter, who is a United States citizen, petitioned for an immigrant visa for Martinez as an immediate relative. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs also applied for family-based status adjustment to LPR in conjunction with their daughters' petitions. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 65.)

In response, USCIS issued a request for evidence of lawful admission or parole into the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 66.) Plaintiffs each timely responded to the request with documentation of their TPS and a copy of Bonilla v. Johnson , 149 F. Supp. 3d 1135 (D. Minn. 2016), holding that TPS approval satisfied the admission requirement under INA § 245(a). (Id. ¶¶ 53, 67.) USCIS nonetheless denied Plaintiffs' applications for adjustment of status, asserting that a grant of TPS is not an admission.³ (Id. ¶¶ 55-56, 69-70.) Plaintiffs commenced this action for review of USCIS' denials under the Administrative Procedures Act.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz Co., LLC v. Lloyd's of London , 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). However, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo. , 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur , 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Scope of Review

Plaintiffs' claims are brought under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). Under the APA, the reviewing court must affirm an agency decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In reviewing an agency action, the court applies a two-step analysis set forth in Chevron. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ; see also Ortega-Marroquin v. Holder , 640 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2011) (adopting Chevron analysis).

First, the court must determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," and "unambiguously expressed its intent." Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Courts use "traditional tools of statutory construction" to determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, [courts] must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ " King v. Burwell , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (quoting F.D.A. v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) ). If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous, then both the court and the agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see also Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck , 164 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 1999) ("When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, the court first considers whether the intent of Congress is clear; if so, the court's inquiry is over[.]"). When "Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the interpretive question at hand," the court need not defer to the agency's interpretations. Pereira v. Sessions , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018).

If, however, the court finds that the statute "is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court proceeds to step two of the analysis to determine "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Courts may defer to an agency

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interpretation even when the agency is not exercising its formal rule-making authority. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). The weight of deference, if so given, depends on "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161.

III. Analysis

The sole issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation. The threshold question under Chevron is whether the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), read in context, makes clear that when a person is granted TPS...