Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild-AFT 951
| Decision Date | 29 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-269-A,GUILD-AFT,75-269-A |
| Parties | , 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2041, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,098 Albert MENARD et al. v. WOONSOCKET TEACHERS'951 et al. ppeal. . Oct, 8, 1976. Richard R. Ackerman, Inc., Woonsocket, for plaintiffs. Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Richard A. Skolnik, Providence, for defendants. OPINION BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice. This civil action was commenced in the Superior Court upon the filing of a complaint by the plaintiffs, various named members of the Woonsocket School Committee (the School Committee) requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendants, the Woonsocket Teachers' Guild (the Teachers' Guild or the Union), its officers, representatives, and members, from engaging in a strike or work stoppage in the Woonsocket school system. After a hearing, the requested order for a preliminary injunction was granted from which the defendants appealed. Subsequently, the School Committee filed a motion to have the defendants adjudged in contempt for failing to comply with that order. That motion was granted and the Teachers' Guild, certain named officers and members were found guilty of civil contempt. The defendants have appealed from this order as well. The two major questions presented by these appeals may be briefly stated: (1) whether the testimony presented at the hearing provided sufficient evidence upon which to base a preliminary injunction, and (2) whether defendants violated the injunction by this failure to return to work. We hold that the trial justice's decision to grant a preliminary injunction was proper and based upon sufficient evidence and that defendants' subsequent conduct violated that order. In August 1974 the Teachers' Guild, representing the schoolteachers in the Woonsocket school system, entered into a binding 2-year employment contract with the School Committee. A section of that agreement provided that either party had the right to reopen negotiations with respect to wages, salaries, and fringe benefits to be effective during the seco |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This civil action was commenced in the Superior Court upon the filing of a complaint by the plaintiffs, various named members of the Woonsocket School Committee (the School Committee) requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendants, the Woonsocket Teachers' Guild (the Teachers' Guild or the Union), its officers, representatives, and members, from engaging in a strike or work stoppage in the Woonsocket school system. After a hearing, the requested order for a preliminary injunction was granted from which the defendants appealed. Subsequently, the School Committee filed a motion to have the defendants adjudged in contempt for failing to comply with that order. That motion was granted and the Teachers' Guild, certain named officers and members were found guilty of civil contempt. The defendants have appealed from this order as well.
The two major questions presented by these appeals may be briefly stated: (1) whether the testimony presented at the hearing provided sufficient evidence upon which to base a preliminary injunction, and (2) whether defendants violated the injunction by this failure to return to work. We hold that the trial justice's decision to grant a preliminary injunction was proper and based upon sufficient evidence and that defendants' subsequent conduct violated that order.
In August 1974 the Teachers' Guild, representing the schoolteachers in the Woonsocket school system, entered into a binding 2-year employment contract with the School Committee. A section of that agreement provided that either party had the right to reopen negotiations with respect to wages, salaries, and fringe benefits to be effective during the second year of the contract. Pursuant to that provision negotiations were begun in January of 1975. Despite numerous meetings, however, a successful resolution of the negotiations had not been concluded prior to the scheduled opening of the 1975-76 school year. On August 29, 1975, a telegram addressed to the Superintendent of Schools indicated that the membership of the Teachers' Guild had adopted a 'no contract, no work' position. Nonetheless, 4 days later, as previously scheduled, orientation day was held. Out of 459 teachers who were expected to attend that session only three were present at the various public schools. The following day, September 3, the first scheduled day for classes, again only three teachers were in attendance. As a result the Superintendent of Schools deemed it advisable to send the students home. Shortly thereafter, the School Committee filed their complaint requesting injunctive relief.
At the hearing, testimony, some of it conflicting, was heard by the trial justice who then made certain findings of fact. Essentially, he found that the public school teachers were engaged in an illegal strike or work stoppage which was causing irreparable harm to the Woonsocket schoolchildren and was threatening to continue indefinitely. Based upon what he considered to be at least a reasonable probability that the School Committee would prevail on a hearing on the merits of this case, on September 11, 1975, their prayer for preliminary injunction was granted. Picket lines which previously had been drawn around various Woonsocket public schools and manned by public school teachers were withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, the Superintendent of Schools notified the schoolteachers through the media that an injunction had been issued and announced that an orientation session would be conducted on the following day, September 12. On that day, however, only seven teachers were in attendance. This result precipitated the School Committee's motion to adjudge the Teachers' Guild, its officers and most of its members in contempt of the restraining order.
After a hearing on the contempt motion the court found that a strike was then in existence and that
'* * * by means of communication and signaling the specifics of which cannot be known, the (U)nion and its members and its officers communicated to the membership that the principle, 'no contract, no work,' was not in any way to be derogated by the preliminary injunction.'
The court went on to conclude that in order to adhere to the mandate of the injunction, at the very least the Guild officers should have affirmatively advised the membership that they had an obligation to return to work and that the Guild officers themselves should have returned to work to manifest the good faith of their urgings.
As a result of its findings and conclusions, an order was entered on September 20, 1975, adjudging certain named officers of the Teachers' Guild, the Teachers' Guild itself, and those members who had actual knowledge of the injunction and participated in the strike or work stoppage, to be in contempt of the order of September 11, 1975. Before imposing the sentence, the court gave the Union officers an opportunity to take the affirmative steps necessary to comply with the preliminary injunction and avoid punitive action. With the exception of one of the named officers, they refused this opportunity and were sentenced to the Adult Correctional Institutions until such time as they expressed a willingness to the court to comply with the September 11 order. 1 The Union members who had actual notice of the injunction and violated it by not returning to work were also adjudged in contempt. 2
The defendants' first contention is that the trial justice in granting the motion for preliminary injunction did not adhere to the guidelines set down by this court in School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973), in so far as proper recognition was not given to the conduct of the parties during the contract negotiations. Specifically, they argue that the order was predicated solely on the fact of a strike or work stoppage.
In the Westerly case we held that in disputes between teachers and school committees an ex parte temporary restraining order could no longer be justified upon the verified complaint of the school committee in which it is averred that the schools had not opened as scheduled and that the public had sustained irreparable harm. Id. at 104, 299 A.2d at 445-46. Instead before a trial justice can enter an order affording such relief he '* * * should normally conduct a hearing where (he) would review what has gone on between the disputants and then determine whether injunction should issue and if so, on what terms and for what period of time. Id. at 104-05, 299 A.2d at 446 (Emphasis added.); School Dist, v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.E.2d 206 (1968).
Essentially our holding in Westerly was aimed at curbing the use of the judiciary as an '* * * unwitting third party at the bargaining table and a potential coercive force in the collective bargaining processes.' School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, supra, 111 R.I. at 104, 299 A.2d at 446. We recognize that the 'give and take' so necessary to the negotiating process would be seriously eroded if the leverage that a preliminary injunction would exert upon a teachers' union could be utilized merely upon a showing that a strike was imminent or even in progress.
Accordingly, before a trial justice may issue a preliminary injunction there must be a sufficient showing at the hearing that such relief is necessary. Significant factors, among others, which a trial justice might consider in determining the propriety of injunctive relief are: the probability that a successful and timely resolution of negotiations can be achieved without judicial intervention, the existence of alternate administrative or legislative remedies, and the likelihood that the public will suffer irreparable harm unless the defendants' conduct is enjoined. Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, 114 N.H. 245, 251, 317 A.2d 555, 559 (1974). We would stress that the mere fact that the teachers are engaged in an illegal strike does not in and of itself warrant the issuance of an injunction; irreparable harm is a critical factor to be considered keeping in mind that the trial court's and this court's ultimate concern should be the welfare of the students.
Returning now to defendants' contention, a careful examination of the record persuades us that the trial justice did not misconstrue the guidelines set out in the Westerly case. A hearing was held at which testimony had been presented detailing the circumstances which led to the frustration of negotiations between the disputants and, ultimately, to the closing of the public schools while the strike continued. The purpose of that testimony as already indicated was to provide the trial justice with the facts necessary to make a valid determination of whether the order requested should be granted; it was not to determine the so-called 'equities' between the parties. The defendants' contention that the School Committee was not bargaining in good faith and so should be denied injunctive relief is without merit. While we recognize that an absence of good faith on the part of either or both of the parties may result in a prolongation of negotiations, its only relevance in the instant case is in determining whether there was a probability of quickly settling the strike and avoiding continued irreparable harm to the schoolchildren.
The defendants' related contention is that insufficient evidence was introduced to sustain plaintiffs' burden of proof and thus it was reversible error for the trial court to order injunctive relief. We do not agree.
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