Melton v. Melton
Decision Date | 13 March 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 17131,17131 |
Citation | 91 S.E.2d 873,229 S.C. 85 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | J. T. MELTON, Appellant, v. Helen Mae MELTON, Respondent. |
Clement L. McEachern, Greenville, for appellant.
Leon W. Harris, Anderson, Wyche, Burgess & Wyche, Greenville, for respondent.
On the 22nd day of April, 1954, Appellant filed his petition, together with a rule to show cause, in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County, for the purpose of having declared null and void, on the grounds of fraud and deceit, his marriage contract entered into with Respondent on August 27, 1938, and to recover such sums as he had previously paid Respondent under a separation agreement entered into in October, 1948. On or about the 20th day of May, 1954, Respondent, through her attorneys, served notice of motion for a change of venue, demurrer to the petition, and motion to vacate the Order to show cause, and return and counterclaim. The motion for a change of venue was heard and granted by the Honorable J. Robert Martin, who ordered the venue changed to Anderson County, the residence of Respondent; and that Order was affirmed by this Court, Melton v. Melton, 227 S.C. 183, 87 S.E.2d 485.
Thereafter, the case was heard on its merits by the Honorable J. B. Pruitt, Resident Judge of the 10th Circuit, who filed his Decree holding that there was a binding marriage contract, a binding separation agreement between the parties; and that the judgment entered against Appellant on March 24, 1954, in the Greenville County Court directing Appellant to pay the April, 1953, and March, 1954, installments was binding upon Appellant and res judicata of the issues sought to be raised in the instant proceedings. However, the Order continues and also decides the merits of the cause adversely to Appellant.
By reference to the Decree of the Greenville County Court, we find that it was 'Ordered, that the attached copy of contract, as well as the attached copy of Decree in divorce be, and the same are hereby attached and made a part of this Decree, and the judgment of this Court with reference to the payment of One hundred thirty-five ($135.00) dollars per month due Plaintiff by Defendant, and that said payments are due to be paid each and every month, in the amount of one hundred thirty-five ($135.00) dollars. * * *'
We are of the opinion that Judge Pruitt was correct in holding that the matters sought to be adjudicated here are res judicata. As heretofore stated, the marriage contract was entered into on August 27, 1938; and Appellant's petition states that he and Respondent were 'duly and lawfully married' to each other on this date and lived together as husband and wife until the 16th day of October, 1948, on which date the separation agreement was entered into whereby Appellant agreed to pay Respondent a lump sum and the sum of $135.00 per month thereafter so long as she lived or until she remarried. The lump sum payment was to enable Respondent to purchase a house in Anderson, South Carolina, in exchange for the home in Greenville, South Carolina, which the parties occupied prior to their separation. The agreement further provided that no divorce proceeding should be instituted or brought seeking to nullify the separation agreement. Thereafter, Appellant instituted a divorce proceeding in the State of Florida and obtained a Decree of divorce from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit on January 18, 1950; Respondent entered her appearance in the proceeding. The resulting Decree incorporated the contents of the separation agreement with reference to the monthly payments and a transcript of these proceedings was introduced into evidence.
Appellant continued to make the monthly payments up to March, 1954, with the exception of one payment for the month of April, 1953. Respondent then brought an action in the County Court for Greenville County, South Carolina, seeking judgment against Petitioner in the amount of $270 for the April, 1953, and March, 1954, unpaid installments. Appellant failed to file answer or make appearance; and on March 24, 1954, judgment was entered against petitioner for the amount sought. Attached to the Decree of the Court was a copy of the separation agreement as well as that of the divorce Decree. Such were made a part of the Decree, and Appellant was ordered in and by said Decree to pay Respondent the sum of $135 per month in accordance with the separation agreement and the divorce Decree. Said judgment was duly entered in Judgment Roll F-8780, Office of the Clerk of Court for Greenville County, South Carolina, and a transcript was made and appears as Judgment Roll 21778 in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Anderson County. The latter judgment was introduced in evidence and is part of the record of this case; and it is this judgment Appellant refers to in his petition, wherein he seeks:
a. An annulment of the marriage;
b. Relief from the judgment obtained against him on March 24, 1954, in the County Court for Greenville County, South Carolina, based on the separation agreement;
c. Judgment against Respondent for sums paid her, amounting to $20,505; and
d. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
The return and counterclaim set up the judgment of the Greenville County Court, dated March 24, 1954, and alleged petitioner's failure to comply with the Orders of the Court and asked that he be held in contempt of Court for refusing to...
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