Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 38
| Decision Date | 31 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 38,38 |
| Citation | 786 S.W.2d 951 |
| Parties | MEMPHIS BOARD OF REALTORS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruth COHEN, Defendant-Appellant. 786 S.W.2d 951 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Asa H. Hoke, Memphis, for defendant-appellant.
Paul A. Matthews, Teresa J. Sigmon, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant, Ruth Cohen, appeals from the final decree of the Chancery Court in a declaratory judgment suit filed by plaintiff, Memphis Board of Realtors.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a Tennessee not-for-profit corporation and that defendant is a real estate broker licensed by the State of Tennessee and is a member of the Memphis Board of Realtors. The complaint avers that the Board provides various privileges for active members which include the right to use the registered term "Realtor"and participation in the Board's Multiple Listings Service and various educational programs. It is further averred that active members have obligations, one of which is the subjection to disciplinary action for violation of by-laws of the Board, and the Code of Ethics of the Board and the National Association of Realtors. The complaint further avers that the sanctions for unethical conduct include reprimand, fines, probation, suspension and expulsion. Plaintiff further avers that a complaint of unethical conduct was filed against the defendant and she was afforded a hearing before the Professional Standards Committee. This committee found that she had been guilty of certain unethical conduct and recommended expulsion from membership as the penalty. Defendant appealed this finding to the Board's board of directors. The board of directors affirmed the finding of the Professional Standards Committee, but reduced the sanction to a one year suspension. The complaint further avers that defendant has stated her intention to bring suit against the plaintiff contending that the disciplinary sanctions wrongfully deprive her of rights, including use of the Multiple Listings Service, without due process. Because of this intention, the Board seeks a review of the disciplinary proceeding and a declaration that defendant was afforded a proper hearing and that the imposition of the one year suspension is not in violation of defendant's rights.
Defendant's answer denies the material allegations of the complaint and joins issue thereon. The answer avers that defendant was denied a fair and impartial hearing before the initial hearing panel and before the board of directors. Defendant asserts that the action of the Board deprives her of substantial property rights without due process under the Constitution of the United States and the Tennessee Constitution and that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. She further avers that the sanctions imposed are excessive and not in keeping with sanctions generally imposed by the Board. The defendant asked the court to find that there was no fair and impartial hearing by the Board and further that the punishment imposed was excessive.
At the conclusion of the trial, the chancellor found that the Board's professional standards proceedings and the sanctions imposed in those proceedings were proper and did not violate defendant's rights. Defendant appeals.
The first issue for review is whether the trial court erred in not granting defendant a continuance.
Defendant contends in this Court that she should not have been "forced" to go to trial because: (1) she did not have an attorney, although the attorney of record had never formally withdrawn from the case; (2) she was not prepared for trial, and the court knew or should have known she was not prepared for trial; (3) she had not obtained documents from the plaintiff necessary for her defense; and, (4) that her attorney had waived her right to a jury trial by his failure to file issues of fact required by local rules of court.
The record reflects that this suit was filed September 28, 1987, and plaintiff, through her attorney, filed an answer November 13, 1987. There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant undertook any discovery proceedings under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The record further reflects that although defendant demanded a jury in the answer, the jury demand was waived by a failure to file proposed issues of fact as required. Defendant blames her attorney for the lack of discovery and the waiver of the jury trial and asserts that she is entitled to a continuance because of these errors. We disagree. While defendant may have a grievance against her attorney, as to the other party to the suit she is bound by the attorney's knowledge and his actions in her behalf. See Moody v. Moody, 681 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.1984).
On the morning the case was set for trial, defendant advised the chancellor that she had discharged her attorney approximately two months prior to the date of the trial and had been unable to obtain an attorney to represent her. The chancellor advised her that he would continue the case for two to three weeks to allow her time to obtain an attorney, but she stated that she wanted a two month continuance. She further stated that if she could not have two months, she was ready to go to trial on that date.
Moreover, there is no absolute right...
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Kinard v. Kinard
...these decisions are discretionary. See State v. Raspberry, 875 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989); Wiseman v. Spaulding, 573 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978). However, instead of making this decision based on subj......
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Bell v. Todd
...that there is no absolute right to counsel in a civil trial. See Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d at 900; Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1989). Indigent civil litigants, unlike indigent criminal litigants, possess neither the constitutional nor the statutory ......
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Gsb Contractors, Inc. v. Hess
...way of knowing what proof would have been introduced, the appellate review of the court's action is waived." Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted); see also Dickey, 63 S.W.3d at 723. Accordingly, since GSB failed to carry its burden to ......
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Bell v. Todd, No. M2003-00192-COA-R3-CV (TN 9/14/2005)
...that there is no absolute right to counsel in a civil trial. See Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d at 900; Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Indigent civil litigants, unlike indigent criminal litigants, possess neither the constitutional nor the statutor......