Melton v. Harbor Pointe Llc.
Decision Date | 10 September 2010 |
Docket Number | 1081096. |
Citation | 57 So.3d 695 |
Parties | Sharon MELTONv.HARBOR POINTE, LLC. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Henry L. Penick of H.L. Penick & Associates, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.Philip A. Thompson of Haygood, Cleveland, Pierce, Matson & Thompson, LLP, Auburn, for appellee.LYONS, Justice.
Sharon Melton appeals from a January 7, 2009, judgment of the Lee Circuit Court denying Melton's claims alleging trespass and seeking a judgment declaring that she had an easement over real property owned by Harbor Pointe, LLC (“HP”).1
On April 15, 2008, Melton sued HP in the Lee Circuit Court stating a claim of trespass and seeking a judgment declaring that she had an easement by prescription and by implication across property owned by HP. Specifically, Melton alleged that she had used the easement to access her property “openly and hostilely for the statutorily required ten year period, Section 18–3–1 of the Code of Alabama [1975], and therefore ha[d] established the easement through prescriptive means.”
The trial court received ore tenus evidence at a bench trial held in July 2008. Maxine Jackson, from whom HP had purchased its property and who owned property over which HP contended Melton had an alternate means of access to her property, did not testify. The trial court subsequently viewed the disputed property and, on September 3, 2008, it entered an order stating:
On November 12, 2008, the trial court received ore tenus evidence from Jackson. As the hearing began, the court asked Melton's attorney: “[H]ave y'all chosen to add her in or are you just going to call her as a witness?” Melton's attorney responded: “We are just calling her as a witness, I guess, Judge.” Jackson testified, but she was never added as an indispensable party to the action under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.
The evidence presented to the trial court in July and November 2008 shows the following facts. In the 1930s, Melton's great-great-grandfather, Lemmie Morgan, owned farmland in Lee County. His land was eventually subdivided and conveyed to family members. The record does not disclose all the various conveyances, but by 1990 Melton's aunt, Eva Mae Williams, owned a parcel known as lot 9B and Melton's uncle, Wilbert Tolbert, owned a parcel known as lot 10. The record does not show that Tolbert ever owned any interest in lot 9B or that Williams ever owned any interest in lot 10. Lot 10 was situated immediately east of lot 9B. Lot 9B was landlocked. Immediately east of lot 10 was a road running north to south, access to which over lot 10 forms the basis of this litigation.
In 1990, Melton purchased lot 9B from Williams. Tolbert granted Melton a 30–foot–wide easement across lot 10 for the benefit of lot 9B. The easement was platted across the southern part of lot 10. Although the easement was platted in a specific location, Melton and Tolbert believed that Melton could access lot 9B through lot 10 anywhere she wanted. As a result, when Melton built a house on lot 9B in 1990, she built a driveway on the northern part of lot 10 with Tolbert's oral permission, not on the southern part of lot 10, where her easement was situated according to the plat. Melton used the driveway on the northern part of lot 10 to access her house for 18 years.2
There is some indication in the record that Tolbert may have granted another easement in favor of lot 9B across land he owned to the south of lot 10 that was eventually acquired by a family named Bass. However, because the references to the documents by the witnesses and attorneys are not clear and because facts regarding this issue were never explored or explained on the record during trial, it is impossible to state the existence of such an easement with any certainty.
Sometime after Melton built her house and began using the driveway in the northern part of lot 10, Tolbert subdivided lot 10 into lot 10A to the north and lot 10B to the south. Melton's driveway was located entirely on lot 10A. The platted easement was located entirely on lot 10B. In 1994, a house was built over part of the easement on lot 10B, blocking all but a 10–foot–wide strip of the 30–foot–wide platted easement.
When Tolbert died, he devised lots 10A and 10B to Jackson, his daughter. In 2007, Jackson began negotiations to sell lot 10A to HP, a company that owned a nearby subdivision. James Starr, a representative of HP, testified that Jackson told HP that Melton had no rights to the driveway located on lot 10A. Starr testified that he viewed the recorded plat showing an easement on what had become lot 10B and confirmed Jackson's representation. HP then concluded that it could purchase lot 10A free of any encumbrances or easements. Jackson testified that she had assumed that the driveway across lot 10A belonged to Melton but concluded otherwise based on information she reviewed during the course of the sale of lot 10A to HP. It is undisputed that Starr told both Jackson and Melton that HP intended to move Melton's driveway to lot 10B if it purchased lot 10A. HP purchased lot 10A from Jackson in December 2007.
In the spring of 2008, HP began to remove Melton's driveway from lot 10A. Melton filed her action against HP on April 15, 2008, seeking a judgment declaring that she had an easement across lot 10A in the location of the driveway. On April 16, 2008, Melton requested that the trial court enjoin HP from destroying the driveway. It is unclear how the trial court ruled on Melton's request, but by the time the action came to trial on Melton's trespass and declaratory-judgment claims, HP had destroyed Melton's driveway and had put in a gravel driveway for her on lot 10B. That driveway was situated along the 10 feet of the 30–foot platted easement that remained accessible after the house was constructed on lot 10B.
At trial, Melton's attorney asked her why it was necessary for her to have access to her house through the driveway located on lot 10A. Melton responded: than the gravel driveway across lot 10B. She then described the various ways in which the gravel driveway over lot 10B was not as convenient for her as the driveway across lot 10A.
On January 7, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of HP, stating:
3
On January 29, 2009, Melton filed what she captioned a “motion for reconsideration,” but which was in substance a motion under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. The trial court gave HP 21 days to respond, and it did, but the trial court never ruled on Melton's postjudgment motion. Under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., Melton's motion was denied by operation of law on April 29, 2009. Melton thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Melton advances six arguments on appeal: 1) that Jackson and a member of the Bass family should have been joined as necessary parties under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.; 2) that the trial court should have reformed the deed that granted her an easement across lot 10; 3) that she had an easement across lot 10A based on a theory of statutory adverse possession; 4) that she had an easement by prescription across lot 10A; 5) that she had an easement by necessity across lot 10A; and 6) that she had an easement by implication across lot 10A.
I. Joinder of Parties
In her brief on appeal, Melton argues that the trial court erred in failing to join both Jackson and a member of the Bass family as indispensable parties under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P. Melton did not raise these arguments before the trial court. This Court has explained:
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