Mena–Valdez v. E.M. T–Shirts Distributors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11–1255 (FAB).
• Citation: 878 F.Supp.2d 357
• Parties: Ruben MENA–VALDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. E.M. T–SHIRTS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

878 F.Supp.2d 357

Ruben MENA–VALDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.E.M. T–SHIRTS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11–1255 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 23, 2012.

Ivan A. Ramos, Ramos & Soler, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Enrique J. Mendoza–Mendez, Mendoza Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion for reconsideration filed by defendants E.M. T–Shirts Distributors, Inc.; E. Mendoza & Co., Inc.; Eduardo Mendoza Corp., and Calcomanias Garneda, Inc. (collectively, “defendants”), (Docket No. 83), and the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff Mena. (Docket No. 90.) For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, E.M. T–Shirts, alleging interference with his protected rights and termination of employment without just cause under, inter alia, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; Law 80; and article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141 (“article 1802”). (Docket No. 1.) Defendant E.M. T–Shirts filed a motion to dismiss on April 14, 2011, (Docket No. 12), to which plaintiff filed an opposition on June 30, 2011. (Docket No. 25.)

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 27, 2011. (Docket No. 21.) Plaintiff added as co-defendants E. Mendoza & Co. Inc., Eduardo Mendoza Corporation, and Calcomanias Garneda, Inc., under the umbrella of Supermercado de Camisetas. Plaintiff also added a claim under section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (“ERISA”). On July 5, 2011, E.M. T–Shirts filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, (Docket No. 30), which was later joined by co-defendants. (Docket No. 35.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 21, 2011, and defendants replied five days later. (Docket Nos. 38 & 41.)

Pursuant to a referral order issued by the Court, Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) with regard to defendants' second motion to dismiss on March 23, 2012. (Docket No. 63.) The magistrate judge recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to plaintiff's ERISA claim and article 1802 claim. The magistrate judge also recommended that the Court deny defendants' motions to dismiss as to plaintiff's FMLA and Law 80 claims. (Docket No. 63 at p. 17.) On April 3, 2012, the Court adopted the findings of the R & R in an Opinion and Order. (Docket No. 68.)

On August 8, 2011, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Docket No. 46.) Plaintiff added two discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Docket No. 46 at ¶¶ 57–78.) Defendants answered the second amended complaint on August 11, 2011. (Docket No. 47.) On March 23, 2012, before Magistrate Judge Lopez submitted his R & R, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, a statement of undisputed material facts, and a variety of supporting evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”). (Docket No. 61.) The motion for summary judgment sought to dismiss all of the allegations made by plaintiff up to and included in his second amended complaint.

On June 26, 2012, the Court issued an order that granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 82.) The Court granted defendants' motion regarding plaintiff's ADA and Law 80 claims. Id. at pp. 14, 18 & 25. The Court nonetheless denied defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's FMLA claim, finding that defendants' alleged failure to comply with the FMLA notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 2619 might have burdened plaintiff's exercise of his basic FMLA rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615. Id. at p. 22; see Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89–90, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002).

On June 28, 2012, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that a private right of action does not exist for a violation of the FMLA notice provision. (Docket No. 83 at p. 2.) Defendants also aver that the Court's “speculations” are insufficient to establish a causal connection between defendants' failure to notify plaintiff of his FMLA rights and plaintiff's harms. Id. at p. 3.

Plaintiff, too, filed a motion for reconsideration on July 6, 2012. (Docket No. 90.) Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider his Law 80 claim, contending that he was in fact constructively discharged from E.M. T–Shirts and, moreover, that the Court paid short shrift to evidence of his harassment by defendants. Id. at p. 2.

II. Motion for Reconsideration

“ ‘The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration.’ ” Sanchez–Perez v. Sanchez–Gonzalez, 717 F.Supp.2d 187, 193–94 (D.P.R.2010) (internal citations omitted). Any motion for reconsideration is usually decided pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”) ² or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (“ Rule 60(b)”).³See In re Spittler, 831 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that even though the moving party did not state a particular rule that permits its motion, “it is settled in this circuit that a motion which asked the court to modify its earlier disposition of case because of an allegedly erroneous legal result is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).”); see also Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir.2009). A successful Rule 59(e) motion requires that a party “clearly establish a manifest error of law or [ ] present newly discovered evidence.” Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz–Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir.2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The motion cannot “raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before judgment [was] issued.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotations omitted). Motions filed pursuant to Rule 59 are not “confined to the six specific grounds for relief found in Rule 60(b).” Perez–Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.1993). Conversely, the Rule 60(b) standard requires that a party “demonstrate ‘at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the [ability] to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted.’ ” Fisher, 589 F.3d at 512.

A motion is characterized pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) based upon its filing date. Perez–Perez, 993 F.2d at 284. “If a motion is served within [twenty-eight] ⁴ days of the rendition of judgment, the motion will ordinarily fall under Rule 59(e).” Id. Motions served after twenty-eight days are considered pursuant to Rule 60(b). Id. It is important to determine whether the motion for reconsideration is brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) because a motion “for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), unlike a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), does not toll the thirty-day appeal period.” Perez–Perez, 993 F.2d at 283;see also App.R. 4(a)(4) (stating that if a party files a motion to “alter or amend the judgment under Civ.R. 59,” or a motion “for relief under Civ. R. 60 if the motion is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered,” then “the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion”). The Court will first determine under which rule the defendants' motion should be regarded. Then, the Court will address defendants' and plaintiffs' arguments for reconsideration in turn.

III. Legal AnalysisA. Defendants' and Plaintiff's Motions Implicate Rule 59(e)

Both defendants and plaintiffs fail to state whether they are bringing their motions pursuant Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). (Docket No. 83.) Nonetheless, we note that the Court issued its Opinion and Order on June 26, 2012; and that defendants filed their motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2012, and plaintiffs on July 7, 2012. Therefore, both parties filed their motions well within the twenty-eight day time period provided by Rule 59. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); see also Perez–Perez, 993 F.2d at 284 (“the litigant who gets his motion in on time enjoys the ... relief provided by Rule 59 ...”). Because defendants and plaintiff timely filed their motions for reconsideration, Rule 59(e) is implicated for the analysis. See Id. Both parties, however, have failed to persuade the Court to reconsider their respective arguments. The Court will first address defendants' motion for reconsideration, and then plaintiff's motion.

B. Defendants' Argument for Reconsideration

Defendants argue that a private right of action does not exist for a violation of the FMLA notice provision pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a). In support of this argument, defendants cite two cases in which district courts have dismissed a plaintiff's FMLA notice claim because the claim did “not fall within the scope of § 2617(a) which affixes liability on an employer who interferes with an employee's FMLA rights.” Jessie v. Carter Health Care Center, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 613, 617 (E.D.Ky.1996); Cormier v. Littlefield, 112 F.Supp.2d 196, 200 (D.Mass.2000) (holding that a private right of action did not exist for a violation of the FMLA notice provision when plaintiff received more leave than that to which he was entitled under the FMLA and was unable to perform his job functions at the expiration of the twelve-week period). Therefore, defendants argue, in order for plaintiff to maintain an FMLA claim, he cannot rely exclusively on defendants' failure to post notice pursuant to § 2619(a). (Docket No. 83 at p. 2.) That the Court engaged in mere “assertions or speculations” in analyzing plaintiff's claim, as defendants suggest, only makes matters worse;...