Mendez v. Cal. Forensic Med. Grp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-cv-03756-NJV |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | INES MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA FORENSIC MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Before the court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 24 & 27) and Plaintiff's Responses (Docs. 41 & 42). For the reasons that follow, the motions are granted as to the federal claims contained in Counts I and II, and the state law claims contained in Count I are dismissed.
Defendants removed this action from the Superior Court County of Humboldt on August 19, 2014. All parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 8, 12, &14). Due to some confusion, the parties filed separate Case Management Statements. See Defs.' Statement (Doc. 18); Order to Show Cause (Doc. 17); Pl.'s Statement (Doc. 18). An initial Case Management Conference was held on November 18, 2014, wherein the parties agreed to engage in limited discovery in order to determine whether Plaintiff's claims were properly filed against these Defendants. A second Case Management Conference was held on January 13, 2015, and a Case Management Order was entered setting a jury trial for November 16, 2015, with a non-expert discovery cutoff of June 11, 2015, and a dispositive motions hearing set for August 11, 2015. See Order (Doc. 23).
On June 24, 2015, Defendant California Forensic Medical Group ("CFMG") filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 24). On July 8, 2015, Defendants Humboldt County Correctional Facility ("HCCF") and Humboldt County Sheriff's Department filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 27). On July 28, 2015, after Plaintiff had failed to timely file any responses in opposition to the Motions, the court canceled the hearing set for August 11, 2015 and pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), took the Motions under submission. See Order (Doc. 28).
On August 4, 2015, the court issued an order which stated that:
Order (Doc. 29). On the morning of August 11, 2015, Plaintiff's Counsel filed two responses to the Motions for Summary Judgment. Counsel then appeared at 11:00 a.m. for the 10:00 a.m. hearing and: 1) admitted that he was not eligible to practice law within the state of California; and 2) admitted that he had not served Plaintiff with a copy of the court's previous order. Following the hearing, the court issued an order stating that: "The situation now is that Plaintiff does not have a lawyer representing him in this matter and may not even know it." Order of Aug. 8, 2015 (Doc. 32). The court also struck the Responses filed by Plaintiff's Counsel as they were filed in violation of Local Rule 11 (), and vacated the trial date. Id. The court set the matter for another hearing on August 25, 2015, in an attempt to notify Plaintiff of the events in the case. To that end, the court sent copies of its orders to Plaintiff's two last known addresses. On August 25, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. the court called the matter and noted for the record that neither Plaintiff, not his counsel had appeared for the hearing. At 10:12 a.m., after learning that Plaintiff's Counsel had arrived at the courthouse,the court recalled the matter. Plaintiff's Counsel informed the court that he had been reinstated to the State Bar of California, but he did not know why his client was not present for the hearing. The court informed Counsel that he would have to be reinstated with the District in order to continue in this case and reset the matter for a Show Cause hearing for September 22, 2015, for Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and for disobeying the orders of the court. The court was intent on making sure that Plaintiff was aware of the fact that his attorney had been, for a period of time, ineligible to practice law and had missed the responsive pleading deadlines and to determine how and if Plaintiff intended to proceed. On September 22, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before the court and confirmed that he intended to prosecute this action and that he wished for Counsel to remain on the case. Accordingly, the court discharged the Show Cause Order and allowed Counsel to re-file the Responses.
The Court has carefully considered all exhibits submitted in support of the pleadings, and the statements of facts contained within the Motions for Summary Judgment and the Responses.1 The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:
Plaintiff was injured on or about February 17, 2013, while working as a Sheriff's Work Alternative Program laborer. Plaintiff was assigned to work with a log splitter. Plaintiff's left index finger became lodged in a crack in the log and was crushed by the machinery.
On February 24, 2013, Plaintiff was arrested by the Eureka City police Department and housed in the HCCF. CFMG contracts with the HCCF to provide medical care within their facilities. CFMG provided Plaintiff with medical care during the time he was incarcerated. On March 12 and 26 of 2013, the first segment of Plaintiff's finger was amputated at St. Joseph'sHospital in Eureka, California, due to infection.
Plaintiff successfully filed a complaint for workers' compensation and was awarded the payment of his medical bills, disability payments, and a cash settlement.
A court "shall" grant summary judgment when the pleadings, discovery, and evidence show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the action, and a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party bears both the initial burden of production as well as the ultimate burden of persuasion to demonstrate that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party is required "to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Courts considering summary judgment motions are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is inappropriate. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
Prior to the discussion of Defendants' Motions the court must perform some legal "housekeeping." With regard to the parties, neither the HCCF, nor the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office is a proper party in this case. "Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under [§ 1983], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as the police departments, are not generally considered 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983." Cooke v. Liles, No. C 12-1844 SBA, 2013 WL 1196990, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013) (citing Hervey v.Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the court construes Plaintiff's claims as being against the County of Humboldt ("the County").
As to Plaintiff's claims, Counts I and II of the Complaint are very similar in that they both allege that Defendants had a duty to provide Plaintiff adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Count I asserts that Defendants' actions deprived Plaintiff of his liberty and property in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count II, while titled "Second Cause of Action Based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983," asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which resulted in the deprivation of rights protected under the United States Constitution. Because § 1983 "is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials," Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002), and because the duty to provide medical care means the "right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to [a detainees] serious medical needs," Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996), the court reviews these two Counts together and construes them as arising under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and brought pursuant to § 1983. Count III is simply a request for injunctive relief. "[A] request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action." Edejer v. DHI Mortgage Co., No. C 09-1302 PJH, 2009 WL 1684714, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June...
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