Melton v. Crotts

• Decision Date: 09 May 1962
• Docket Number: No. 386,386
• Citation: Melton v. Crotts, 257 N.C. 121, 125 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. 1962)
• Parties: D. G. MELTON v. George David CROTTS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 396

125 S.E.2d 396

257 N.C. 121

D. G. MELTON v.George David CROTTS.

No. 386

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 9, 1962

Beamer Barnes, Lexington, for plaintiffappellee.

Walser & Brinkley, by Walter F. Brinkley, Lexington, for defendantappellant.

RODMAN, Justice.

Appellant's motion for nonsuit was overruled.He asserts this ruling was erroneous for two reasons: First, there was no evidence to show defendant was negligent; second, the evidence suffices to establish plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law.

G.S. § 20-129 says: 'Every vehicle upon a highway within this State during the period from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise * * * shall be equipped with lighted front and rear lamps * * * subject to exemption with reference to lights on parked vehicles as declared in § 20-134.'

G.S. § 20-134 requires lights visible for 500 feet on front and rear of any vehicle parked or stopped on a highway 'except that local authorities may provide by ordinance that no lights need be displayed upon any such vehicle when parked in accordance with local ordinances upon a highway where there is sufficient light to reveal any person within a distance of two hundred feet upon such highway.'

Plaintiff testified that defendant's car was stopped with its right rear wheels off the hard-surfaced portion of the road, that a little over half of defendant's car was on the hard-surfaced portion, there were no lights on defendant's car.It was dark.

Cassell, driver of plaintiff's car, testified: 'There were no lights emitting from any source from the defendant Crotts' automobile before I struck it.There were no flares stationed or otherwise emitting any light up and down the highway from the defendant's car at anywhere.'

Hall, who had turned from N. C. 8 to the Junior Order Home Road and was meeting plaintiff's car, testified: 'I saw a car coming.I dimmed my lights, he dimmed his, along as we approached one another, he hit something.It was the back of Mr. Crotts' car, but I didn't see the car myself until Mr. Melton had already contacted it.You couldn't tell much what color Mr. Crotts' car was.It hadn't been cleaned up in a good while.It was some shade of green.* * * I would say at least two-thirds of Mr. Crotts' car was parked on the highway.Mr. Crotts was headed east toward Highway #8.He was on his right side traveling east.There were no lights visible on the parked car belonging to Mr. Crotts.The parking lights were turned on while I had gone to call the ambulance.There were no lights visible on the defendant's car before the accident happened and there were no flares.'

Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant did not comply with the provisions of G.S. § 20-134.Such a violation is negligence.Scarborough v. Ingram, 256 N.C. 87, 122 S.E.2d 798;Keener v. Beal, 246 N.C. 247, 98 S.E. 2d 19;Bumgardner v. Allison, 238 N.C. 621, 78 S.E.2d 752;Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N.C. 122, 52 S.E.2d 377;McKinnon v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N.C. 132, 44 S.E.2d 735;United States v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 4 Cir., 208 F.2d 280;5A Am.Jur. 487.

G.S. § 20-161 regulates parking on highways.It does not purport, except as to trucks, trailers, and semitrailers, to define what means the owner of a vehicle stopped on the highway shall use to notify others using the highway of his presence.It does not conflict with nor reduce the obligation imposed on the operator of a vehicle stopped or parked on the highway at night to light his vehicle as required by G.S. § 20-134andG.S. § 20-129.To the extent that Meece v. Dickson, 252 N.C. 300, 113 S.E.2d 578, may be construed as conflicting with what is here said, it is overruled.

Does the evidence suffice to show plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law warranting a nonsuit?On that question the evidence tends to show these facts: Plaintiff's car came into the Junior Order Home Road some 900 or 1000 feet west of the scene of the collision.His car did not exceed a speed of 30 to 35 m. p. h. When Hall, driving the westbound car, turned from N. C. 8 onto the Junior Order Home Road, both cars dimmed their headlights.The headlights on plaintiff's car had not picked up defendant's car before Hall turned from N. C. 8.Plaintiff and Hall had not passed when the collision occurred.Hall was traveling at a speed of 20 to 25 m. p. h. When Cassell first observed Hall's car as it turned from N. C. 8, Cassell reduced his speed.Cassell said he saw the Crotts car a second or two before the collision.Plaintiff, in fixing the distance the Crotts car was seen before the collision, said: '(I)t wasn't but a short distance; it wasn't too far; it was about 10 or 12 feet, somewhere along there, in my estimation.'The dark color of defendant's car and the black road tended to absorb the lights from the approaching vehicles rather than to reflect it.It was, of course, the duty of plaintiff's driver to exercise caution and to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles on the highway.The evidence is insufficient to establish the single conclusion that plaintiff's driver was negligent.Scarborough v. Ingram, supra;Keener v. Beal, supra;Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, supra;Privette v. Lewis, 255 N.C. 612, 122 S.E.2d 381;Carrigan v. Dover, 251 N.C. 97, 110 S.E.2d 825;Burchette v. Distributing Co., 243 N.C. 120, 90 S.E.2d 232;Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N.C. 377, 64 S.E.2d 276.

If the jury should find that defendant did not have his vehicle lighted as required by statute, and such failure was the proximate cause of the collision, and should further find plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, he would be entitled to recover.It follows that the court properly refused to allow the motion to nonsuit.

Plaintiff does not limit his right to recover to defendant's failure to display lights.He pleads an additional negligent act, to wit, the violation of G.S. § 20-161. Subsec.(a) of that statute, so far as pertinent to this case, reads: 'No person shall park or leave standing any vehicle * * * upon the paved * * * portion of any highway * * * when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off of the paved * * * portion of such highway: Provided, in no event shall any person park or leave standing any vehicle * * * upon any highway unless a clear and unobstructed width of not less than fifteen feet upon the main traveled portion of said highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for free passage of other vehicles thereon * * *.'

The provisions of subsec.(a) are limited by subsec.(c), which reads as follows: 'The provisions of this section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved * * * protion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such vehicle in such position.'All of the evidence tends to show the collision occurred some 400 or 500 feet west of N. C. 8.The Junior Order Home Road was in a cut.The banks on each side are four or five feet high.Next to the bank is a ditch.The distance between the bank-ditch and the pavement was not sufficient to take care of defendant's car when he stopped.This condition existed for some distance to the west of the point where defendant stopped, all the way east to N. C. 8, and for some distance on N. C. 8 before a place could be found where a car could be parked without a portion of the car extending over on the paved area of the road.The distance from point of collision to an adequate parking area was variously estimated at 1000 to 1500 feet.The evidence was plenary that defendant stopped because of a punctured tire.There was conflict in the evidence as to the distance defendant's car extended over the paved part of the highway and the portion of the highway left open for traffic.Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that such area was less than fifteen feet.Defendant's evidence would fix the area as more than fifteen feet.

The court charged: 'If you find by the evidence and by its greater weight that on the occasion in question that the defendant was parked on a public highway at night, and that he failed and neglected to remove his motor vehicle from the traveled portion of the highway so as to leave a clear and unobstructed width of not less than 15 feet upon the main-traveled portion of the highway opposite said motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes 20-161; and such violation was the proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the damage and injury complained of, then it would be your duty to answer the first issue YES.'Defendant excepted to the foregoing instruction.He also excepted to the failure of the court to refer to and explain defendant's rights accorded by subsec.(c).

It is the duty of the court, without a request for special instructions, to explain the law and to apply it to the evidence on all substantial features of the case.Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 123 S.E. 2d 785;Westmoreland v. Gregory, 255 N.C. 172, 120 S.E.2d 523.

The quoted portion of the charge, so far as it went, is a correct statement of the law.The burden rested on plaintiff to show that defendant had violated the statute.Defendant, if he would escape the consequences of his violation, had the burden of bringing himself within the provision of subsec.(c).Hence we are confronted with the question: Were the facts in this case sufficient to require the court to inform the jury of the provisions of subsec.(c) and to apply its provisions to the facts of this case?In other words, was a puncture and flat tire at a point where the operator of a motor vehicle could not get off the highway for several hundred feet sufficient to warrant him in stopping to change tires, leaving a part of his vehicle on the paved part of the highway?

Plaintiff relies on Lambert v. Caronna, 206 N.C. 616, 175 S.E. 303, to support his...