Melvin v. Doe

• Decision Date: 19 November 2003
• Citation: 836 A.2d 42,575 Pa. 264
• Parties: Joan MELVIN, Appellee v. John DOE, Allen Doe, Bruce Doe, Carl Doe, David Doe, Edward Doe, Frank Doe, George Doe, Harry Doe, Irving Doe, Kevin Doe, Larry Doe, and Jane Doe, Appellants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

836 A.2d 42

575 Pa. 264

Joan MELVIN, Appellee v. John DOE, Allen Doe, Bruce Doe, Carl Doe, David Doe, Edward Doe, Frank Doe, George Doe, Harry Doe, Irving Doe, Kevin Doe, Larry Doe, and Jane Doe, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 3, 2003.

Decided November 19, 2003.

Ann Beeson, Pro Hac Vice; Ronald D. Barber, Witold J. Walczak, Pittsburgh, for appellants

John Andrew Valentine, for appellant amicus curiae, America Online, Inc.

John R. Orie, Robert O. Lampl, Pittsburgh, for appellee, Joan Melvin.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.

OPINION

Justice LAMB.

In this appeal, we are asked to review the Superior Court's refusal to overturn the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas forcing Appellants, John Doe et al., to reveal their identities to Appellee, Joan Melvin.

Appellee, a former Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge, has been a Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge since November of 1997. In early 1999, Appellants, via a service provided by America Online, published a statement about Appellee on an Internet webpage known as "Grant Street `99". The statements posted on the webpage included allegations that Appellee had engaged in "misconduct" by lobbying the Ridge administration¹ for the appointment of a particular attorney to an upcoming vacancy on the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.

After becoming aware of the statements posted on the website, Appellee commenced a defamation action in Allegheny County. Thereafter, Appellee propounded discovery seeking Appellants' identities. Appellants filed a motion for a protective order, as well as a motion for summary judgment, alleging that they enjoy a First Amendment² right to engage in anonymous political criticism, and that the court, in order to protect that right, should require Appellee, a public official defamation plaintiff, to prove actual economic harm prior to obtaining discovery of Appellants' identities. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment because Appellee had produced evidence that would support Appellee's claim as a matter of law. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for a protective order and ordered that Appellants reveal their identities subject to a confidentiality order.³

Appellants filed an appeal from the trial court's order with the Superior Court. Appellee filed a motion to quash, which the Superior Court granted. The Superior Court held that the order denying Appellants' motion for summary judgment was not a collateral order subject to immediate appellate review under Pa. R.A.P. 313. Melvin v. Doe, 789 A.2d 696, 698 (Pa.Super.2001).⁴ In so concluding, the Superior Court stated that "Appellants' motion for summary judgment cannot be considered a collateral order, since it clearly is not separable and collateral from the action where it had the potential to decide one or more issues in the case." Id. (citing Pace v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 717 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super.1998)). We agree with the Superior Court that the denial of the motion for summary judgment would not qualify as a collateral order. Therefore, the Superior Court was correct in quashing Appellants' appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment.

The Superior Court also held that the trial court's order directing Appellants to disclose their identities was not a collateral order under Pa.R.A.P. 313 as it "directly relates to and is intertwined with the actual claim, and thus cannot be considered collateral." Melvin, 789 A.2d at 699. Reargument was denied on Jan. 31, 2002. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the Superior Court's determination that the trial court's discovery order was not collateral, and we reverse the order quashing Appellant's appeal therefrom.

As discussed infra, under the collateral order doctrine,⁵ Appellants, in seeking to protect their First Amendment rights, were entitled to appellate review of the trial court's order requiring disclosure of Appellants' identities.⁶ Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 states:

(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313.

This Court recently discussed the collateral order doctrine in Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547 (1999). In Schwartz, we addressed the issue of whether a trial court order compelling the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs to produce its investigative file in connection with a dental malpractice action was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Similar to the action of Appellants in the instant case, the bureau filed a motion for a protective order claiming, inter alia, that the investigative file was privileged and thus not subject to discovery.⁷

A crucial issue in Schwartz was the separability prong of the collateral order doctrine. Specifically, the Bureau argued that a determination of the issue of privilege was separate and distinct from the underlying cause of action, even where discovery of the allegedly privileged information was sought precisely because it would shed light on the underlying malpractice claim. In support of its argument on separability, the Bureau cited the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir.1997), in which the appellate court held to be an appealable, collateral order, the trial courts refusal to protect as attorney work product or under the attorney-client privilege, certain internal corporate documents pertinent to the Bronco II product liability litigation. Schwartz, 729 A.2d at 551. In Schwartz, we held:

As in Ford Motor, the issues of privilege raised by the Bureau can be addressed without analysis of the alleged negligence of the dentists in treating Ewa Ben. We find, therefore, that the Bureau has demonstrated that the issue of privilege is separate from the merits of the dispute for purposes of the collateral order doctrine.

Id.

In the instant case, Appellee argues that the trial court's discovery order cannot be considered a collateral order because it is "intertwined closely and inseparabl[y] with the merits of Appellee's defamation claim." Appellee's Brief, p. 20. We disagree with Appellee's argument based on Schwartz, where this Court unanimously concluded that the Ford Motor concept of separability is more practical in its application than the standard articulated by the Commonwealth Court in Doe v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 482, 524 A.2d 1063 (1987), which prior to Schwartz, was a leading case on the subject.

The Superior Court held that it could not review the discovery order because it "may only be considered collateral where the material subject to discovery is not intertwined with the facts necessary to support the cause of action." Melvin, 789 A.2d at 698. Thus, the Superior Court has returned the analysis of separability to the substance of the information sought by discovery, precisely the analytic method we rejected in Schwartz. It is true that Appellants' identities are needed to evaluate the actual malice portion⁸ of Appellee's burden of proof. However, it cannot be said that review of Appellants' instant claim relating to the trial court's discovery order requires consideration of the merits of the underlying defamation action.

Appellants claim that they enjoy a First Amendment right to engage in anonymous political speech and that the trial court failed to adequately protect that right by requiring Appellee to prove actual economic harm as a prerequisite to disclosure of their identities in discovery. The main cause of action is a defamation claim based on the allegedly defamatory statements made about Appellee. Appellate review of the constitutionality of the discovery order is not directly related to or impermissibly intertwined with the resolution of the underlying defamation claim. Consideration of whether a harmful defamatory statement was made (i.e., publication, falsity, defamatory meaning, actual malice, and actual harm) is not necessary. Rather, the issue Appellants sought to present to the Superior Court was strictly a legal one, entailing consideration of what threshold requirements must be imposed as a prerequisite to discovery in an anonymous defamation case in order to implement essential First Amendment protections. Such inquiry is plainly separable from the defamation action.

However, this Court is committed to preventing the erosion of the principle behind the collateral order doctrine. As we explained in Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (1999), the collateral order doctrine is a specialized, practical application of the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right. Thus, Rule 313 must be interpreted narrowly, and the requirements for an appealable collateral order remain stringent in order to prevent undue corrosion of the final order rule. See Geniviva, 725 A.2d at 1214

. To that end, each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly present before an order may be considered collateral. Therefore, we must also give critical attention to the remaining criteria of whether the trial court's discovery order directly affects a right that is too important to be denied review and whether the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

As we stated in Geniviva, "[f]or purposes of defining an order as a collateral order under Rule 313, it is not sufficient that the issue be...