Melville v. American Home Assur. Co., Civ. A. No. 73-1398.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-1398.
• Citation: 443 F. Supp. 1064
• Parties: Virginia J. Barry MELVILLE v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

443 F. Supp. 1064

Virginia J. Barry MELVILLE v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY.

Civ. A. No. 73-1398.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

November 25, 1977.

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Gerald A. Robbie, New York City, for plaintiff.

Sidney L. Wickenhaver, Carol A. Mager, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

                                      INDEX
                  I. Preliminary Statement                        1068
                 II. The Procedural History                       1070
                III. The Facts Adduced at Trial                   1070
                 IV. Choice of Law                                1076
                     A. Introduction                              1076
                     B. Is the Presumption Against Suicide
                        Procedural or Substantive?                1077
                     C. Must We Choose? — The Relevant
                        Similarities and Differences Among
                        the Laws of Pennsylvania, New York
                        and Delaware                              1080
                     D. The Three Competing Choice of Law
                        Systems                                   1082
                     E. Pennsylvania Choice of Law Doctrine
                        the Legacy of Griffith and its Impact
                        on Contract Cases                         1084
                        1. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
                          and Superior Court Decisions            1085
                        2. The Court of Appeals (Third Circuit)
                           Decisions                              1090
                        3. A Disquieting Verdict                  1094
                     F. The Parties' Contentions; The Impact
                        of Van Dusen v. Barrack                   1094
                     G. Our Pretrial Bench Opinion                1097
                     H. Application of Pennsylvania Choice of
                        Law Principles to this Case               1097
                       1. Analysis Under Restatement I and
                           Lex Loci (Contractus) Rules            1097
                       2. Post-Griffith Interest/Restatement
                          II Hybrid Analysis                      1100
                          (a) Interest Analysis: Lex Loci v
                              Lex Fori in the "Unprovided-for
                              Case."                              1100
                          (b) Territorial Contacts Analysis       1104
                       3. Conclusion                              1107
                   V. The Charge to the Jury                      1107
                  VI. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the
                      Verdict                                     1110
                VII. Admissibility of the FAA Airworthiness
                     Directives                                   1110
                

OPINION AND ORDER

EDWARD R. BECKER, District Judge.

I. Preliminary Statement

This is a suit on a policy of insurance covering accidental death. The jury, instructed as to the New York presumption against suicide which we held applicable to the facts, found for the plaintiff, Virginia Barry Melville, who was the sole beneficiary under the $500,000 policy. This opinion addresses defendant's post-trial motions.¹ At the core of those motions and of the case lies a complex question of choice of law: whether the presumption to be applied with respect to suicide is that of Pennsylvania, New York or Delaware where: (1) Pennsylvania is the forum state, the situs of the principal office of the insurance broker which placed the policy, and the sometime residence of the plaintiff; (2) New York is the place where the insurance contract was made, as well as the state where the defendant insurer was incorporated and had its main office; and (3) Delaware was the residence of the insured, the situs of his death, the locale where most of the facts relevant to the question of accident or suicide occurred and the place where the order for insurance was initiated. In answering that question we will be obliged to determine the applicability of the landmark case of Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) in a contractual context. In the course of that determination we will be obliged to engage in a comprehensive survey and analysis of Pennsylvania choice of law principles and their underlying policy bases.

The foregoing is a synopsis of the facts underlying our choice of law decision. The facts which formed the basis for the decision on the merits are not so mundane; indeed, they are extraordinary. They relate to the life and times of the insured, Josiah Marvel ("Jay") Scott, member of a respected and wealthy Wilmington family, who bilked the family fortune of many millions, most of which he squandered on disastrous venture capital undertakings, and some of which he lavished upon the plaintiff, who was his secretary and his mistress. The saga ended — and this case began — when Scott, on the brink of exposure for his misdeeds, died in an exceedingly strange airplane crash which was presaged, in full view of spectators at the Wilmington airport, by bizarre aerobatic maneuvers. The trial testimony thus ranged from the moods and escapades of Jay Scott to the aerodynamics of aerobatic flight. The aerodynamic testimony was adduced to aid the jury in determining whether the "loops," "split-S," "tight turns" and "hammerhead stalls" performed by the chartered Atlantic Aviation Piper Cherokee Arrow in which Scott was a passenger at the time of the fatal crash occurred, as the plaintiff contends, either because the pilot was responding brilliantly to a mechanical malfunction, or because the pilot was showing off or had gone mad; or, as defendant argued to the jury, because Scott had interfered with the pilot's use of the plane's dual controls in order to cause the plane to crash, and the pilot had valiantly, but futilely, attempted to compensate for Scott's actions so as to keep the plane aloft.

The choice of law question, which is the principal issue considered in this opinion, is best understood in context of the procedural history of the case and of the facts adduced at trial; hence, we address these matters first. However, we shall also take up the following issues raised by defendant's motion:

(1) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, so that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict and, thus, is now entitled to a judgment n. o. v.;

(2) whether the verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence that defendant should be granted a new trial;

(3) whether we correctly instructed the jury as to the New York presumption against suicide; and

(4) whether we erred when we admitted into evidence certain F.A.A. documents (Airworthiness Directives) which opined that particular parts of the Piper Cherokee Arrow model involved posed dangers serious enough to require prompt and/or regular inspections, repairs, or replacements.

The choice of law question is both unsettled and abstruse. However, for the reasons which follow, we reaffirm the choice of law decision previously made, although on different grounds from those on which it was previously made. In the course of our discussion we will note and document our conclusions that:

(1) the presumption against suicide is substantive not procedural, hence not to be determined by mere reference to the law of the forum;

(2) in general terms, the post-Griffith Pennsylvania choice of law cases have moved from (Griffith) interest analysis to a hybrid scheme containing elements of both interest analysis and the "significant contacts" approach of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement II), but with strong territorial overtones reminiscent of the traditional rules of Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Restatement I) (3) in contract choice of law cases specifically, the post-Griffith Pennsylvania case law contains a strong Restatement I strain, i. e. numerous cases have retained the traditional territorial (place of contracting) rules, though the traditional approach vies with the post-Griffith interest analysis/Restatement II hybrid for superiority;

(4) in any event, the post-Griffith case law on choice of law in contract cases is in utter disarray and confusion, leaving unclear how Pennsylvania would resolve the case at bar, particularly in view of the fact that, in interest analysis terms, this is an "unprovided-for case," i. e. one in which no state has an interest;

(5) it is therefore necessary to examine the issue before us on alternative assumptions: that the traditional choice of law rules for contracts are applicable, and that the Griffith interest analysis/Restatement II hybrid approach is applicable; and

(6) both assumptions lead to choosing New York's law on the presumption of suicide.²

We also are satisfied that we correctly stated New York law when we charged the jury that if they believed there to be a "fair question" whether Scott died from accident or suicide, they should "find accident." Additionally, we find no error in our evidentiary ruling(s) and hold the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the verdict.³ Accordingly, defendant's post-trial motions will be denied.

II. The Procedural History

The litigation between the parties did not begin in this Court. Instead, plaintiff first sued the defendant in the state courts of New York. That suit was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, at least in part because the insurer claimed that most of the witnesses who could testify as to whether the crash was an accident or the product of a suicide resided in Delaware or Pennsylvania. The dismissal was conditioned upon the insurer's consenting to jurisdiction either in Pennsylvania or in Delaware and on its waiving the statute of limitations. Barry v. American Home Assurance Co., 38 A.D.2d 928, 329 N.Y.S.2d 911; aff'd 31 N.Y.2d 684, 337 N.Y.S.2d 259, 289 N.E.2d 180 (1972). Thence, Ms. Melville, who was then a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought this diversity action.

III. The Facts Adduced at Trial

The facts adduced at trial concerned three subjects: (1) the placement of the insurance policy; (2) the events in Jay Scott's life preceding the fatal flight; and (3) the flight itself, (including both eyewitnesses and expert testimony).

The evidence with respect to the insurance policy was undisputed and was essentially as follows. In 1966,...