Mendenhall v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC09-400.,SC09-400.
• Citation: 48 So.3d 740
• Parties: Charles MENDENHALL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

48 So.3d 740

Charles MENDENHALL, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC09-400.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 28, 2010.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Meghan Ann Collins, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Mary G. Jolley, Wesley Heidt and Jeffrey R. Casey, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Mendenhall seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Mendenhall v. State, 999 So.2d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sousa v. State, 976 So.2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and the First District Court of Appeal in Wilson v. State, 898 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).¹

This case concerns section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2004)-commonly known as the "10-20-Life" statute-specifically section 775.087(2)(a)(3), which provides that defendants who discharge a firearm during the commission of certain enumerated crimes, including murder and attempted murder, and inflict death or great bodily harm as the result of the discharge shall be sentenced to a "minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." ² The issue before this Court is whether the mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life provide the trial judge with discretion to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory maximum for the crime contained in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2004).

For the reasons explained below, we hold that the specific provisions of the 10-20-Life statute with regard to mandatory minimums control over the general provisions of section 775.082 regarding statutory maximums. This reading of the statute avoids rendering part of the statute mere surplusage and effectuates the Legislature's intent to punish those offenders who possess or use firearms to the fullest extent of the law. Thus, we conclude that the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.

Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District's decision in Mendenhall v. State, 999 So.2d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the decisions of the Second District in Sousa v. State, 976 So.2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and the First District in Wilson v. State, 898 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We also disapprove the decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Collazo v. State, 966 So.2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007),Thurston v. State, 984 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), Leary v. State, 980 So.2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Johnson v. State, 17 So.3d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), to the extent that those decisions hold that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not vest discretion in the trial judge to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory maximum for the crime. ³

FACTS

Charles Mendenhall was charged with attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Mendenhall guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, a second-degree felony. § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat (2004). The jury also found that during the commission of the offense, Mendenhall was in possession of a firearm, discharged a firearm, and inflicted serious bodily injury.

On March 2, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and sentenced Mendenhall under Florida's 10-20-Life statute, imposing a sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment, with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum. Mendenhall then filed a motion to correct sentencing error, asserting, inter alia, that his sentence was illegal because under the plain language of the 10-20-Life statute, the maximum sentence he could receive was thirty years with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum. The trial court granted Mendenhall's motion in part, concluding that it was required to reduce Mendenhall's sentence to a term of thirty years' imprisonment, with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum.

A brief overview of the statutory scheme is helpful to provide context for the facts of this case. Because Mendenhall used a firearm during the commission of the offense, his conviction was reclassified from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is fifteen years, and the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony is thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). The 10-20-Life statute provides for mandatory minimum sentences for certain enumerated offenses, including attempted murder, where a defendant possesses a firearm (minimum term of imprisonment of either three years or ten years, depending on the offense), discharges a firearm (minimum term of imprisonment of twenty years), or discharges a firearm and as the result of the discharge, inflicted death or great bodily harm ("minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison"). § 775.087(2)(a)(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 775.082(3)(b)-which is not part of the 10-20-Life statute-provides that a person convicted of a first-degree felony must be punished by "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Mendenhall appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, asserting that "the jury did not make a finding that 'death or great bodily harm was inflicted on any person.' " Mendenhall, 999 So.2d at 666. The Fifth District rejected this argument because the jury's use of the term "seriousbodily injury" was synonymous with "great bodily harm." Id. at 667. That issue is not before the Court in this case.

The State cross-appealed the reduction of the sentence, contending that the original sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum was legal and, accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion to correct sentence. Id. The Fifth District agreed with the State, holding that its "review of cases which have similar facts to those presented here [led it] to conclude that the trial court's original sentence of 35 years' imprisonment, with a 35-year mandatory minimum, was legal." Id. at 667. The court outlined the pertinent parts of the 10-20-Life statute, emphasizing a portion of the first sentence of subsection (2)(c):

Pertinent parts of section 775.087 of the Florida Statutes provide as follows:

775.087. Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification; minimum sentence

....

(2)(a) 1. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for:

a. Murder;

....

3. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a "firearm" or "destructive device" as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.

....

(c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section.

Id. at 667-68 (quoting §§ 775.087(2)(a)(1), (3), 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004)).

In arriving at its conclusion that the original thirty-five-year sentence and mandatory minimum were legal, the Fifth District noted that this Court affirmed a defendant's life sentence under factual circumstances similar to those presented in the instant case in Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla.2006). Mendenhall, 999 So.2d at 668. The Fifth District then stated:

Importantly, upon review, our Supreme Court affirmed the Second District's opinion [in Sanders] regarding their analysis of the penalty for a lesser included offense and, in dicta, the Court made the following observation:

The maximum sentence for the core offense of attempted first-degree murder is thirty years, while the sentence for attempted second-degree murder without any enhancements is fifteenyears. However, with the application of the ten-twenty-life statute, the resulting maximum sentence for both attempted first- and second-degree murder while discharging a firearm and inflicting great bodily harm is the same-life.

Id. (quoting Sanders, 944 So.2d at 205).

Finally, the Fifth District found additional support in its earlier decision in Brown v. State, 983 So.2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), in which it had "recognized that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in excess of the maximum penalty was indeed permissible based upon special findings such as those found in this case." Mendenhall, 999 So.2d at 669. The Fifth District affirmed the judgment, but reversed the sentence and remanded for reimposition of the original sentence of...