Melton v. United States, 3:18-CV-347-TWP
| Decision Date | 14 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:10-CR- 126-TWP-HBG-1,No. 3:18-CV-347-TWP,3:18-CV-347-TWP,3:10-CR- 126-TWP-HBG-1 |
| Parties | JASON JENNINGS MELTON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Before the Court is Jason Jennings Melton's ("Petitioner's") pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. 1; Criminal Docket ("Crim.") Doc. 131].1 The United States has responded in opposition [doc. 4; crim. doc. 134]; and Petitioner has replied [docs. 9, 10]. Petitioner has also filed a supplement to his § 2255 motion [doc. 13]. Also before the Court are the government's motion to substitute attorney [doc. 2; crim. doc. 132], motion for extension of time to file response nunc pro tunc [doc. 5; crim. doc. 135], and Petitioner's motion for extension of time [doc. 7]. For the reasons below, the government's motion to substitute attorney [doc. 2; crim doc. 132] and motion for extension of time to file response nunc pro tunc [doc. 5; crim doc. 135] are GRANTED. Petitioner's motion for an extension of time [doc. 7] will likewise be GRANTED. Petitioner's § 2255 motion [doc. 1; crim. doc. 131] will be DENIED.
In 2010, Petitioner was charged in a single-count indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). [Crim. doc. 1]. After a protracted procedural history, involving numerous motions to suppress and motions in limine, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement with the government, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to the sole count of the indictment. [Crim. doc. 113 at 1].
In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that he was an armed career criminal, and therefore, faced a mandatory minimum term of 15 years' imprisonment. [Id.]. The plea agreement noted that the factual basis for the charge stemmed from the execution of a search warrant at Petitioner's residence, during which law enforcement found a sawed-off shotgun, loaded with five rounds of ammunition, and a .380 pistol. [Id. at 2]. The plea agreement also stated that Petitioner was a "multi-convicted felon," noting the following prior convictions: (1) 1999 convictions in Dekalb County for burglary, theft over $1,000, and aggravated burglary; (2) a 2001 conviction in DeKalb County for aggravated burglary; (3) a 2001 conviction in DeKalb County for burglary; and (4) 2002 convictions for aggravated burglary and escape. [Id. at 2-3]. The plea agreement stated that "[p]ursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant and the United States agree that a total sentence of imprisonment of one hundred and eighty (180) months . . . is the appropriate disposition of this case." [Id. at 4].
At the plea hearing, the government recited the elements of the offense, and, in reciting the punishment for the offense, noted that, "[b]ecause this defendant is an armed career criminal . . . he faces a mandatory minimum term of 15 years[.]" [Crim. doc. 139 at8-9]. The government also recited Petitioner's criminal history, as contained in the plea agreement. [Id. at 9-10]. Petitioner then agreed with the government's summary of the factual basis for the charge. [Id. at 11]. Petitioner then pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and testified that he understood what he was pleading guilty to, and was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty. [Id.]. The Court found that Petitioner was fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea of guilty, and stated that the plea would be accepted by the Court. [Id. at 16].
The presentence investigation report ("PSR") calculated Petitioner's adjusted offense level as 24, but noted that the offense of conviction was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and Petitioner had at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, rendering him an armed career criminal, and resulting in an offense level of 33. [PSR ¶¶ 23-24]. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 30. [Id. ¶¶ 25-27].
In recounting Petitioner's criminal history, the PSR identified four Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") predicate offenses: (1) a January 29, 1999 conviction for aggravated burglary in DeKalb County, Tennessee; (2) an April 10, 2000 conviction for aggravated burglary in DeKalb County, Tennessee; (3) a May 9, 2000 conviction for aggravated robbery in Cannon County, Tennessee; and (4) a May 9, 2000 conviction for aggravated burglary in Cannon County, Tennessee. [Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 34]. According to the PSR's factual recitation, both of the May 9, 2000 convictions stemmed from the same course of conduct. [Id. ¶ 34]. The PSR ultimately calculated Petitioner's criminal history score as 12, resulting in a criminal history category of V. [Id. ¶ 38]. Based on an offenselevel of 30 and criminal history category V, the PSR calculated a guideline range of 151 months to 188 months. [Id. ¶ 56]. However, the PSR noted that because the statutorily authorized minimum sentence of 15 years was greater than the minimum guideline range, the guideline range was 180 to 188 months. [Id.].
The government filed a notice of no objections to the PSR. [Crim. doc. 116]. The government also filed a sentencing memorandum in which it requested that the Court impose the agreed-upon sentence. [Crim. doc. 117]. Petitioner's counsel also filed a sentencing memorandum, stating that Petitioner had no additional information to add to the sentencing circumstances of the case which was not contained in the PSR. [Crim. doc. 118].
At sentencing, Petitioner stated that he had gone over the PSR with his attorney, and his attorney stated that Petitioner had no objections to the PSR. [Crim. doc. 130 at 3-4]. The probation officer then recited Petitioner's criminal history, as contained in the PSR. [Id. at 5]. The Court asked Petitioner whether he admitted these prior convictions and warned him that, such admission would preclude him from challenging these convictions later to attack his sentence. [Id.]. Petitioner affirmed the prior convictions. [Id. at 6]. The Court thus concluded that Petitioner should be sentenced as an armed career criminal. The Court also noted that, in accordance with Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the parties had recommended a term of imprisonment of 180 months. [Id.]. The Court ultimately accepted the parties' recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to 180 months' imprisonment. [Id. at 12]. Petitioner did not object to the sentence. [Id. at 16]. Judgment was entered on September 19, 2012. [Crim. doc. 120]. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On June 20, 2014, Petitioner mailed a letter to the Court, requesting a copy of his criminal docket sheet. [Crim. doc. 127]. Petitioner stated that he was "trying to file a 2255 appeal[.]" [Id.]. On March 18, 2015, Petitioner sent another letter to the Court, again requesting his docket sheet, and stating that he had "been working on a 2255 direct appeal conscerning [stet] the A.C.C. within the 6th District." [Crim. doc. 128]. Finally, on September 5, 2016, Petitioner sent another letter to the Court, inquiring about the progress of his "Johnson appeal" which he allegedly sent to the Court on "June 20" of 2016. [Crim. Doc. 129]. Petitioner acknowledged that the Court may have a high case load of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 255 (2015) related cases, but expressed his concern at having heard no response, and requested an update. [Id.]. However, the docket does not reflect that the Court ever received any Johnson-based motion prior to this letter.
On August 9, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 motion. [Doc. 1]. In his motion, Petitioner asserts that his sentence constitutes plain error because Tennessee's aggravated burglary statute no longer constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. [Id. at 1-2]. Petitioner asserts that the Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary cannot serve as an ACCA predicate offense, because it is not a violent felony under the ACCA post-Johnson. [Id. at 3-4, 7]. Petitioner thus asserts that his three prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary are no longer ACCA predicates and he should not be deemed an armed career criminal. [Id. at 8]. Petitioner further asserts that his sentence should be reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), because the amended guideline range for his plea agreement has been lowered. [Id. at 9].
On January 15, 2015, the government filed a response, arguing that Petitioner's § 2255 motion is untimely, because it was filed nearly six years after Petitioner's conviction became final, and over three years from June 26, 2015, the date that Johnson was decided. [Doc. 4 at 3]. The government asserts that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to equitable tolling, because he has not been pursuing his rights diligently. [Id. at 4]. The government also asserts that Petitioner's motion is barred by the collateral attack waiver in his plea agreement. [Id. at 5]. Finally, the government contends that Johnson does not affect the validity of Petitioner's sentence, as the Supreme Court has recently held that Tennessee aggravated burglary categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's enumerated offenses clause. [Id. at 6-7].
In early February, Petitioner filed a reply to the government's response. [Doc. 9]. Petitioner asserts that his § 2255 motion is timely because it was filed within one year of the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). [Id. at 1]. Petitioner further asserts that the government is incorrect in stating that, under current Sixth Circuit law, Tennessee aggravated burglary constitutes a violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA. [Id.]. Petitioner also appears to seek permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. [Id. at 4]. Petitioner later filed another...
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