Memphis v. Brown

Decision Date01 October 1876
PartiesMEMPHIS v. BROWN
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

On motion, 1. To dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. 2. To vacate the supersedeas.

Brown obtained a decree in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee against the city of Memphis for $292,000, in conformity with the opinion of this court in the case reported in 20 Wall. 289.

Upon his petition, that court ordered, March 30, 1875, the issue of a peremptory writ of mandamus against the city, directing the levy of a tax for his benefit upon all the taxable property of the city. Under the laws of Tennessee, taxable personal and real property, other than merchants' capital, is embraced in one tax-list, and merchants' capital in another. In March, 1876, Brown discovered that the tax-collector, pursuant to an ordinance passed by he city Dec. 10, 1875, levying 'a special tax of fifty-four cents on the $100 worth of property,' was collecting the tax levied for his account on personal and real property, but not on merchants' capital, although the city, for all other purposes, was collecting a tax on merchants' capital.

It appearing that the tax upon the personal and real property alone would not be sufficient to raise the required sum, a motion was made in the original suit by Brown for a further peremptory mandamus, requiring the city to include in the property to be taxed for his benefit the taxable merchants' capital, as returned and assessed for taxation for other purposes in the year 1875. This motion was granted March 2, 1876, and a judgment entered accordingly. Afterwards, during the same term, May 20, the city appeared and moved the court to set aside the order of March 2; but this motion was refused, and that order re-entered as the final judgment of the court in the premises. A writ of error was sued out upon this last judgment, and a supersedeas perfected, by giving the required bond within sixty days thereafter.

Mr. P. Phillips and Mr. W. M. Randolph in support of the motions.

By art. 2, sect. 28, of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, all property is taxable. No one species is to be taxed higher than another of equal value, and all taxation is to be equal and uniform throughout the State.

The judgment of March 30, 1875, requiring that the tax should be levied on all the taxable property of the city, was rendered in a direct proceeding, to which the city was a party.

The subsequent orders were mere...

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  • Atl. Greyhound Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Of West Va.
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 5 avril 1949
    ...the court, suspended the decree until it was disposed of, and that an appeal dates from the order denying the rehearing. So, in Memphis v. Broivn, 94 U. S. 715: Tt is the uniform practice in this State to enter judgment at once, in the Circuit Court, upon the verdict of a jury or a finding ......
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 5 avril 1949
    ...the court, suspended the decree until it was disposed of, and that an appeal dates from the order denying the rehearing. So, in Memphis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 715 : is the uniform practice in this state to enter judgment at once, in the circuit court, upon the verdict of a jury or a finding of t......
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    • U.S. Supreme Court
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    ...first because the first decree, at the time of entry, was only regarded by the parties and the court as tentative); City of Memphis v. Brown, 1877, 94 U.S. 715, 24 L.Ed. 244 (appeal allowed from second judgment on the ground that the second made material changes in the first). See United St......
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