Melton v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 05 November 1914
• Citation: 160 Ky. 642,170 S.W. 37
• Parties: MELTON v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

170 S.W. 37

160 Ky. 642

MELTON v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 5, 1914

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch First Division.

Dr Frank Melton was convicted of criminal contempt, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Hobson C.J., and Hannah, J., dissenting.

Burnett & Burnett and A. P. Dodd, all of Louisville, for appellant.

Jas. Garnett, Atty. Gen., and Robert T. Caldwell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

CARROLL J.

On May 26, 1914, the following information was filed in the Jefferson circuit court by the Honorable William H. Field, one of the judges of that court:

"Commonwealth of Kentucky, Plaintiff, v. Arthur C. Popham, William H. Roose, Dr. Frank Melton, Defendants.

Information.

The commonwealth of Kentucky, upon information based upon the statements of Clyde C. Collins, this day filed, charges: That Arthur C. Popham and William H. Roose each is and each was at the times mentioned herein an attorney at law practicing at the bar of the Jefferson circuit court, being members of the firm of Popham, Trusty & Roose; that Dr. Frank Melton is a practicing physician of the city of Louisville; that on October 9, 1913, one Clyde C. Collins was driving a wagon of the American Ice & Cold Storage Company, which came into collision with an automobile of Grainger & Co. near the intersection of Eighth and Walnut streets, and went into the drug store at that corner for the purpose of telephoning; that, while there, defendants, Popham, Roose, and Melton, arrived, coming without call or solicitation by said Collins; that said Collins was not injured, and so stated; that the defendants, and each of them, endeavored to persuade said Collins that he was injured; that defendants Popham and Roose told said Collins in substance that he could get 'a bunch of money' out of it; that defendants and each of them insisted upon said Collins submitting to examination, and that he was examined by defendant Dr. Melton; that said Melton discovered a small bandage worn by Collins as a result of a slight accident sustained the day previous; that, in spite of Collins' explanation, said Melton rebandaged him, saying in substance that 'they don't know about that'; that subsequently Dr. Melton again bandaged Collins; that suit was subsequently filed by Popham, Trusty & Roose, in behalf of Collins, against Grainger & Co. The statement, under oath, of said Collins is made a part hereof.

Wm. H. Field, Judge."

Accompanying this information was the verified statement of Collins in the form of a deposition, in which he was asked and answered many questions, the substance and effect of his evidence being as stated in the information; and it was on the faith of this statement that Judge Field filed the information, upon which a rule issued from the circuit court against Popham, Roose, and Melton. The rule against Melton citing him "to show cause, if any he has or can, why he shall not be proceeded against for contempt of court, as particularly set forth in information this day filed." In answer to this rule Melton appeared in court and filed a response in which, after averring that the charge made against him by Collins in his evidence supporting the information, and the charge contained in the information, was each false, he proceeded to say that on the occasion mentioned in the information, and while he was engaged in a professional way in the vicinity of Eighth and Walnut streets--

"he stopped at the drug store at the corner of Eighth and Walnut streets for the purpose of telephoning to his office; that while there he observed that there had been a collision or accident of some kind; and that when he entered the drug store he observed two men, unknown to him, sitting in chairs and claiming to have been injured in the collision; that the clerk of the drug store was at the time at the telephone, and turned to this respondent and said that the said two men had been hurt, and that he had been trying to call a doctor, that he had called up two doctors, and had been unable to reach either of them, and asked this respondent to aid the two men. Respondent says he did examine the said two men, who claimed that they were injured, and especially the said Clyde Collins; that said Collins at that time had no bandages or plaster on his back, as is claimed in said statement, but did complain of pains in his back, and that in order to relieve the same this respondent, with the assistance of the said clerk, and no one else, did first wash with alcohol the places claimed to be causing the pain, and then put over that place an adhesive plaster in order to limit the motions and use of the muscles in the neighborhood of the place where the said Collins claimed the pain came from."

He further said:

"That he is in no way, shape, or form connected with the firm of Popham, Trusty & Roose, or any member of said firm; that he has not in this or any other transaction in any way employed said firm, or done anything to suggest or encourage their employment; that neither of them was present in the drug store on the 9th day of October, 1913, when this respondent entered said drug store for the sole purpose of using the telephone; that respondent did not have any knowledge or information whatever as to how said attorneys were called to the said drug store or as to their business there; that all of the statements made in said affidavit and statement of Clyde Collins filed herein, connecting said firm of attorneys with respondent, or that said attorneys directed respondent what to do, are absolutely false; that respondent received no instructions from said attorneys or either one of them, nor was he in any way guided or controlled in his treatment of Collins by directions from or the interests of said attorneys in the case."

He also said:

"That, if the said Collins was not hurt, he misstated the facts to respondent, and represented to respondent that he was suffering from pains in his back as above set out."

It further appears from the record:

That Melton did not see or prescribe for Collins in a professional way, or give him any advice, or make to him any suggestions about his injury, after the suit was brought. That the acts committed by Melton, and on which the contempt charge was based, occurred before the suit was instituted, but were done in contemplation of the suit and for the purpose of sustaining it. That, six days after the incident at Eighth and Walnut, a suit was brought in the Jefferson circuit court by Popham, Trusty & Roose, attorneys for Collins, against Grainger & Co., to recover damages for the alleged injury. That this suit was assigned for trial in the division of the Jefferson circuit court, presided over by Judge Field, but before coming to trial was dismissed by Collins, and soon thereafter this rule was issued. That the attorneys Popham and Roose were disbarred. That Judge Field impaneled a jury to try Melton, and the jury, after hearing the evidence and receiving the instructions, found him guilty and fixed his punishment at $500.

On this appeal by Melton, although several grounds are assigned why the judgment should be reversed, the principal one is that the prosecution and conviction of Melton on the information filed by Judge Field, and the rule issued thereon, was void, because Judge Field had no authority or jurisdiction to issue the rule or hear and determine the issues arising thereon. This ground of reversal involves an inquiry into the power and jurisdiction of Judge Field to proceed against Melton for contempt on the state of facts shown in the information and supporting evidence, and, if Judge Field was without jurisdiction to issue the rule and hear and determine the matter, the judgment of conviction was unauthorized and void.

The Jefferson circuit court is composed of seven branches or divisions, presided over by seven judges; six of them having civil jurisdiction and one criminal jurisdiction. But these seven divisions constitute only one court, namely, the Jefferson circuit court, and these seven judges merely preside over divisions of that court. A contempt against the authority of any of these judges or courts would be a contempt against the authority of the Jefferson circuit court, and any of the judges or any of the courts would have jurisdiction to proceed against any person guilty of a contempt against the authority of any of the judges or any of the courts composing the Jefferson circuit court, although the contempt might not have been committed against the authority of the particular judge or particular court in which the proceeding for contempt was instituted and heard. It is therefore not material whether the particular contempt here in question was committed by Melton against the authority of Judge Field or the division of the court presided over by Judge Field, because, if it was a contempt against the authority of any of the other judges or any of the other courts, Judge Field would have jurisdiction to hear and determine the contempt proceeding.

So that the question for decision is: Was the conduct of Melton such a contempt of the Jefferson circuit court as that he might be proceeded against by rule as for contempt, or was he guilty of an offense for which he could only be proceeded against and punished by the ordinary processes of the criminal law in the form of a warrant such as may be issued under the authority of the Criminal Code or by indictment of the grand jury?

We assume, and will hereafter show, that Melton's conduct amounted to an offense that may be described as the common-law misdemeanor of obstructing justice, for which he could be proceeded against and punished in the manner provided by law for the punishment of persons guilty of a...