Menard, Inc. v. Deden
Decision Date | 29 September 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 93-0819,93-0819 |
Citation | 508 N.W.2d 76,179 Wis.2d 505 |
Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. MENARD, INC., d/b/a Menards Cashway Lumber, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paula DEDEN, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
NETTESHEIM.
Menard, Inc. appeals from a small claims judgment which dismissed its complaint against Paula Deden to recover the value of a window for which Deden was mistakenly not charged. Menard contends the trial court erred in rejecting its claim of unjust enrichment and in refusing to reform the contract because of mutual mistake. We affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Menard's complaint.
The facts are not disputed. On April 6, 1992, Deden entered into a "Special Order Contract" with Menard to purchase $3135 of millwork and paid forty percent down. The contract included the purchase and delivery of two Andersen C35 casement windows valued at $787.30 each. Despite the efforts of Menard's salesperson and Deden to ensure that the quantity and dimensions of the ordered items were correct, 1 the salesperson incorrectly wrote the total price of the two Andersen C35 windows as $787.30 rather than $1574.60, which would have reflected the actual total value of the two windows purchased. 2
On May 20, 1992, almost two weeks after Deden received and paid for the two C35 windows, both the Menard's salesperson who wrote the special order contract and the store manager called Deden and told her that a mistake on the contract had been made by not multiplying the unit price of the C35 window by two, the amount ordered and received by Deden. Deden was given the option of either paying the additional sum owed or returning the windows. Deden refused, stating that the windows had already been installed and that she had performed her part of the contract. Menard's small claims action to recover the value of the window ensued.
Deden represented herself at the bench trial. 3 Following the close of the evidence, the trial court ruled initially in favor of Menard on the ground that the parties were mutually mistaken as to the individual price and total cost of the two windows. The court reasoned that Menard made a mistake in writing the contract and Deden made a mistake because
Following this ruling, Deden asked to be heard further. The trial court granted this request and permitted Deden to present additional testimony. 4 Deden explained that she did not notice the total price of the windows because she was only concerned with the contract's bottom line. She testified that after buying the bulk of the windows from Menard, she bought a smaller Andersen C15 window from a competitor that was $11.61 less than that paid at Menard for the same window. She further explained that she had obtained an estimate from the competitor prior to purchasing the windows at Menard which would have been lower than Menard's price had Menard not miscalculated. 5 Thus, Deden contended that she was concerned only with the contract's bottom line and would have purchased the competitor's windows had she known Menard's bottom line was higher than that reflected by the contract.
Based upon this additional evidence, the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and, instead, dismissed Menard's complaint. The court now held that the parties were not mutually mistaken, stating:
I am going to change my mind, because if she is comparing bottomlines and she found Menards' price more attractive, then you got the business on the basis of that.
....
[A]s was evident from my [earlier ruling], I was satisfied that Menards made a mistake. There is no doubt about that. And the point which was that this six-foot window was on a unit basis would be cheaper than the [smaller window] made sense, that would underlay my prior indication of a ruling. But she made a good point here, if she was comparing bottomlines and you beat the bottomline.
The court also rejected Menard's unjust enrichment claim.
On appeal, Menard contends the trial court erred in rejecting its claim of unjust enrichment and in refusing to find the contract was based upon a mutual mistake.
We will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Section 805.17(2), Stats. Where the trial court acts as the finder of fact and there is conflicting testimony, the court is the ultimate arbiter of the witnesses' credibility. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis.2d 243, 250, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979). Moreover, we may affirm the judgment if a review of the record demonstrates that the trial court reached a result which the evidence would sustain if there were specific findings. Hochgurtel v. San Felippo, 78 Wis.2d 70, 86, 253 N.W.2d 526, 533 (1977).
Menard argues that the trial court erred in not reforming the contract because of mutual mistake. It asserts the mistake was mutual because both parties had ample time to review the contract and "[i]t is ridiculous to suggest that either party could have intended that two multiplied by $787.30 should equal $787.30, as was done on the special order contract." We are not persuaded.
To reform a contract on the ground of mistake, the mistake must either be mutual or there must be mistake on one side and fraud on the other. Bailey v. Hovde, 61 Wis.2d 504, 509, 213 N.W.2d 69, 72 (1973); Meyer v. Norgaard, 160 Wis.2d 794, 802, 467 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Ct.App.1991). The party seeking reformation bears the burden of proving, by clear...
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