Mendez-Soto v. Rodriguez
| Decision Date | 12 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 02-1608 (JAG). |
| Citation | 334 F.Supp.2d 62 |
| Parties | Pedro MENDEZ-SOTO, et al., Plaintiffs v. Hon. Anabelle RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, F.R. Gonzalez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Carlos Del-Valle-Cruz, Department of Justice Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Ivonne Palerm-Cruz, Commonwealth Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Pietrantoni Mendez & Alvarez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
On March 4, 2004, this Court dismissed plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for lack of jurisdiction under Article III of the United States Constitution. On March 15, 2004, Pedro Méndez-Soto and Alberto Medina-Velázquez (collectively "plaintiffs") filed a motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 38). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
Law No. 363 of September 2, 2000 ("Law 363") provided a one hundred percent (100%) salary increase for the technicians of the Property Registry of Puerto Rico, in recognition of the important public service that the technicians render and its effect on the island's economy. (See, Statement of Motives, Law 363.)
Plaintiffs Méndez-Soto and Medina-Velázquez are Property Registry technicians, who are also the principal officers of "Junta de Técnicos del Registro de la Propiedad, Inc." ("JTRP"). The "JTRP" is an association of public service employees that is comprised of over 300 Property Registry technicians from all over the island.
Plaintiffs were informed that the Governor's Office had filed an Administrative Proposal with the Legislature of Puerto Rico to abrogate the salary increase provided under Law 363. The Attorney General, co-defendant Anabelle Rodríguez, personally appeared and testified before the House of Representatives' Treasury Commission to present the Governor's official position opposing the salary increase provided by Law 363. Plaintiffs later appeared in front of the same Commission to present their position against the Administrative Proposal and in favor of the salary increase.
On Monday, June 25, 2001, about 300 Property Registry technicians went to the Puerto Rico legislature to lobby against the Administrative Proposal. After much debate, the Governor's Office Administrative Proposal was defeated in the Legislature and Law 363 remained in effect.
Plaintiffs assert that most of the 300 technicians that attended the legislature debates on June 25, 2001 requested a leave of absence for that day by presenting an OP-13 form. The OP-13 is the form customarily used by government employees to charge absences to vacation or compensatory time. Other technicians were treated by their physicians and requested a sick leave. That same Monday, co-defendant Delia Castillo de Colorado1 contacted all of the 29 Property Registries in Puerto Rico and requested from the supervisors a memorandum containing the names of all the technicians that were absent that day.
On July 5, 2001, co-defendant Anabelle Rodríguez sent a letter to all the technicians that were absent on the day in question, notifying them of the Department of Justice's decision to discount the absent day from their salaries and to sanction them with a three-day salary employment suspension. The letter informed the plaintiffs of their right to request an informal administrative hearing. Accordingly, 175 of the 195 technicians who received letters requested the informal hearing.
Co-defendant Anabelle Rodríguez appointed Sara Gregory Mora to preside over the hearings and to submit a report and recommendation on each of the technicians that requested the informal hearing. The evaluation reports were submitted, recommending the disciplinary action only in those cases where the employee was not able to present evidence that the absence was authorized. Eventually, the Department of Justice began to serve a number of technicians with disciplinary-sanction letters.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2003, co-defendant Anabelle Rodríguez sent a letter to the sanctioned technicians lifting the disciplinary measures imposed previously.
Plaintiffs dispute this court's previous determination that their claim was mooted by defendants' lifting of the sanctions once imposed on plaintiffs. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that: (1) defendants have not met their heavy burden to persuade the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur, (2) that in ruling against plaintiffs this court improperly shifted the heavy burden towards plaintiffs, and (3) inasmuch as the instant action seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief under U.S.C. § 1983, the denial of injunctive relief would not lead to a subsequent finding of mootness because of the request for damages resulting from an alleged constitutional violation. Each of these claims shall be separately discussed below.
Generally, a case becomes moot if "it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). A party can have no legally cognizable interest in the outcome of a case if the court is not capable of providing any relief which will redress the alleged injury. Gulf of Maine Fisherman's Alliance v. Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir.2002). As a result, First Circuit precedent supports the notion that the core question that Article III of the United States Constitution compels courts to ask is whether adjudication of an issue can grant meaningful relief. Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2004). Pronouncing judgment in the absence of any effective remedy would be to wander impermissibly into the realm of the advisory and the hypothetical. Oakville Development Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 986 F.2d 611, 615 (1st Cir.1993).
A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The Supreme Court has held that "a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Id. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693. The First Circuit has described the "reasonably expected to recur test" as an estimate of raw probabilities, such that if there is a high likelihood of recurrence, the case should not be mooted, but if the risk is very low, mootness ought to follow. Adams v. Bowater, Inc., 313 F.3d 611, 613 (1st Cir.2002).
Plaintiffs contend that the language employed in the Secretary of Justice's letter, which confirmed the voluntary cessation of the disputed conduct, defeats any claim by defendants to the extent that they have met their heavy burden of persuasion. Specifically, the letter states that plaintiffs' conduct clearly departs from the reasonable and just behavior that can be expected from a public servant who is conscious of his professional responsibilities and duties, and that the Secretary of Justice was not renouncing the authority given to her by the law to act in this situation or condoning or diminishing the graveness and impropriety of the conduct. In light of this letter, plaintiffs ask this court to reconsider its ruling because defendants, it is alleged, have not met their heavy burden of persuading this court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur, since defendants have not demonstrated any "change of heart".
This Court is of the opinion that defendants in this case have met the heavy burden of persuasion imposed when mootness is raised and the allegedly wrongful conduct has been voluntarily discontinued. A major factor in finding mootness in voluntary cessation cases is "whether there are aspects of the factual situation beyond the defendant's control that make recurrence of the challenged conduct unlikely". Cicchetti v. Lucey, 514 F.2d 362, 366 (1st Cir.1975). In Cicchetti, a person whose driver's license had been suspended without hearing because of his alleged failure to appear in response to a traffic summons brought action for a declaration that the statute under which such suspension was accomplished was unconstitutional. The court held that the case was rendered moot because Cicchetti had to be summoned to appear in court for violating a traffic regulation before he could default a summons, which meant that defendant could not unilaterally engage in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. Id. at 366. The case at hand is analogous to Cicchetti. Plaintiffs allege that they were penalized for exercising their First Amendment rights in the context of legislative debates regarding targeted salary increases. They specifically claim that because they attended those debates, thereby becoming absent from work and not presenting any excuses for it, they suffered temporary retaliatory measures. As in Cicchetti, the allegedly unlawful conduct in the present case was the result of a serendipitous chain of events that included legislative debates addressing concerns directly affecting the plaintiffs, having almost three-hundred technicians attend those debates and become absent from their workplace, and then, after informal hearings on the issue, the imposition of sanctions by a Cabinet-level supervisor. In short, the conditions were unique and are unlikely to recur. Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 632, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979).
A defendant's reluctance to concede that the conduct at issue,...
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