Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-4718,84-4718 |
| Citation | 784 F.2d 1320 |
| Parties | Robert Earl MELOY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONOCO, INC., Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OILFIELD SERVICES of CAMERON, INC., Third Party Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Jones, Tete, Nolen, Hanchey, Swift & Spears, Gregory P. Massey, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before RUBIN and REAVLEY, Circuit Judges, and DUPLANTIER *, District Judge.
This appeal presents two issues related to the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, one of which is controlled by a recent Fifth Circuit opinion; the other appears to be res nova.
Plaintiff Robert Meloy and his wife sued Conoco, Inc., for damages they allegedly sustained as a result of Meloy's accident in June 1983 on Conoco's production platform off the Louisiana coast, asserting jurisdiction based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(b). Conoco filed a third-party demand against Oilfield Services of Cameron, Inc. (OSI), Meloy's employer, seeking defense and indemnity pursuant to an agreement between Conoco and OSI's predecessor company. 1
On the basis that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act of 1981 (the act), La.Rev.Stat.Ann Sec. 9:2780, 2 barred Conoco's claim, the district court granted OSI's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing OSI with prejudice pursuant to Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Conoco appeals; we affirm.
Because the accident occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast, Louisiana law controls. 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(a)(2); Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969).
Conoco contends that summary judgment is unavailable to defeat its claim for cost of defense: if after trial on the merits Conoco is found to be free of negligence or fault, the anti-indemnity statute would not apply, the indemnity agreement would be valid, and OSI would owe Conoco cost of defense. Suffice it to say that this precise argument was rejected in Knapp v. Chevron, 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.1986), followed in Doucet v. Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.1986).
The unsettled issue raised by Conoco merits discussion. Conoco contends that the act does not address, and therefore does not affect, an indemnity agreement to the extent that the agreement purports to indemnify the indemnitee (in this case, Conoco) for the negligence of the indemnitor (OSI) in causing injury to one of its own employees (plaintiff). Thus if both Conoco and OSI are found to be negligent or at fault (strict liability) for plaintiff's injuries, Conoco contends that although OSI is shielded from a direct claim by its employee, plaintiff, Conoco would nevertheless be entitled to indemnity for the percentage of OSI's negligence or fault.
The short answer to this claim by Conoco is that plaintiff's complaint charges negligence only against Conoco, not O.S.I.; under Knapp, supra, the pleadings control obligations under an indemnity agreement. Knapp rejected the notion that indemnity agreements should be subject to post-trial evaluation.
Even if the Louisiana Supreme Court should hold that Knapp was incorrectly decided, we disagree with Conoco's interpretation of the act. As it is used in the statute, the phrase "to the extent" does not modify the terms "negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee." The phrase "to the extent" limits the statute's nullifying effect to those portions of an oilfield service contract relating to indemnity for an indemnitee's own negligence or fault. Such contracts contain many provisions; the statute nullifies only the portion which seeks to impose an obligation to indemnify in circumstances in which the indemnitee is negligent or at fault. "To the extent" that such a contract imposes such an indemnity obligation, the act nullifies the entire indemnity provision; "to the extent" that any such contract deals with matters other than indemnity, the act does not void those parts of the contract.
Significantly, the statute refers to nullification of indemnity provisions that indemnify the indemnitee for its "sole or concurrent negligence or fault." (Emphasis added.) If the statute was intended to invalidate an indemnity agreement only insofar as it would apply to the percentage of the indemnitee's own negligence, the word "concurrent"...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Offshore Oil Servs.
...attorneys' fees and costs from IOC if Offshore is found not to be at fault, the motion for summary judgment in its entirety is premature. Meloy only serves as an exception to the LOIA's bar of for defense costs when the potential indemnitee is found free of fault after a trial.[180] The que......
-
Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.
...the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 794 F.2d 992 (1986), by decision rendered at 792 F.2d 56, recalling opinion at 784 F.2d 1320, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Certification granted, to be briefed and argued, at 496 So.2d 3......
-
Clement v. Pressure Services, Inc.
...that summary judgment is unavailable to defeat its claim for costs of defense was also considered by the Fifth Circuit in Meloy. 784 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir.1986). The original judgment discounting that contention and affirming the summary judgment dismissing Conoco's third-party claim against t......
-
Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.
...the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 794 F.2d 992 (1986), by decision rendered at 792 F.2d 56, recalling opinion at 784 F.2d 1320, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.Certification granted, to be briefed and argued, at 4......