Mendez v. Baughman

• Decision Date: 04 April 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:14-cv-01715-DAD-MJS (HC)
• Parties: JUAN MANUEL MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. DAVID BAUGHMAN, Warden Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

JUAN MANUEL MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. DAVID BAUGHMAN, Warden Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01715-DAD-MJS (HC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

April 4, 2018

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIRTY (30) DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. David Baughman, Acting Warden of California State Prison, Sacramento, is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent is represented by Tami M. Krenzen of the Attorney General's Office for the State of California.

The petition raises the following claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's Wheeler/Batson motion; (2) the jury did not render an unequivocal verdict of guilt on Count 3; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner's request for release of juror identifying information; (4) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request instructions on conspiracy to be an accessory after the fact; (5) in light of the equivocal verdict on Count 3, the firearm enhancement must be stricken; (6) the trial court erred in failing to clarify the verdict or further instruct the jury; (7) Petitioner was improperly convicted of two counts of being an accessory; and (8) the gang enhancement must be stricken.¹ (ECF No. 1.)

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that the petition be granted

I. Procedural History

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced. He was initially convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and two counts of accessory after the fact, with gang and firearm enhancements. People v. Mendez, No. F063497, 2013 WL 4830803, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2013). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, enhanced by a term of 25 years to life due to the firearm allegation. Id. at *2.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence (Lodged Doc. 2) and, on September 10, 2013, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District reversed one of the accessory counts, vacated a gang enhancement, and otherwise affirmed the judgment (Lodged Doc. 1). Mendez, 2013 WL 4830803, at *23. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 5.) On November 26, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner did not file any state habeas petitions.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on October 8, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on May 1, 2015. (ECF No. 20.) Petitionerfiled a traverse on July 10, 2015. (ECF No. 24; see also ECF No. 27.) The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Fifth District Court of Appeal's September 10, 2013, opinion and are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

On the night of the shooting, DeAngelo and J.S. were sitting on a bench in an apartment complex near a basketball court. They were approached by three armed Hispanic males. Shots were fired, resulting in the death of DeAngelo. J.S. survived, despite being shot twice. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting the shooting was gang related, although neither DeAngelo nor J.S. was a gang member.

A witness, who went to high school with Mendez, identified Mendez as the driver of the vehicle that transported the shooters to and from the apartment complex. Mendez was arrested that night and gave the police a statement admitting his involvement in the shooting. We will summarize Mendez's statement, which was played for the jury, to explain his defense and the basis for his claimed inability to identify the shooters.

Mendez initially claimed he did not know why he was being interrogated and that he was at home asleep at the time of the shootings (10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.). He denied driving the vehicle used to transport the shooters that night. He denied being at the scene, even after being told a witness had identified him and the vehicle he was driving.

A search of Mendez's home resulted in the discovery of the guns used in the shooting being found under Mendez's bed. Mendez's story quickly changed. Mendez said he received a call asking if he could give the caller a ride. The caller, whom Mendez stated he did not know, said that Fire had told him to call Mendez for a ride. Mendez knew Fire from a high school he attended for a short while.

Mendez picked up Fire, the caller, and a third man near a store. Fire first stated the three were going to a party, but then asked Mendez to stop at the apartment complex. When the three men exited the vehicle, they used their shirts to cover their faces, except for their eyes. Mendez waited about 10 minutes. He heard approximately five gunshots and thenthe three men came running out of the complex. They told Mendez to "just go, just go." Mendez drove to a park. The three men said there were two Black guys at the apartment complex. An argument started and shots were fired. The three men told Mendez to hide the guns—two pistols and a shotgun. Mendez claimed he did not know any of the three men except for Fire.

Mendez dropped off the three at the same store at which he had picked them up and then dropped off the guns at his house. After Mendez got home, a different friend called for a ride. Mendez did not want to take the truck because it had been used in the shooting, so he took his brother's car.

The prosecution contended Mendez was guilty as an aider and abettor to the murder of DeAngelo and the attempted murder of J.S., and that Mendez conspired with the shooters to commit the crime. Mendez argued he was merely giving a friend a ride and did not know the three men were going to shoot anyone that night. He acknowledged that his actions after the shooting would make him guilty of being an accessory after the fact, in violation of section 32, but asserted he was not guilty of the three charged crimes.

Mendez, 2013 WL 4830803, at *1-2.

III. Jurisdiction and Venue

Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner under a judgment of a state court if the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered a violation of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the action and that venue is proper.

IV. Applicable Law

The petition was filed after April 24, 1996 and is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, federalhabeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A. Standard of Review

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The "clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a 'principle' or 'general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle (or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003).

A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A statecourt's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme Court]." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009).

B. Requirement of Prejudicial Error

In general, habeas relief may only be granted if the constitutional error complained of was prejudicial. That is, it must have had "a substantial and...