Melton v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 13 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-10604,15-10604
• Citation: 875 F.3d 256
• Parties: Michael David MELTON, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kelly D. PHILLIPS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

875 F.3d 256

Michael David MELTON, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Kelly D. PHILLIPS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15-10604

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED November 13, 2017

Jason Andrew Duff, Law Office of Jason Duff, Greenville, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Robert Scott Davis, Esq., Flowers Davis, P.L.L.C., David Ryan Herring Iglesias, Iglesias Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Tyler, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge, joined by STEWART, Chief Judge, JOLLY, JONES, SMITH, CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES,^* and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges:

Michael David Melton alleges that he was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment for an assault committed by another man with the same first and last names. He seeks to hold Deputy Kelly Phillips, who took the original incident report, liable for his arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Deputy Phillips moved for summary judgment in district court, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court determined that fact issues precluded summary judgment on one of Melton's Section 1983 claims. Because Deputy Phillips is entitled to summary judgment even when construing all the facts in the light most favorable to Melton, we REVERSE the district court's order and RENDER summary judgment on Melton's remaining Section 1983 claim against Deputy Phillips.

I.

In June 2009, Deputy Phillips interviewed an alleged assault victim and filled out an incident report identifying the alleged assailant by the name "Michael David Melton."¹ After Deputy Phillips submitted the report, an investigator with the Sheriff's Office began investigating the assault. A year later, the alleged victim provided the investigator with a sworn affidavit identifying the alleged assailant as "Mike Melton." The Hunt County Attorney's Office then filed a complaint against "Michael Melton." The alleged assailant's first and last names are the only identifying information contained in the complaint, and their accuracy is undisputed. Four days after the complaint was filed, a Hunt County judge issued a capias warrant correctly identifying the assailant as "Michael Melton."² Two years after the judge issued the warrant, Melton was arrested on assault charges and detained for sixteen days before being released on bond. It is undisputed that Deputy Phillips's involvement in the chain of events that led to Melton's May 2012 arrest and detention ended with the incident report in June 2009. Melton v. Phillips , 837 F.3d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 2016).

The assault charges against Melton were ultimately dismissed for insufficient evidence. Melton then sued Deputy Phillips under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Deputy Phillips was responsible for his arrest under Franks and Hart because Deputy Phillips included false information in his incident report.³ Deputy Phillips asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity and provided an affidavit stating broadly that the identifying information in the incident report "would have been based solely on what I was told by [the victim]." In his affidavit, Phillips also averred, as is stated in the incident report, that the victim provided the assailant's first name, last name, gender, ethnicity, and date of birth.

Melton responded by alleging that Deputy Phillips did not obtain any identifying information from the victim other than the assailant's first and last names. Melton relied on an affidavit by former Hunt County Patrol Lieutenant Brian Alford for his explanation of how Deputy Phillips obtained the information in the incident report. According to Alford's affidavit, victims generally cannot provide the exact date of birth or driver's license number of an offender who is not a family relation. Therefore, Alford averred that Deputy Phillips must have obtained the information from a database called a P.I.D. used by the Hunt County Sheriff's Office. Alford further stated that Melton and the true assailant have no identifying characteristics in common other than their first and last names. Accordingly, Alford inferred that Deputy Phillips must have obtained the information in the incident report from the P.I.D. without asking the victim to verify any information other than first and last names. Finally, Alford's affidavit averred that a reasonable officer would not rely on the P.I.D. without verifying additional information beyond first and last names.

The district court determined that Alford's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy Phillips obtained identifying information from the victim, whether he cross-checked that information against the P.I.D. results, whether he used the P.I.D. system at all, and whether his use of the P.I.D. system was improper. The district court reasoned that these questions were material to recklessness, which is an element of liability under Franks . Accordingly, the district court denied Deputy Phillips's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity with respect to Melton's Franks -based Section 1983 claim.⁴

Deputy Phillips appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment. Interlocutory appeal was appropriate in this case because Deputy Phillips had raised the defense of qualified immunity, which is an immunity from suit that must be considered at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). A divided panel of this court affirmed the district court in part and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent it challenged the genuineness of the factual dispute over recklessness. Melton , 837 F.3d at 510. The panel majority further held sua sponte that, although Jennings v. Patton , 644 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2011), and Hampton v. Oktibbeha County Sheriff Department , 480 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2007), "grant[ed] qualified immunity to government officials who neither signed nor drafted warrant applications," these opinions lacked precedential value because, in the panel majority's view, they contradicted this court's earlier decision in Hart . Melton , 837 F.3d at 509. Accordingly, the panel majority sua sponte overruled Jennings and Hampton . The panel majority also rejected Deputy Phillips's alternative argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity under the independent intermediary doctrine.

The dissenting opinion would have held that the requirement of participation in preparing an application for a warrant in Jennings and Hampton is consistent with Hart 's requirement that information be provided "for use in an affidavit in support of a warrant." Id. at 513 (Elrod, J., dissenting). Because there was no evidence that Deputy Phillips provided information for the purpose of having it used in obtaining a warrant, the dissenting opinion would have held that Deputy Phillips was entitled to summary judgment under Hart , Hampton , and Jennings . Id. at 511–13. Deputy Phillips petitioned for rehearing en banc , and we granted the petition.

II.

"The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine to the extent that it turns on an issue of law." Flores v. City of Palacios , 381 F.3d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2004). "Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the genuineness of a fact issue but have jurisdiction insofar as the interlocutory appeal challenges the materiality of [the] factual issues." Allen v. Cisneros , 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016). We review the materiality of fact issues de novo . Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc. , 174 F.3d 629, 634 (5th Cir. 1999). Where the district court has identified a factual dispute, we ask whether the officer is entitled to summary judgment even assuming the accuracy of the plaintiff's version of the facts. Kinney v. Weaver , 367 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

"A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available." King v. Handorf , 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016). To satisfy this burden and overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test. Morgan v. Swanson , 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). First, the plaintiff must show "that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right." Id. Second, the plaintiff must show that "the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Id. To avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity, "the plaintiff need not present absolute proof, but must offer more than mere allegations." King , 821 F.3d at 654. Because the plaintiff is the non-moving party, we construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 307, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) ; Tolan v. Cotton , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1865, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014).

As explained below, Melton's claim fails under both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis because, even assuming his version of the disputed facts and construing all facts and inferences in his favor, the connection between Deputy Phillips's conduct and Melton's arrest is too attenuated to hold the deputy liable under the rule that we reaffirm today or under any law that was clearly established at the time that Deputy Phillips filled out the incident report.

A.

Melton's argument that Deputy Phillips violated his Fourth Amendment rights is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Franks and our subsequent application of Franks in Hart . The defendant in Franks was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to life imprisonment after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence that had been seized pursuant to a search warrant. Franks , 438 U.S. at 160, 98 S.Ct. 2674. The warrant affidavit in ...