Mendenhall v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 01 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 65841,65841
• Citation: Mendenhall v. Roberts, 17 Kan.App.2d 34, 831 P.2d 568 (Kan. App. 1992)
• Parties: Dale MENDENHALL, Appellee, v. Gary ROBERTS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 568

831 P.2d 568

17 Kan.App.2d 34

Dale MENDENHALL, Appellee, v.Gary ROBERTS, Appellant.

No. 65841.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

May 1, 1992.

Review Denied July 8, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1.Notice to terminate an oral farm lease under K.S.A. 58-2506(c) is sufficient if it fixes March 1 as the termination date.Such a notice will terminate the lease as to fall seeded grain crops on the date specified in the statute even though no termination date other than March 1 is specified.

2.A notice which states that an oral farm lease is terminated pursuant to K.S.A. 58-2506(a), (b), or (c) will terminate the lease on the dates specified in the statute even though no specific date is mentioned.

3.A written notice by a landlord to his tenant mailed August 30, 1988, and received September 2, 1988, which advised the tenant that his farm lease would terminate on August 1, 1989, was in substantial compliance with the terms of K.S.A. 58-2506(c) and was effective to terminate the tenancy on the date specified.

4.A motion for a directed verdict should not be entertained or granted until all of the evidence on the issue in question has been presented.

Donald L. Martin, of Shepherd, Harding, Martin & Schmeidler, Ellis, for appellant.

Thomas C. Boone, of Law Offices of Thomas C. Boone, Hays, for appellee.

Before RULON, P.J., and LARSON and LEWIS, JJ.

LEWIS, Judge:

This is an appeal on issues arising from the attempted termination of an oral farm lease pursuant to K.S.A. 58-2506(c).The trial court held that the notice given was in compliance with the law and terminated the lease.The appellant appeals from that decision and from the trial court's orders on other issues.

For the purposes of clarity, the appellant, Gary Roberts, will be referred to as "T" for tenant.The appellee, Dale Mendenhall, was the landlord and will be referred to as "LL."

Sometime in 1988, the parties entered into an oral lease involving 560 acres of farm ground in Lane County.Insofar as the validity of the notice of termination is concerned, all the rented ground may be considered crop ground.LL was the uncle of T and the owner of the real estate.Under the lease, the crops were to be shared one-third to LL and two-thirds to T.

On August 30, 1988, LL sent a handwritten note to T, terminating the oral lease.T received this notice on September 2, 1988.The notice read as follows:

"Gary,

"This is to let you see that the lease on the farm ground on [Southeast Quarter (SE/4), the Northeast Quarter (NE/4), Southwest Quarter (SW/4) and the South Half of the Northwest Quarter (S/2-NW/4) of 3-16-27] of Lane County will run out August 1, 1989.

"Sorry that you did not farm it so you could have keep [sic] it.

"Sincerely,

"Dale Mendenhall"

At the time the notice was received, there were no growing crops on the land.The 1988 wheat crop had been recently harvested.The summer fallow ground had been worked and prepared for the seeding of the 1989 wheat crop.That crop was ultimately sown and harvested by T.There is no issue as to the 1989 crop.All parties agree that T had the right to harvest it, and it was divided pursuant to the crop-sharing agreement between the parties.

The crop in issue is the 1990 crop.T chose to ignore the notice he received on September 2, 1988, and planted all of the farm ground back to wheat in the fall of 1989.In doing so, T not only planted the summer fallow acres but continuously cropped the balance of the farm acres into wheat.At some point after the 1990 crop was planted, LL destroyed 100.7 acres of the wheat.

T took the position, and maintains that position on appeal, that the notice to terminate his lease was ineffective.He argues that, under K.S.A. 58-2506(c), a notice is required to fix the termination of an oral farm lease as March 1.T argues that the failure of the notice in this case to fix the termination date of the tenancy as March 1 rendered it a nullity.As a result, T argues that the lease was never terminated.

T also contends that he entered into a new oral lease with LL sometime after the 1989 harvest.The new agreement, T contends, permitted him to plant 100.7 acres of LL's ground to wheat and to harvest those acres in 1990.

The dispute between the parties over the possession of the ground led to the filing of this action by LL.LL's petition alleged that the lease was terminated August 1, 1989, and sought to eject T from the real estate and to recover $1,656 in damages.

T responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.This motion was based on T's argument that the notice to terminate was ineffective on its face and was insufficient to show that LL had terminated the tenancy.

After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the 1988 lease had been properly terminated by the notice on August 1, 1989.

In due time, T filed an answer to the petition and several counterclaims against LL.In his answer, T continued to claim that the notice given was ineffective to terminate the oral lease.The answer also alleged a new lease between the parties in 1989, giving T the right to plant 100.7 acres of wheat for harvest in 1990.The answer set up counterclaims for breach of a pasture lease, unjust enrichment, damages for destroying wheat, and other matters.

After the issues were finally identified, the case was set for jury trial.The trial court reiterated that it had already ruled on the termination of the 1988 lease and that this ruling was not subject to further debate.The case went to trial principally on the claim of T that a new oral lease was entered into between the parties in 1989.

The case was never submitted to the jury.Prior to T's resting his case but after he had testified, the trial court took the case from the jury and entered judgment in favor of LL.The court ruled that T was attempting to rely entirely on his 1988 lease, which the court determined had already been terminated.The court held that T had offered insufficient evidence to show that a new lease between the parties had been entered into in 1989.No damages were awarded to either party.

T appeals from these rulings.

WAS THE NOTICE EFFECTIVE TO TERMINATE

THE 1988 LEASE?

This case involves one issue of significant importance.That issue is whether the notice given was sufficient to terminate the farm tenancy.The answer to this question requires us to interpret and give meaning to K.S.A. 58-2506.While this may seem a simple task, it is far from that.Quite frankly, the efforts of the legislature to draft an equitable standard for the termination of farm tenancies in this state presents a confusing history.Over the years, judicial decisions perceived to be unfair to tenants have prompted legislation designed to blunt further application of those decisions.As a result, we now have a statute that requires the notice to fix the termination date as March 1 but construes that notice, under some circumstances, to terminate the tenancy on an entirely different date.

The factual situation presented in this case is the ultimate nightmare for those who draft statutes and those who must interpret them.The notice in this case does not fix the termination of the lease on the date mandated by statute.Instead, it fixes the termination date on the date the statute says shall be the construed date of termination.We search for a logical result to a rather illogical problem.We begin by conducting a historical review of the subject.

From at least 1923 to 1975, the statute governing the termination of oral farm tenancies was straightforward and subject to very little interpretation.G.S.1949, 67-506 stated: "In cases of tenants occupying and cultivating farms, the notice must fix the termination of the tenancy to take place on the first day of March: ...."

There was an exception, not applicable here, for tenants holding over under a prior written lease.For oral farm tenancies, however, the only relevant date was March 1.There were no exceptions, no references to other dates, and no consideration as to whether a crop had been planted or crop ground had been prepared for planting.A notice to terminate a farm tenancy had to terminate that tenancy on March 1, and it did terminate on that date regardless of the consequences.There was no construed date of termination.

Although the statute was simple and straightforward, it gave rise to some rather inequitable results.For example, in Fox v. Flick, 166 Kan. 533, 203 P.2d 186(1949), the landlord sent the tenant a notice on December 20, 1946, terminating the tenancy effective March 1, 1947.The tenant pointed out that, on the date he received the notice, he had already worked the ground and planted the fall wheat crop, which was growing on that very date.If the lease were to terminate on March 1, 1947, it would deprive the tenant of the crop he had planted and result in a windfall to the landlord.This argument was to no avail.The statute made no exception for harvesting growing crops, and the tenant was unceremoniously ousted as of March 1, 1947.The Kansas Supreme Court cited Bank v. Jesch, 99 Kan. 797, 163 P. 150(1917), and said: "The decision is a clear statement of the rule that even if a tenant is under the duty, by the terms of his lease, to sow a crop which does not mature until after his lease expires, he is not by that fact alone entitled to harvest the crop."166 Kan. at 540, 203 P.2d 186.This rather harsh statement was then put into practice.The tenant in Fox v. Flick was removed from possession of the real estate on March 1, 1947, and forfeited his interest in the wheat crop he had planted.

In 1975, the legislature rewrote the statute in an obvious effort to protect the rights of the tenant and eliminate results such as that of Fox v. Flick.The statute was then changed to read as follows (the emphasized language indicates the addition to the statute in 1975):

"In cases of tenants occupying and cultivating...